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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the impact of immigration on party politics in Northern Ireland 
between 2004 and 2014. It maps out key areas of consensus and conflict between 
the major political parties during a period of changing cultural demography. In order 
to do this, an in-depth, thematic analysis is carried out on party narratives that relate 
to immigration, cultural accommodation and racism during the period studied. The 
data is derived from original interviews, contributions to assembly debates and a 
range of other qualitative sources. The thesis highlights a tendency for issues related 
to immigration to become ‘swords and shields’ in the arena of inter-party conflict.  
 
It will be shown that ethnically defined parties utilise immigration in order to bolster 
long-standing ideological narratives related to historic divisions in the territory. It is 
argued that this process undermines the possibility for political leadership in offering 
cultural accommodation for new minorities, and joined-up action in tackling racism. 
It is suggested that this evidence highlights the need for some degree of explicit 
political separation between matters that pertain to immigration-generated diversity, 
and issues related to bi-national accommodation in the territory.  
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Chapter One: Introducing the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
What are the effects of immigration on ideological positioning in an ethnically defined 
party system? In a setting where cultural difference, ethnic segregation and 
discrimination define the major political battle grounds, will immigration serve to 
undermine traditional ideological cleavages that divide the parties? Or, will it become 
enmeshed within processes of inter-party conflict? These are the central questions 
that underpin this piece of research. In order to provide answers, the thesis employs 
a case study that considers inter-party positioning in Northern Ireland during a period 
of changing migratory patterns between 2004 and 2014. Its principal focus is upon a 
qualitative study of the language used by political parties in relation to immigration, 
the accommodation of cultural pluralism, and the narratives on racism/anti-racism 
that have marked inter-party debate in the territory during this period.  
 
The thesis makes a unique contribution knowledge by detailing the process by which 
political issues related to immigration generated diversity become absorbed within 
existing ideological positioning strategies in the context of an ethnically divided party 
system. It is shown that immigration issues become utilised as swords and shields in 
the prosecution of inter-party conflict. This is demonstrated through an in-depth 
qualitative study of inter-party debates in Northern Ireland during a period of 
increasing immigration. The research highlights the manner in which the parties 
adopt new issues within their wider ideological positioning strategies. The processes 
captured by this approach are of particular relevance to academic debate on the 
politics of immigration in sub-state settings and also for scholars of party politics in 
Northern Ireland. The thesis builds on the findings of existing scholars such as Gilligan 
et al. (2011), who have considered the effects of immigration on Northern Irish 
politics using quantitative research techniques, and Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero 
(2014) who have studied the dynamics of immigration politics at sub-state level 
across a range of case studies. This thesis carries out a new case study into the 
specific situation in Northern Ireland using a novel methodological approach to this 
area of study. The thesis differs from these existing studies due to the depth of 
linguistic nuance that it captures and the manner in which it exhibits the competitive 
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dynamics of immigration politics as they have emerged in this particular sub-state 
context.  
 
There is a significant pool of literature that considers the effects of immigration upon 
the ideological positioning of political parties operating within the traditional left/right 
axis of party competition (Bale, 2003; 2008; Green-Pederson, 2007; Dennison & 
Goodwin, 2015; Mudde, 2012: Odmalm, 2014). Also, there are small pools of 
emerging research into the effects of immigration on sub-state, regional party 
systems, some of which bear the hallmarks of historic ethnic division (Hepburn 2009; 
2011, Hepburn and Zapata-Barrerro, 2014). Finally, there is a small pool of literature 
that explicitly focusses upon the political ramifications of increasing diversity in 
Northern Ireland (McGarry et al. 2008; Gilligan et al. 2011). The thesis adds to this 
body of research through contributing a richly detailed account of how parties in 
Northern Ireland have approached a number of key issues associated with 
immigration and changing cultural demography. We are principally interested in 
studying the manner in which increasing immigration impacts upon three areas of 
inter-party debate: 
 
1) Expansive and restrictive approaches to immigration 
2) The politics of cultural accommodation 
3) Responses to racism and anti-racism 
These areas of enquiry will combine to provide us with a picture of how immigration 
has impacted upon processes of inter-party positioning in Northern Ireland during 
the timeframe of the case study. Through carrying out a qualitative study into the 
competitive dynamics of inter-party debate in these areas, the thesis will contribute 
to the emerging pool of research upon immigration into sub-state territories 
(Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Jeram et al. 2015). Additionally, the study will 
collate data that is useful to scholars studying party politics in Northern Ireland more 
generally, as it explores elements of competition beyond those shaped by years of 
conflict and the consociational system constructed as part of the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998. The empirical body that has been compiled here provides an 
important snapshot of debates on diversity and identity as they have emerged during 
a period of changing cultural demography in the territory.  
12 
  
 
The overarching argument that arises from this investigative process is that parties 
operating in an ethnically defined political framework, will utilise immigration issues 
in order to support established ideological positioning strategies. In this sense, 
migrants become swords and shields in the prosecution of inter-party conflict. This is 
highlighted in the thesis through a detailed dissection of ideological positioning in 
relation to immigration, cultural accommodation and racism between 2004 and 2014. 
This introductory chapter will proceed by providing a brief outline of the more 
substantive chapters that comprise the thesis. The first of these chapters reviews a 
wide body of academic literature including theoretical work on the accommodation of 
cultural pluralism, controversies related to immigration policies, and texts that 
consider the positioning processes of political parties.    
1.2 Thesis Outline    
Chapter two considers a selection of important literature that will serve to underpin 
the processes of research discussed later in the thesis. It provides a critical overview 
of key academic controversies in order to highlight the strengths and limitations of 
the current body of research. By engaging with important aspects of academic 
discussion on cultural pluralism, immigration and political parties, the chapter will 
provide a firm conceptual foundation for our enquiry into how such debates have 
been operationalised in the specific context of Northern Ireland between 2004 and 
2014. 
 
This evaluation of literature proceeds in three broad stages. Firstly, the chapter 
outlines some of the key theories related to the accommodation of cultural pluralism. 
Assimilation is characterised as an active attempt to forge cultural homogeneity in 
diverse societies. It will be argued that this approach is flawed due its capacity to 
justify illiberal measures in the pursuit of societal solidarity (Glazer, 1997; Alba & 
Nee, 1997). Secondly, the section considers the concept of difference-blind liberalism 
as a means to accommodate cultural pluralism. It is suggested that whilst the idea 
of cultural neutrality is normatively appealing, it is impossible to achieve due to the 
organic forms of racial, ethnic and religious intolerance that so often emerge in 
response to diversity (Marshall, 1963; Rawls, 1999). Thirdly, the section considers 
multiculturalism as a means to accommodate cultural pluralism. It will be argued that 
multiculturalism represents a pragmatic and sensitive approach to the 
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accommodation of cultural pluralism in diverse societies (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 
2006, Modood, 2007). Finally, the section turns to highlight the intricacies of scholarly 
debate between interculturalist and multiculturalist theorists. It will be suggested 
that despite elements of disparity between these two schools of thought that they 
are subtly distinct and somewhat complementary. 
 
With these overarching conceptual approaches to the accommodation of difference 
discussed, the chapter moves on to consider key areas of academic debate associated 
with immigration policy. This will be articulated through engagement with expansive 
and restrictive approaches to immigration policies and the drivers of these conflicting 
positions. The section suggests that the primary fault-lines of these controversies are 
based upon the distinction between public opinion and elite policy-making (Freeman, 
2002), the economic benefits and risks associated with immigration (Daneygier & 
Donnelly, 2012), and the potential for migrants to impact negatively upon social 
solidarity (Miller, 2000; Joppke, 2007). The purpose of this section is to outline the 
key fault-lines in immigration politics so that we may explore the manifestations of 
these positions in inter-party debate in Northern Ireland during the period of our case 
study.  
 
The final part of the literature review begins by considering existing research into the 
effects of immigration on political parties. Most of this literature focusses upon state-
wide party systems that are principally defined by a left/right axis of party 
competition. It will be shown that there is a reasonable body of literature that 
considers such cases; though it tends to be dominated by investigations into the 
effects of radical-right-wing parties (Bale, 2003; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Van Spange 
2010; Mudde, 2012). With this established, the chapter considers the small number 
of texts that explicitly engage with the effects of immigration in sub-state party 
systems marked by strong ethnic cleavages (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Adam 
& Deschouwer, 2015; Jeram et al., 2016). It is illustrated here that there is a small 
body of research emerging that considers how immigration affects politics in such 
settings through examining some of the more relevant case studies in these areas. 
It will be argued that further work is required in delving into the competitive dynamics 
of party politics on diversity and immigration, in ethnically divided societies, if we are 
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to proceed to a point where it is possible to extract generalisable theories in these 
areas. With this established, three central questions are posed that relate specifically 
to the case study used in this thesis: 
 
 What can Northern Ireland tell us about the manner in which immigration 
debates impact on ideological positioning in an ethnically defined party 
system? 
 
 What impact has immigration had upon cultural politics in the ethnically 
defined party system in Northern Ireland? 
 
 
 Has immigration-generated diversity had a significant impact on inter-party 
debates related to racism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland? 
 
Chapter three outlines some of the methodological choices employed in order to find 
answers to these questions. The chapter begins by outlining the motivations behind 
selecting Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014 as a case study in order to 
consider the relationship between ethnically defined political parties and issues 
related to immigration. It will be shown that Northern Ireland represents an example 
of an ethnically defined, sub-state party system and that during the period of our 
study, immigration was leading to distinctive changes in the cultural demography of 
the territory (Gilligan et al., 2011). Furthermore, justification is provided for adopting 
a qualitative approach in order to establish the dynamics of inter-party positioning 
on these issues. It will be argued that due to the key role played by language in 
demarcating the ideological positioning between political parties it is necessary to use 
a detailed study of the discursive trends that emerge in the narratives of party 
representatives (Downs, 1957; Petrocik, 1996; Finlayson, 2012).  
 
The particular merits and the potential drawbacks of carrying out a thematic analysis 
will be discussed in this section in order to offer clarification of why certain 
methodological choices were made to proceed with this investigation (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Finally, there is a review of some of the primary challenges that arose during 
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the research process and the actions that were taken in order to overcome them. 
This includes sections on elite interviewing and an overview of the coding and 
thematising procedures that provide the key findings in the latter part of the thesis 
(McEvoy, 2006; Kin, 2011). 
 
Chapter four outlines in a more detailed fashion the particularities of the Northern 
Irish case study. This begins by considering some of the key sources of division in 
Northern Irish society. These include: conflicting claims to national self-
determination; the role of religion in demarcating the primary communities; and the 
manner in which cultural issues have become central fault-lines in the communal 
division (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995, Coakley, 2007, McGlynn et al 2014). The thesis 
recognises that through focussing upon these particular societal fissures it falls into 
the trap of discussing Northern Irish society using a binary discursive framework in 
places (Rolston, 1998; Little, 2003; Finlayson, 2007). It is understood that this does 
not capture the true width of complexities that mark diversity in Northern Irish 
society. However, it is necessary in this instance to utilise the ‘two traditions’ 
paradigm in order to highlight the salience of communal division in underpinning 
party politics in the territory.  
 
With some of the key dimensions of societal segregation established, greater detail 
is provided upon the form and content of inter-party positioning in the devolved party 
system. This outlines the presence of a dual party system and the existence of a non-
aligned, cross-communal party (Tilley et al. 2008). The chapter also considers the 
importance of the consociational institutional structure within which party 
competition takes place. This serves to illustrate theoretical debates upon the efficacy 
of consociationalism for managing ethnic tensions, and also, to highlight recent 
trends in the party politics of Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a; 2006b; 
Wilford, 2009). The final section discusses the impact immigration has had upon 
cultural diversity in the province during the period of our case study. This provides 
an audit of the extent of immigration into Northern Ireland and then considers three 
key pools of existing research related to these developments. This includes work on 
attitudes towards immigration (Gilligan et al. 2011), changes in linguistic diversity 
(McMonagle, 2009), and racism/sectarianism in the territory (Geoghegan, 2010; 
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McVeigh, 2014; Gilligan, 2017). With these areas covered, the foundation is laid for 
our in-depth study of party positioning in relation to these three key areas. 
 
Chapters five, six and seven highlight the detailed findings that have emerged from 
our qualitative study into the competitive dynamics of party positioning on 
immigration, cultural accommodation and racism. Each of them utilises the discursive 
themes that emerge from studying interview data, party documents and 
contributions to Assembly debates made by the major parties during the period of 
our case study. Key areas of conflict and consensus between the parties are teased 
out using illustrative examples that enable us to characterise the positioning 
strategies employed by the major political groupings in relation to the concepts under 
consideration.  
 
Chapter five highlights key fault-lines that emerge in relation to immigration. It will 
be suggested that there are broad areas of crossover between nationalist and non-
aligned party representatives; though the motivational drivers behind these 
narratives emerge from different strategic calculations. Furthermore, it is shown here 
that that there is evidence of a schism within political unionism that crosses both of 
the unionist parties. Unionists are characterised as being internally split between a 
cautious endorsement of immigration and demands for further restrictions to be 
placed upon inward migration. It will be suggested that this is most likely to stem 
from underlying civic and ethnic fissures within political unionism. 
 
Chapter six considers what impact immigration has had upon political debates related 
to the accommodation of cultural pluralism in Northern Ireland. It is contended that 
there is evidence of a distinction between the larger and smaller parties in their 
assessment of how immigration has changed diversity in the territory. Smaller parties 
tend to discuss such issues with reference to a changed cultural context brought 
about by the impact of immigration. The larger parties focus more upon their 
perceptions of the work ethic of migrant communities, ignoring the changing nature 
of cultural pluralism in the territory. It will be argued that this ties in with strategic 
calculations stemming from the fact that larger parties have prospered through 
utilising ‘parity of esteem’ as means to mobilise support. Furthermore, it is suggested 
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that this approach mirrors their stances on traditions of cultural celebration and 
performative ritual in the Northern Irish context. Finally, we will see that the smaller 
parties differ markedly from the two tribunes, due to a shared interest in seeing 
issues related to the ‘two traditions’ diminish in political salience.  
 
This contrast is particularly interesting when considered in light of policy frameworks 
for the management of diversity in Northern Ireland which are marked to some extent 
by the language of multiculturalism and interculturalism. Despite the fact that the 
later  frameworks were been driven by the OFMDFM, there is a distinct disparity 
between the semantic content of these policy documents and the narratives adopted 
by the two largest parties. The chapter utilises the issue of language diversity in order 
to illustrate the dominance of debates related to internal minority languages, at the 
expense of linguistic protections for immigrant groups. It will be shown that cultural 
politics is marked by the powerful pull of ethnic outbidding strategies and that only 
the non-aligned APNI construct arguments that relate to the totality of linguistic 
diversity in the territory.  
 
Chapter seven illustrates the nature of inter-party debates over racism in the context 
of an increasingly diverse society. It will be suggested that there is clear evidence 
here of the manner in which issues related to immigration become resources for the 
prosecution of inter-party conflict. The key manifestation of this dynamic is located 
in Sinn Fein’s attempts to utilise racism to support arguments that relate to their 
characterisation of the Northern Irish sub-state as inherently discriminatory. It will 
be suggested that this has the effect of pushing unionists to adopt defensive positions 
on racism that prevent the possibility for cross-party unity in tackling this problematic 
social issue. Finally, the chapter will highlight a counter-narrative of frustration that 
emanates from the smaller parties due to the lack of progress made by the OFMDFM 
in tackling racism during the period of our study. The overarching argument that 
emerges from these chapters is that immigration issues, in the context of an 
ethnically defined party system, tend to become absorbed by long-standing 
trajectories of inter-party positioning.  
 
18 
  
 
Chapter eight brings the thesis to a conclusion through explicitly relating the findings 
chapters to our original research questions. Highlighting the relevance of the research 
for existing academic debates on immigration at sub-state-level, the politics of 
cultural accommodation, and racism in the Northern Irish context. It will be argued 
that due to the tendency for political debate over issues related to traditional 
communal fissures to absorb matters related to immigration-generated diversity, 
there is a need for a degree of separation between these areas of discussion. Finally, 
the chapter will consider a number areas of continuity and change in the Northern 
Irish context that are likely to underpin further research into these matters in the 
future. The next chapter will now turn to outline some of the key foundational 
controversies that will underpin the wider thesis in order to establish a firm theoretical 
base from which to proceed in the investigation. 
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Chapter Two: The Politics of Immigration and 
Diversity 
2.1 Introduction 
Immigration and diversity management have become central features of political 
debate in the majority of Western states during the last three decades. This has 
become particularly evident as globalisation has impacted upon nation-states since 
the 1990s (Cangiano, 2016). This period has witnessed significant shifts in the 
movements of people across national borders with profound impacts on diversity in 
receiving states (Joppke, 2007). In political terms, the effects of these changes have 
become most obvious in debates over the control of territorial borders and the 
accommodation of cultural diversity in host states. In the context of our case study 
in Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014, we are most interested in examining 
the effects of immigration-generated diversity on ideological positioning in an 
ethnically defined party system. Consequently, this chapter will begin by discussing 
theoretical literature on the accommodation of cultural pluralism in ethnically diverse 
societies and move on to outline political controversies associated with immigration 
policies. Collectively, these areas combine to provide the theoretical foundations of 
the wider study. The later chapters will draw upon these insights in order to guide 
our enquiry into the specific forms such debates have taken in Northern Ireland 
during the period studied. 
 
The first section of the chapter begins by outlining the fact that many societies are 
marked by multiple-strains of diversity. These differing diversities manifest 
themselves in a number of ways. Firstly, there are the type of deep-rooted, multi-
national differences that we see in Northern Ireland (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). 
Secondly, there are longer standing migrant communities who have settled in the 
host-state such as the Commonwealth migrant communities in the United Kingdom 
(Modood, 2007). Finally, there are short term immigrants who have chosen to work 
abroad on a transient basis, but may seek to settle in the receiving state (Dustmann 
& Weiss, 2007). Asylum-seekers represent a further distinctive strand in debates 
around immigration, though for our purposes in this thesis we will be focussing upon 
voluntary migration (Hein, 1993). 
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The most important argument that emerges in this section is that each of these forms 
of diversity comes with its own distinctive issues. It will be argued that due to these 
differences, internal diversity of the multi-national variety should be understood as a 
separate entity to the type of cultural pluralism that arises as a result of immigration. 
Furthermore, that measures taken to accommodate difference should be tailored to 
the needs of the minority groups rather than an overarching, singular approach. 
When we turn to consider the party politics of immigration in Northern Ireland as it 
has evolved during the timeframe of our investigation, it will become clear that the 
needs of immigrant communities are distinctive from those of the primary ethnic 
groups; though in the arena of inter-party conflict they tend to become intertwined. 
It will be shown that equating these varieties of cultural pluralism too closely serves 
to swamp external minorities within the overwhelming priorities of bi-national 
accommodation. 
 
The section will then provide a brief overview of assimilatory and difference-blind, 
approaches to the accommodation of ethnic diversity, before offering a detailed 
examination of debates between multiculturalist and interculturalist scholars. It will 
be argued that while assimilation and difference-blind liberalism are normatively 
appealing, they are not suited to the realities of dealing with group-based inequalities 
in diverse societies. It will be suggested that multiculturalism and interculturalism 
are more relevant to this study as each of these approaches has impacted upon 
policies aimed at accommodating difference in the Northern Irish context during the 
period studied. 
 
The next section of the chapter turns to consider more practical debates about the 
type of immigration policies that should be adopted by receiving states. This 
incorporates sub-debates about the economic effects of immigration and the extent 
to which migration impacts upon the social solidarity needed to support welfare 
systems in receiving states (Banting, 2005; Joppke, 2007; Miller, 2000). The section 
will outline some of the primary contributions to these academic debates in order to 
support our study of immigration politics in the context of an increasingly diverse 
Northern Ireland. Firstly, we will address the central question of expansive or 
restrictive approaches to immigration and the perceived division between elite 
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decision-making and public opinion (Freeman, 1995; Statham & Geddes, 2006). 
Secondly, the section will discuss debates related to the economic drivers of 
immigration and the effects of migration upon advanced industrial economies 
(Dustman et al. 2005; Mayda, 2005). Thirdly, we will consider research into the 
relationship between solidarity and diversity through a discussion of migration and 
welfare systems in host states (Miller, 2000; Banting, 2005).  
 
It will be argued that these debates provide the substance of contemporary 
immigration politics, but that they make little reference to the influential role of 
political parties in shaping such debates. The review of qualitative findings that 
emerge from our case study later in the thesis will highlight the manner in which 
these types of argument have become employed as discursive themes in inter-party 
positioning in Northern Ireland. 
 
With the key facets of these controversies discussed, the chapter then considers the 
pool of literature that does place an explicit focus upon the party politics of 
immigration and diversity. It will be shown that the majority of such literature 
focusses upon state-level party systems defined by a left/right ideological cleavage. 
We will consider the argument that immigration creates new fissures in such systems, 
crossing traditional ideological fault-lines and complicating trajectories of party 
competition (Odmalm, 2012; 2014). The section will then highlight the relatively 
limited body of research that considers the effects of immigration upon ideological 
positioning in sub-state party systems. This is particularly important for our study of 
Northern Irish party politics due to the fact that many devolved systems emerge in 
response to demands for self-governance made by sub-state, national minorities 
(Bogdanor, 1999). 
 
We will turn at this point to consider the key findings of a small body of research that 
engages with the relationship between sub-state parties and immigration (Hepburn 
and Zapata-Barrero 2014; Jeram et al. 2016). An overview of some of the more 
pertinent studies into the party politics of immigration in the context of sub-state 
polities will be discussed. In particular, work on Scotland and Belgium will be 
highlighted in order to outline what will be added to this body of research through an 
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in-depth, qualitative study into party political narratives on immigration and pluralism 
as they developed in Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014 (Hepburn & Rosie, 
2014; Dandoy, 2014).  
 
The broad argument that will unfold throughout this review of academic literature 
will be that, although a significant body of theoretical texts serve to elucidate the 
core fissures in contemporary immigration and diversity politics, they fail to offer in-
depth accounts of how such debates find manifestation in the cut and thrust of inter-
party debate. Furthermore, they do not highlight the manner in which strategic 
calculations and ideological positioning processes serve to influence the party 
narratives associated with such issues. Finally, it will be suggested that in most cases, 
investigations into the party politics of immigration lack sufficient depth of qualitative 
enquiry to capture the true complexities of these debates as they emerge in the form 
of competitive ideological positioning. It is in this area that this thesis will make its 
primary contribution to knowledge through adopting a novel approach to the study 
of inter-party positioning on immigration and diversity in the context of the ethnically 
defined party system in Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014. 
2.2 The Accommodation of Cultural Pluralism 
Sub-state nationalism and immigration have tended to be dealt with separately in 
academic literature with very limited overlap between the two (Gilligan & Ball, 2011). 
Both examine the relationships between cultural groups to some extent, though there 
are good reasons why the two areas seldom crossover in the field of academic 
research. Multi-national societies often emerge as a result of historic immigration, 
most commonly rooted in colonial conquests that have marginalised indigenous 
groups and established long-standing settler communities (Winter, 2014). This is 
distinctive from the modern variety of immigration that has tended to see smaller 
scale movements of people from a number of different places settling in host states 
in order to pursue employment opportunities (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2014).  
 
Northern Ireland, during the period of our case study, highlights the importance of 
recognising the difference between the multinational diversity that is rooted in 
historical conflict dating back to the plantation settlers of the 16th and 17th centuries, 
and the more recent arrival of smaller, diffuse groups of economic migrants from a 
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number of geographic locations (Gilligan et al. 2011). Furthermore, our case study 
illustrates the need for a particularly sensitive approach to the accommodation of 
immigrants in the context of an ethnically divided society. The following section will 
discuss some of the key theoretical approaches that have been advocated for the 
accommodation of diversity in such settings and highlight some of their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 
This section will begin by outlining the idea of cultural assimilation often referred to 
in common terminology as the ‘melting pot’. This theory proposes active measures 
to be taken in order to reduce the divisive aspects of diversity (Park, 1914; Park & 
Burgess, 1921; Gordon, 1964; Glazer, 1993). With this position established, the 
section will consider the idea of liberal neutrality as an approach to the management 
of cultural pluralism (Marshall, 1963; Rawls, 1999). Thirdly, it will outline the concept 
of multiculturalism as an ideational framework for the accommodation of different 
racial, ethnic and religious groups present within contemporary, diverse societies 
(Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2006; Modood, 2007). Finally, the section will review the 
concept of interculturalism through an examination of its critical engagement with 
multiculturalism. It will be shown that interculturalists claim to have adopted a 
superior approach based on principles of dialogue and interaction. However, it will 
also be noted that multiculturalists have mounted defensive counter-arguments 
claiming that criticisms of their theory are unfounded. Ultimately, this section will 
conclude that interculturalism should be seen as a distinctive framework though one 
which draws heavily on certain multicultural ideas whilst explicitly eschewing others. 
(Wood et al, 2006; Bouchard, 2011; Modood & Meer, 2012a; 2012b). 
 
The basic contours of each of these conceptual approaches will be mapped out using 
relevant contributions to academic literature. It will be suggested that while 
assimilation and liberal neutrality seem normatively appealing, they fail to take 
account of the realities of group-based inequality. As these arguments proceed it will 
be noted that theorists contributing to such debates do not tend to discuss the role 
that political parties play in shaping the style and substance of approaches to cultural 
accommodation in democratic societies. It will be shown that such texts primarily 
focus on the relationship between citizens, cultural groups and the state, largely 
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ignoring the intermediary role played by political parties. Further, it is suggested that 
this gap serves to highlight the need for further qualitative research into inter-party 
positioning around these issues if we are to gain deeper understanding of the politics 
of cultural pluralism in societies marked by multiple diversities. The first section will 
now turn to examine the central tenets of assimilation theory. 
2.2.1 Assimilation Theory 
Advocates of assimilative approaches to the management of diversity argue that 
processes of intergenerational contact between different racial, ethnic and religious 
groups present in a given society will see cultural differences gradually diminish 
until diversity no longer holds social and political salience. This concept first came 
to prominence in countries such as the United States of America, Canada and 
Australia. Each of these territories had witnessed indigenous peoples becoming 
marginalised due to the influence of European colonisation. Each had become 
dominated by an English speaking, white, Anglo-Saxon majority. Furthermore, all of 
these countries witnessed further waves of subsequent immigration throughout the 
twentieth century (Kymlicka, 1995). All of these states were consequently marked 
by multiple strains of diversity. In the Northern Irish case the issue of colonialism 
has clear implications in the competing histories of the territory presented by the 
primary communities (Miller, 2014). The experience of subsequent waves of 
immigration is a relatively new addition to the cultural mix in the territory (Gilligan 
et al. 2011). 
These similarities in historical context in Australia, New Zealand and North America 
lent themselves to a degree of convergence on how best to manage forms of cultural 
difference within a common civic framework. Often, this approach revolved around 
measures taken to actively anglicise members of minority cultures in order that they 
may fit more neatly into the cultural mainstream. Whilst assimilation was generally 
expressed in terms of helping minorities integrate in to the society, in practice it often 
involved illiberal measures, such as the banning of minority languages or certain 
forms of religious observance (Parekh, 2006). In the Irish context, debates relating 
to assimilatory pressures have tended to revolve around the erosion of 
multilingualism on the island (O’Reilly, 1999). 
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The concept of assimilation found its clearest expression in academic literature 
written in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century (see Park, 
1914; Park & Burgess, 1921; Duncan 1933). In order to highlight some of the central 
features of assimilation theory, it becomes necessary to examine some of the key 
pieces of literature associated with this canon. Some of the earliest examples of 
assimilation theory are located in the work of a group of sociologists collectively 
termed ‘the Chicago School’ (Alba & Nee, 1997).  
One of the seminal texts on the subject was written by Park and Burgess (1921) who 
describe assimilation as:  
A process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire 
the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by 
sharing their experience and history are incorporated with them in a common 
cultural life (Parks & Burgess, 1921, p. 735). 
The piece contends that assimilation is a benign process in which groups separated 
by fault-lines of race, ethnicity and religion may gradually overcome differences in 
order to forge a common identity based on mutual cultural exchange. This idea of 
distinctions gradually eroding and unity emerging is undoubtedly appealing and 
reflects to some extent the manner in which Western European settlers in the United 
States gradually forged shared identities as citizens (Glazer, 1993). However, in 
practice, assimilation is deeply flawed as a means to accommodate cultural pluralism 
in diverse societies for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, processes of cultural exchange are unequal, they tend to favour the largest 
ethnic group at the expense of minorities. Imbalanced processes of assimilation do 
not result in a common, shared identity. Rather, smaller groups tend to become 
swamped by the mainstream culture, losing their sense of distinctiveness due to the 
pressures of mainstream dominance in areas such as language, artistic expression or 
religious practices. (Taylor, 1994). Secondly, assimilation is not necessarily a benign 
and organic process. Often, state driven attempts to enforce unity from above have 
the potential to promote illiberal outcomes for minority groups. Such results are 
observable when we consider attempts to enforce Anglo-conformity upon Native 
Americans in the United States, or legislation banning head scarves in France (Hoxie, 
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2001; Chrisafis, 2011). Thirdly, groups that are perceived as ‘too different’ from the 
mainstream to easily assimilate can become ghettoised in response to the experience 
of racism and discrimination thereby undermining the possibility of forging a unified 
citizenry. A prime example of this type of process is evident in the United States 
where African Americans in particular have suffered generations of group-specific 
inequality based on historical injustice and antagonistic racial differentiation. The 
effect of such forms of institutionalised discrimination have served to hinder the 
possibility for an inclusive cultural melting pot in the territory (Glazer, 1997). 
The idea of coercive assimilation still permeates political discussions related to 
immigration and integration. For instance, a number of overtly anti-immigration 
parties operating throughout Europe have increasingly adopted narratives based on 
the perceived failure of some groups to assimilate into the norms of the host society 
(Bunzl, 2005). Such narratives are deeply flawed in that they assume the existence 
of a common, uniform national culture into which immigrants can easily assimilate, 
whilst offering no credible attempt to outline what this model could look like in 
practice. Given that many societies are marked by internal cultural pluralism these 
types of argument are clearly misguided. Furthermore, assimilation has the potential 
to provide justification for illiberal measures taken to be against cultural minorities 
in order to promote homogeneity.  
Due to these weaknesses and the possibility for its abuse, assimilation represents a 
logically flawed and potentially dangerous approach to the management of cultural 
difference in societies marked by multiple strains of diversity. The next position that 
we will examine similarly contains appealing aspects when taken in theoretical terms, 
but fails to engage with some of the unfortunate realities of group-based prejudice 
and discrimination. The following section will consider the concept of difference-blind 
neutrality, most commonly associated with post-war liberalism. 
2.2.2 Difference-Blind Liberalism 
In the post-war era, the dominant approach to the accommodation of cultural 
pluralism in the majority of Western liberal democracies has been described as 
‘difference-blindness’, ‘liberal-neutrality’, or ‘benign neglect’ (Kymlicka, 1995). The 
theoretical underpinnings of this approach are rooted in liberal traditions. Firstly, 
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neutrality assumes that the state has no place interfering in matters such as religion, 
culture or personal identity. Secondly, where identity is concerned, individuals are 
seen as participating in a kind of market-place, in which some cultural forms prosper 
and others wither according to the extent that individuals find them to be valuable. 
Thirdly, the liberal conception of citizenship, in which individuals participate in the 
public sphere as uniform citizens, provides an important foundation for the concept 
of difference-blind neutrality. These ideas have been articulated more or less 
explicitly in a number of post-war liberal texts on the concept of citizenship.  
 
This is evident when we consider Marshall’s conception of the homogenous citizenry 
participating in a shared civilization (Marshall, 1963). Corresponding views can be 
located in John Rawls’ discussions of individuals arriving at universal principles of 
justice through imagining away their unique identity and placing themselves behind 
a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999). However, this approach ignores the existence of 
indigenous diversities that are a feature of many societies and lacks the intellectual 
tools for accommodating immigration-generated diversity in a sensitive fashion.  
 
It must be noted that the conception of the neutral state has an understandable 
theoretical appeal. It makes sense to allow all forms of cultural observance to flourish 
or to expire according to the preferences of individuals making free, informed choices. 
In an ideal world citizens would leave identity in the private sphere and coalesce 
around universal principles of justice to which all could subscribe. However, in 
practice, to ignore cultural pluralism in the name of neutrality serves to favour some 
groups and to marginalise minorities. In large part, this is due to the realities of 
group-based prejudice and discrimination such as racism and sectarianism. The 
stubbornly persistent nature of group-specific forms of inequality means that the 
state has a duty to take matters of identity seriously, and to actively redress certain 
imbalances based on pivots of racial, ethnic and religious identity (Glazer, 1997). 
This idea will be considered more thoroughly when we turn to examine the 
relationship between racism and sectarianism in the Northern Irish context later in 
the thesis; however, it is necessary here to offer a brief consideration of these issues 
in order to support our critique of difference-blind liberalism. 
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The first reason why the state must play an active role in matters related to identity 
is because of the pressing and widespread reality of group-based forms of 
discrimination such as racism and sectarianism. Racism in this thesis follows the 
definition outlined by UNESCO in its International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states that:  
 
Racial discrimination shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life 
(UNESCO, 2016).  
 
While the definition of racism is highly contested in some areas of academic writing, 
the UNESCO version has the advantage of being sufficiently wide to capture most of 
its attributes without becoming excessively enmeshed in theoretical controversy (for 
an overview of wider debates on this matter see Miles & Brown, 2003; Garner, 2010).  
 
Sectarianism represents a similar form of group-based discrimination, but one that 
is derived from a religious basis rather than biological or ethnic origins (Geoghegan, 
2010). However, on many occasions, sectarian division and ethnic differences overlap 
and intertwine; with religion acting as a form of demarcation between distinctive 
cultural groups (Modood, 2007; Jarman, 2012). Whilst sectarianism shares many 
common features with racism, given that both amount to forms of discrimination 
against individuals or groups due to personal characteristics beyond their control, it 
is useful to maintain a degree of theoretical distinction between these two concepts. 
Though racism and sectarianism may overlap in places, they often emerge from 
entirely distinct social bases, taking very different forms according to the historical 
and social contexts in play within each community of citizens (Brewer, 1992). Hence, 
throughout this thesis, these issues will be paired in a number of places, but crucially 
they will not be merged. We will discuss racism and sectarianism in greater detail 
later in the thesis when considering their relevance in the Northern Irish context. For 
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our purposes here, we will simply outline the relevance of racism and sectarianism 
for our critique of difference-blind liberalism.  
 
Whilst difference-blind liberals may believe that matters such as identity are the 
preserve of the private sphere and that citizens should participate in a uniform 
manner, society itself seldom meets this ideal. If all citizens genuinely received 
equality of treatment regardless of their racial or cultural characteristics, then the 
state would be justified in taking a passive approach to the accommodation of 
different identities. However, racism, sectarianism and other forms of bigotry are an 
unfortunate reality in the majority of culturally diverse societies (Miles and Brown, 
2003).  
 
For instance, recent research carried out in the U.S. suggests that 52% of the 
Hispanic population feel that they have been treated unfairly due to their race or 
ethnicity (Krogstad & Lopez, 2016). Similarly, a survey carried out in Europe 
suggested that 47% of Roma felt that they had experienced discrimination as a result 
of their cultural origins (FRA, 2009, p. 35). More recently, religion has increasingly 
returned to the fore as a key driving force behind forms of social discrimination. Most 
notably, in some parts of the U.K., this has become manifest in the rise of 
Islamophobia as a form of religious discrimination in a number of liberal democratic 
societies (Modood, 2003; Runnymede, 2016). 
 
This evidence clearly suggests that prejudicial behaviours, far from being the 
preserve of a handful of committed bigots, are a wide ranging phenomenon and a 
persistent feature of social reality in societies marked by cultural pluralism. While 
discrimination is not solely experienced by members of cultural minorities, they are 
proportionally more likely to encounter group-based forms of inequality such as 
institutionalised racism as a result of their distinctive identity (Miles & Brown, 2003). 
For this reason, the state has a duty to recognize the forms of inequality that afflict 
even the most liberal and democratic political communities. The lived experience of 
prejudice has the potential to shift ethnic minority communities to the peripheries of 
the public sphere through contributing to processes of segregation and ghettoisation 
(Fiss, 2003).  
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Through failing to recognise and engage with the deeply ingrained nature of 
discrimination, the state may actually facilitate inequality and the type of social 
fragmentation that liberal theorists seek to avoid. The idea of the neutral, difference-
blind state is built on erroneous logic. In order for the state to be neutral, it must be 
actively engaged with tackling the imbalances that derive from the realities of 
prejudice and discrimination. The state must seek to build solidarity between the 
various different racial, ethnic and religious groups present within the broader 
society. To fail to do this is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the deeply unfair 
practices that emerge from racism, sectarianism and other forms of discrimination 
based on fault-lines of identity. 
 
A second problem with difference-blind liberalism is its excessive focus on the idea 
of the cultural market-place. While the market-place theory may seem to provide an 
equitable means to pursue the accommodation of diversity, there is a key factor that 
prevents this aim from being achieved: the effects of ‘swamping’ (Kymlicka, 1989). 
The nation-state is not neutral, it is built upon the idea of a shared culture that ties 
citizens together within the confines of a community built upon common traditions 
and a degree of homogeneity. In practice, this means that the state inevitably favours 
a dominant cultural group (or in some cases dominant groups). This is highlighted by 
the fact that the state explicitly recognises particular cultural events through 
measures such as conferring public holidays that tie in with such occasions (Parekh, 
2006). Furthermore, the state favours one or more linguistic groups through 
recognising some languages as official, and carrying out governmental work in the 
tongues that are deemed to be of greatest importance to the largest number of 
citizens (Kymlicka, 2001; Kymlicka & Patten, 2003).  
 
Whilst supporters of difference-blind approaches to the accommodation of diversity 
may argue that it is a mere matter of common sense to favour the majority language 
group, or to explicitly recognise mainstream cultural practices while ignoring others, 
this hardly achieves the requirements of equality that underpin liberal ideals. It may 
make sense from a purely utilitarian perspective that the state confers official 
recognition on majority practices, but where does this leave indigenous minorities, 
31 
  
 
or citizens that may not speak the majority tongue as their first language? The answer 
to this is that it leaves them marginalised to some degree by a state that claims to 
be neutral. Hence, in the interests of equality, there is a need for the state not to 
ignore diversity, but to actively seek to redress these forms of cultural imbalance 
wherever they arise. The failings of the difference-blind approach to diversity bring 
us now to the concept of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism represents a more 
sensitive and balanced approach to the accommodation of difference than either 
active assimilation or passive difference-blindness. The next section will outline the 
key principles of multiculturalism and engage with some of the main criticisms that 
this concept has encountered in academic discussion.      
2.2.3 Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism represents a collection of responses to the management of difference 
that recognise the value of diversity and seek to ensure recognition for individuals 
and groups outside of the cultural mainstream. Multiculturalism principally emerged 
as a means for managing difference in societies marked by indigenous internal 
minorities (Taylor, 1994). However, as western societies have become increasingly 
diverse in recent decades due to the greater possibilities for living and working across 
national borders, multiculturalism has become a key feature of debates over the 
accommodation of migrants in the receiving states (Modood, 2007). The term has 
become maligned in some sections of public discourse, giving rise to the claim that 
there is a ‘backlash’ against the multicultural ideal in the early part of the 21st century 
(Vervotec & Wessendorf, 2010). The following section outlines some of the core 
principles of the theory, before highlighting a number of the key criticisms levelled at 
this school of thought. It will be argued that despite the contributions of these critics, 
multiculturalism represents the most pragmatic and sensitive approach to the 
accommodation of cultural pluralism in diverse societies. 
 
The theory begins with an endorsement of the liberal ideal of equality, but recognises 
that forms of inequality may arise when the state ignores diversity. Some 
multicultural theorists see their approach as an adjunct of liberalism itself (for 
instance Kymlicka, 1989; 1995), others argue that multiculturalism should represent 
a more totalistic perspective that goes beyond the limited aims of liberalism, seeking 
to reconstitute the state and to create a ‘community of communities’ (Parekh, 2006). 
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This thesis favours the former approach as it recognises the value of liberal freedoms, 
rejecting difference-blindness, whilst maintaining a practical approach to the 
enduring relevance and merits of the liberal democratic nation-state. Multiculturalism 
should be seen as a toolkit for overcoming the failings of difference-blind approaches 
to the achievement of equality, rather than as a replacement for liberal principles.  
 
This form of multiculturalism should be constructed around two basic principles, each 
of which require some measure of unpacking. Firstly, the suggestion that individual 
equality requires a degree of state recognition for forms of identity outside of the 
majority national culture. Secondly, that the pursuit of equality may require group-
rights in addition to universal rights in order to counteract the effects of culturally 
derived inequality. In this endeavour, the thesis consciously adopts a model of 
multiculturalism outlined in the work of Kymlicka (1989; 1995), though with some 
degree of criticism aimed at certain aspects of his overarching theory. 
The first of these arguments is about recognising the importance of culture and 
identity to the individual. Difference-blind liberals have tended to assume that formal 
equality, guaranteed by universal rights, was a sufficient and fair basis to pursue 
egalitarian outcomes (Barry, 2001). However, when some cultures or identities are 
given official recognition by the state, and others are ignored, this has the effect of 
creating a two tier system of citizens: those who are deemed to belong, and others 
who are to be tolerated or pressured into assimilation.  
 
The argument proposed by the majority of multicultural scholars, is that in some 
cases, the state should be prepared to accord group-rights to the members of 
minorities so that they can be protected from the swamping influences of the majority 
culture. This is most obvious when we refer to indigenous minorities such as 
Aborigines or Native Americans (Taylor, 1994). There are strong arguments that such 
groups should have additional rights alongside universal freedoms, in order to protect 
their way of life from the overwhelming pressure toward cultural assimilation in 
contemporary Western societies (Nickel, 1997). Furthermore, such arguments 
suggest that sub-state, national minorities within diverse states should be afforded 
measures of self-governance where practicable (Kymlicka, 1995).  
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There has been some degree of controversy within the multicultural canon as to 
where theoretical distinctions ought to rest between sub-national groups and 
immigrants. Theorists in the Canadian school have tended to prioritise the needs of 
sub-state national groups. The argument goes that sub-state nations constitute a 
distinct societal culture in a geographically defined region of the state (Kymlicka, 
1989; 1995). Furthermore, it is claimed that because indigenous minorities have 
usually arisen as a result of historic conquest they did not choose to become a 
minority culture. Immigrants, by contrast, are presented in such accounts as being 
territorially diffuse and having chosen to move to the host society in which they now 
constitute an ethnic minority group. Hence, Kymlicka (1995) in particular makes a 
moral distinction between the two forms of diversity and the levels of accommodation 
that they may expect to receive from the state. 
 
However, this distinction is somewhat heavy-handed. For instance, it cannot cope 
with demands of immigrant groups that settle in the host state and form a distinctive 
minority of citizens. This issue is highlighted in the work of Modood who argues that 
Kymlicka “distorts the circumstances of some kinds of migrants in order to highlight 
the condition of national minorities and indigenous people” (Modood, 2007, p. 34). 
Similarly, Parekh claims that Kymlicka “draws too neat a distinction between 
immigrants and citizens the former are not casual visitors but have come to settle, 
and are what I might call probationary citizens or citizens in waiting” (Parekh, 2006, 
p. 103). There is validity in these arguments, whilst it is necessary to draw 
distinctions between varieties of diversity and to recognise that some minority groups 
have different needs to others: it is not appropriate to consign immigrant groups to 
assimilatory pressures. This argument can be highlighted most lucidly through 
reference to the issue of minority languages which will be explored further as the 
thesis unfolds. 
 
Kymlicka (1995) argues that because the minority culture cannot be replicated in the 
host state, matters such as language become an issue for the private sphere and that 
families should keep their language alive within the home. However, this approach is 
not far removed from the assimilatory processes that he purports to oppose. It is 
legitimate for a receiving state to recognise the value of language diversity and to 
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afford a greater degree of protection than the one outlined in Kymlicka’s approach to 
polyethnic rights (Modood, 2007). While the state cannot give official status to every 
language spoken in the territory, it is appropriate to afford some measure of support 
for the full range of linguistic diversity in the society (Bianco, 2010). This may be 
achieved through the formal educational system or by providing financial support for 
migrant community groups to allow them to act in the public sphere to maintain their 
home language, ensuring that linguistic diversity can be passed on to future 
generations. While some immigrants may not wish to maintain bilingualism, others 
will, and there is no reason to deny this opportunity to such groups. However, this 
position is contentious, critics from outside the multicultural school often take issue 
with the idea of any form of differentiated civic rights. 
Critics of multiculturalism have argued that the theory serves to foster societal 
disunity. The suggestion here is that through engaging with racial, ethnic and 
religious diversity, the state gives such identities greater status and a sense of 
permanence that they would not enjoy without this recognition (Kukathas, 1992; 
Barry, 2001). Secondly, it has been argued that multiculturalism harms internal 
minorities such as women, children and homosexuals, through privileging established 
elites within groups, who tend to be conservatively biased older men (Okin, 1999).  
 
The suggestion that multiculturalism creates division is a common criticism. One of 
the leading proponents of this argument was Brian Barry in his piece Culture and 
Equality (2001). The broad scope of Barry’s argument is that universal rights promote 
a sense of solidarity amongst citizens and that attempts to recognise difference 
undermine the possibility for civic unity. Additionally, he argues that group-rights are 
unnecessary as an antidote to discrimination, claiming that equality is enshrined 
within the liberal model of colour-blind justice. His approach is well illustrated by his 
suggestion that differentiated citizenship is best understood as "the exaltation of what 
divides people instead of what unites them" (Barry, 2001, p.8). Barry goes further, 
arguing that because the politics of difference separates people into groups, it 
becomes difficult to achieve a broad consensus amongst all disadvantaged individuals 
in order to tackle the real evil of socio-economic inequality. However, while a 
universal approach to citizenship is normatively appealing, the facts of negative 
stereotyping, discrimination and the alienation of some individuals from full 
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participation in society as a result of their ethnic or cultural background, undermines 
the possibility for uniform treatment.  
 
In some cases, the state must recognise difference in order to make equality possible. 
Multiculturalism does not create division it merely recognises that division exists. If 
some groups are marginalised on the peripheries of society, then the answer should 
surely be more activity to remedy such social ills, certainly not to ignore difference 
and hope it will go away, or to coercively assimilate the members of cultural 
minorities into following some kind of simplistic formula for national identity. This 
argument is well captured in the statement below that was taken from Tariq Modood’s 
piece ‘A defence of Multiculturalism’ (2005):  
 
And when subordinate groups claim equality within the society, they are 
claiming that they should not be marginal, subordinate or excluded; […]. Why, 
they ask, should we have our identities privatised, while the dominant group 
has its identity universalised in the public space? (Modood, 2005, p.65) 
 
This type of argument is important in that it illustrates something that is not 
addressed in Barry’s conception of cultural difference. For Barry, culture and equality 
are entirely separate concepts, Modood highlights the fact that they are inextricably 
intertwined.  
 
Secondly, there is no suggestion in multicultural theory, that group-rights should 
enforce illiberal measures on internal minorities. While critics such as Susan Okin 
have argued that multiculturalism is harmful to women, this suggestion is countered 
in multicultural texts (Okin, 1999). For instance, in the liberal account of 
multiculturalism conceptualised in the work of Will Kymlicka, he is very careful to 
argue that multicultural policies should provide ‘external protection’ for minority 
groups, rather than to enforce ‘internal restrictions’ on group members (Kymlicka, 
1995, p. 35).  
 
Further to this, Anne Phillips directly tackles Okin’s criticisms suggesting that 
multiculturalism and feminism are compatible features of a progressive march 
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towards equality for both women and ethnic minorities. Phillips takes issue with 
Okin's claim that differentiated citizenship will inevitably lead to the subordination of 
women within minority groups. She argues that Okin denies the possibility for female 
members of minority groups to exercise agency. Hence, Okin suggests that women 
exposed to Western liberal cultural norms are capable of autonomy, and that women 
in other communities are passive victims of circumstance (Phillips, 2007). Phillips 
argues cogently that this vastly oversimplifies the real position of women in minority 
communities. Furthermore, she explicitly favours an approach to multiculturalism 
that upholds “the rights of individuals belonging to particular groups rather than the 
right of groups” (Phillips, 2007, p. 164). This is a valuable distinction as it recognises 
the potential for tension between group membership and individual equality and 
mediates between them. 
Any conception of group-based rights must work alongside universal rights, rather 
than contradict them. The protection of individual equality should not be 
compromised by the promotion of illiberal practices within a particular group. 
Differentiated rights should only be established in order to remedy forms of inequality 
experienced by individuals due to their membership of a minority group. Ultimately, 
the equation here is quite simple: multiculturalism is about the pursuit of equality; 
any attempt to impose restrictions on individuals, due to group membership, does 
not adhere to multicultural principles. However, despite the fact that multicultural 
theory is able to withstand these criticisms, it has suffered from the effects of a 
political backlash and largely been displaced in recent years by the adoption of 
interculturalism in policy frameworks aimed at the management of diversity. Most 
importantly for our purposes this process clearly took place in Northern Ireland during 
the timeframe of our investigation. Consequently, we will now turn to provide an 
overview of interculturalism through examining its critical relationship with 
multiculturalism. 
2.2.4 Interculturalism 
As the criticisms of multiculturalism have grown in intensity, a new competitor 
model has emerged that seeks to maintain a healthy recognition of diversity whilst 
fostering societal unity. This approach is commonly referred to as interculturalism. 
The term is particularly relevant to the wider thesis as it is a feature of certain 
policy documents associated with the accommodation of difference in Northern 
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Ireland (OFMDFM, 2013; 2015). Consequently, it is necessary for us to provide an 
assessment of interculturalism so that we may carry out a more fruitful 
investigation into policy frameworks aimed at the management of diversity in the 
Northern Irish context later in the thesis. The next section will outline the key 
aspects of intercultural theory through examining its critical engagement with 
multiculturalism. We will see that this has led to a sizeable body of academic 
debate between multicultural scholars and proponents of interculturalism. In this 
endeavour we will begin by discussing a number of core criticisms levelled at 
multiculturalism by proponents of intercultural theory. It will be argued throughout 
this section, that whilst not all of the criticisms of multiculturalism levelled by 
interculturalists withstand scrutiny, that the theory represents a distinctive 
communicative approach that draws on certain ideas associated with 
multiculturalism whilst rejecting others.  
The primary argument made by interculturalist scholars is the suggestion that 
multiculturalism has placed exclusive focus on the needs of cultural minorities and 
failed to consider the views of national majorities (Bouchard, 2011). Furthermore, 
similarly to the liberal arguments discussed earlier it is suggested that 
multiculturalism is excessively groupist in focus, tending to divide rather than to 
unite (Wood et al. 2006). Linked with this is the claim that multiculturalism — 
whilst pertinent in the era of post-war immigration — is insufficiently subtle to deal 
with the realities of the ‘super-diversity’ that is a feature of modern societies 
affected by globalisation (Cantle, 2014).  
These theorists present interculturalism as the solution to such problems, claiming 
that respectful dialogue between cultural groups on terms that are acceptable 
within mainstream cultural norms are likely to promote the formation of new hybrid 
identities. The suggestion is that through interaction and dialogue it is possible to 
create a type of cultural blend that is more than the sum of its parts, 
simultaneously respecting difference and promoting solidarity. In order to examine 
these arguments further we will begin by considering Bouchard’s (2011) suggestion 
that interculturalism pays greater attention to the needs of cultural majorities than 
multiculturalism. 
38 
  
 
Though Bouchard critiques various aspects of multiculturalism, perhaps the key 
feature of his work is the argument that measures taken in the pursuit of cultural 
accommodation should recognise the majority as well as minorities. Moreover, he 
argues that dominant cultural norms should provide a framework for intercultural 
dialogue. He moves on to claim that multiculturalism is not equipped to provide the 
same type of accommodation for cultural majorities. This type of argument 
becomes evident when Bouchard states that “interculturalism is on the whole very 
sensitive to the problems and needs of the majority culture, which multiculturalism 
cannot provide since, […] it does not recognize the existence of such a culture” 
(Bouchard, 2011, p. 465). These criticisms lead Bouchard to the suggestion that 
interaction and dialogue between cultural groups in order to promote blending and 
sharing is the correct approach to managing diversity.  
The second major criticism of multiculturalism that is commonly expressed in 
intercultural approaches is the suggestion that it is inherently fragmentary in its 
outlook. This is to say that multiculturalism prevents crossover and integration 
between cultural groups. This sentiment is evident in the work of Wood et al. 
(2006), who suggest that “The creative challenge is to move from the multicultural 
city of fragmented differences to the co-created intercultural city that makes the 
most of diversity” (p. viii). Similar views are expressed in the work of Zapata-
Barrero (2016) who states that “interculturalism presents itself as a framework that 
tries to challenge the way multiculturalism(s) have always tended to categorise 
people through origin and nationality” (p. 158). Most accounts of interculturalism 
proceed from a departure point that suggests multiculturalism divides people 
according to cultural traits and that interculturalism by contrast will promote 
dynamic relationships in which inter-group barriers are eroded by mutual 
interaction.  
The third key strand in the intercultural argument is that multiculturalism has failed 
to engage with the nuances of diversity as it has developed during the era of 
globalisation and ‘super-diversity’ (Vervotec, 2007). The result of this is that while 
people are participating in forms of cultural exchange on a daily basis, creating new 
forms of complex hybrid identities in a multiplicity of different blends, that 
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multiculturalism is rooted in an outdated understanding of diversity. This finds its 
clearest expression in the work of Ted Cantle (2014) who argues that: 
The multicultural policies followed by the UK and most European 
governments have become ever more exposed and, it is argued, are no 
longer appropriate to mediate the new era of globalisation and super-
diversity. p. 313. 
Cantle argues that it is necessary that the accommodation of difference is rooted in 
a multi-level civic space which operates both above and below the level of the 
nation-state and the national community. In this sense, his arguments follow very 
closely those of theorists such as Held (1995; 1998; 2003) and Linklater (1998; 
2001) who have argued for cosmopolitan democracy in recognition of the impact of 
globalisation on the nation-state.  
Having outlined this range of criticisms against multiculturalism, interculturalists 
argue that their theory recognises difference and cultivates positive change through 
dialogue and respectful interaction between cultural groups. This is evident in 
Bouchard’s argument in favour of interculturalism when he claims that  
while fostering respect for diversity, the model favours interactions, 
exchanges, connections, and intercommunity initiatives. It thus privileges a 
path of negotiations and mutual adjustments (Bouchard, 2011, p. 448). 
This idea is also present in the work of Zapata-Barrero who states that 
“Interculturalism can be seen as a set of policies sharing one basic idea: that the 
interaction among people from different backgrounds matters” (Zapata-Barrero, 
2016, p. 155). What unites these approaches is the suggestion that 
multiculturalism is ill-suited to the realities of contemporary diversity due to the 
fact that it does not take account of majority preferences, is inherently 
fragmentary, and lacks the subtlety to engage with the complexity of diversity in 
the era of globalisation.  
However, these arguments have been rejected by multiculturalists who argue that 
interculturalism is not a distinctive theoretical innovation, but rather a politically 
expedient rebranding exercise in response to the criticisms of multicultural policies. 
Such scholars tend to point to existing texts within the multicultural canon that 
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cover similar ground to the theories articulated by interculturalists (Kymlicka, 2012; 
Modood & Meer 2012a; 2012b). Furthermore, a number of theorists suggest that 
interculturalism may heighten the assimilatory pressures being placed on cultural 
minorities (Brahm-Levey, 2012; Taylor, 2012).  
One of the key battle-grounds between multicultural and intercultural scholars is 
the argument that multiculturalism favours minorities at the expense of the 
majority. In response to this claim, multiculturalist scholars have argued that 
interculturalism has the potential to lead to swamping due its emphasis on 
maintaining majority norms. This type of argument is expressed in the work of 
Modood and Meer (2012a) who state that:  
all forms of prescribed unity, including civic unity, usually retain a 
majoritarian bias that places the burden of adaptation upon the minority, and 
so is inconsistent with interculturalism’s alleged commitment to ‘mutual 
integration’ (Modood & Meer 2012a, p. 188).  
Furthermore, multiculturalists have taken issue with the suggestion that their 
theories fail to promote dialogue across cultural boundaries. In order to highlight 
this, it is useful once again to begin with the work of Modood and Meer (2012a; 
2012b). Modood and Meer argue that not only is dialogue between cultural groups a 
component of multiculturalism, that it is a foundational aspect of the model.  
Their arguments are supported by surveying multicultural literature. For instance, 
Parekh argues that “every culture represents a limited vision of the good life and 
benefits from a dialogue with others” (Parekh, 2004). In an earlier text on 
multiculturalism Charles Taylor argues that “discovering my own identity doesn't 
mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly 
overt, partly internal, with others” (Taylor, 1997, p. 103). Both of these quotations 
serve to suggest multiculturalist scholars endorsing the types of dialogue espoused 
by interculturalist theorists. Further to this, multiculturalists have argued that the 
driving force behind interculturalism was the need for a new political narrative in 
response to the public backlash against multiculturalism.  
For instance, Taylor argues that the origins of interculturalism in the Canadian 
territory of Quebec were derived from the political imperatives of the Francophone 
41 
  
 
majority in the region and the desire of elites to distinguish the territory from 
Anglophone Canada. This type of sentiment is further outlined in the work of 
Brahm-Levey (2012) who argues that:  
Whether interculturalism differs substantively from multiculturalism is very 
much beside the point. Rather, what matters is that the term 
‘multiculturalism’ has become so mired in controversy and is so maligned in 
public debate that its semantic capital, as it were, has been spent. (Brahm-
Levey, 2012, p. 223).  
Both of these texts locate the tendency towards greater political and scholarly 
endorsement for interculturalism within the context of diminishing popular 
enthusiasm for multiculturalism.  
On balance it is fair to suggest that these scholars highlight key areas in which 
some interculturalists have overstated their case. However, this does not mean that 
there are not certain elements of distinctive theoretical innovation within 
interculturalism. Interculturalism is best seen as a refinement of specific 
multicultural principles which places emphasis on dialogue and makes an explicit 
rejection of divisive tendencies that are associated with certain multicultural 
practices. The tone of the debate is marked by tribal divisions between these two 
scholarly camps, yet the two approaches should be seen as subtly distinct and 
complementary. It is appropriate to suggest that interculturalism is built upon 
foundations laid by multiculturalists but has evolved to some extent to suit different 
needs in the context of globalisation and vastly increased movements of people 
(Cantle, 2014). 
Furthermore, because multiculturalism has always encompassed a range of 
perspectives, some of which emphasise communitarian roots (Parekh, 2006) and 
others which identify more closely with liberal ideals (Kymlicka, 1995) this has left 
a lack of clarity over exactly what it is that multiculturalists stand for. 
Interculturalism cuts through this theoretical fog by explicitly rejecting the aspects 
of communitarian multiculturalism that could be interpreted as placing impermeable 
boundaries around existing cultural groups. Werbner (2012) makes a useful 
contribution to this discussion when she states that interculturalism can be 
understood as a form of multicultural communication employed across religious and 
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cultural boundaries. This definition neatly captures the manner in which 
interculturalism has grown out of multiculturalism through a process of critical 
engagement with its parent theory, yet it does not repudiate multicultural values on 
a wholesale basis.  
Regardless of the specifics of theoretical posturing within these debates, 
interculturalism has clearly become a common semantic feature of policy 
frameworks aimed at the management of difference throughout Europe and notably 
in Northern Ireland. It is for this reason that the theory will be invoked later in the 
thesis order to help us to make sense of a number of important policy 
developments that took place in Northern Ireland during the period of our study.  
So far this chapter has outlined some of the central theoretical controversies 
related to the accommodation of cultural pluralism in diverse societies. The 
importance of these theoretical foundations will become more apparent when we 
begin to consider the manner in which such debates have emerged in the Northern 
Irish context. However, we must note at this point the gap between these 
theoretical models and the substance of democratic politics as practiced in multi-
party democracies. This will highlight the need for further research into the party 
politics of culture in diverse societies. 
2.2.5 Theoretical Debates and Party Politics 
It has been argued throughout the previous section that an active approach to the 
management of cultural pluralism is the most effective way to engage with the 
realities of difference in diverse societies. This is true for both multi-national sources 
of diversity and those brought about by immigration, though the particular methods 
of accommodation may vary. What unites each of the theoretical positions that have 
been discussed has been their lack of focus upon party politics in democratic 
societies. Each of these bodies of literature argues in favour of a particular vision of 
the individual, of cultural groups, and of the manner in which the state should interact 
with the citizenry. Each places focus on establishing theories appropriate to the 
accommodation of difference in democratic societies, yet ignores one of the key 
components of a functioning democracy: political parties.  
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The manner in which democratic choices are placed before citizens in contemporary 
democratic societies is inevitably wound in with the machinations of inter-party 
debate. As political parties seek to position themselves relative to political opponents, 
they collectively present the range of meaningful choices available to voters when 
expressing democratic preferences. Furthermore, successful parties will gain access 
to policy-making forums and to the offices of state, giving party elites a privileged 
positon in the negotiation of policy outcomes (Sartori, 1976; Ware 1996). 
 
If we briefly survey some of the key literature on party systems, the thing that 
connects their characterisation of political parties, is the suggestion that their primary 
role is to act as a discursive conduit between the citizen and levers of the state. For 
Sartori, a party system “allows expressive communication, that is, enables the citizen 
to communicate to the state. Conversely, a party system provides a communication 
network devised for communication to the society” (Sartori, 1976, p. 57). Durverger 
notes a similar function for political parties when he argues that “There is no longer 
a dialogue between the elector and the representative, the nation and parliament: a 
third body has come between them, radically modifying the nature of their relations” 
(Durverger, 1964, p. 353). Nearly all literature that engages with political parties 
places a significant degree of emphasis on the communicative role that they occupy. 
 
In democratic systems, the representatives of political parties that can garner 
sufficient popular support to propel themselves into the executive are in a position to 
place their ideological stamp on the development of subsequent legislation. Other 
successful parties are able to make a contribution to policy deliberations within 
legislative bodies. In doing this, they play a central role  in the interplay of democratic 
discussion. In this sense, parties serve as a vehicle that moves in between the citizen 
and the state (Budge & Keman, 1990). However, it should also be noted that political 
parties do not form their distinctive narratives in a vacuum. They are bound by 
constraints emanating from the institutional framework that they operate in, the 
pressures exerted by other parties, and by the difficulties of navigating the whims of 
public opinion (Downs, 1957; Durverger, 1964; Hay, 2002).  
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Parties should be understood as both the creators of distinctive political platforms 
and simultaneously as a reflection of the prevailing political culture within which they 
operate. They clearly represent a crucial component in democratic decision-making 
processes, so it seems odd to overlook their role in shaping political approaches to 
cultural accommodation. If there is limited research carried out in this area, it is 
possible that we may find greater engagement with political parties when we consider 
wider debates on immigration. The next section turns to review literature on key 
political issues related to immigration. This includes debates over the control of 
territorial borders, the economic effects of migration and the impact of immigration 
on contemporary welfare states. Perhaps here it may be possible to discern a more 
substantial focus on the operation of party politics in relation to these issues. 
2.3 Expansive and Restrictive Approaches to Immigration 
One of the key questions that consistently frames contemporary debate on 
immigration is the issue of restriction or expansion. This effectively entails deciding 
whether the state should seek to open borders and encourage migratory flows into 
the host society, or try to prevent large scale immigration through restrictive entry 
policies. This issue has doubtlessly become a feature of political debate in a number 
of Western liberal democracies. In terms of seminal academic study on this issue, 
the discussion was largely set in motion by the work of Gary Freeman (1995; 2002; 
2011). His contributions contend that policy-makers have tended towards 
expansionist immigration policies, despite the fact that public opinion generally 
endorses more restrictive approaches to inward migration.  
 
Freeman argues that there is a significant divergence between the restrictive 
sentiments that are common place in public opinion and policy outcomes that tend 
towards expansionist measures. This is well captured in his statement that “The 
central puzzle of the politics of immigration in liberal democracies is the large and 
systematic gap between public opinion and public policy” (Freeman, 2002, p. 77). 
His texts are aimed at explaining this apparent gap between the preferences of the 
citizenry at large and the outcomes of policy decisions made by political elites. In this 
sense, Freeman seems to suggest elite responses towards immigration issues are not 
governed by the normal drivers associated with political parties courting popular 
support. Following on from this assertion, his key question is how are we to make 
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sense of this disparity between elites that are rationally expected to adopt vote-
maximising strategies and policy outcomes that appear to contravene the 
preferences expressed in popular opinion? 
 
In order to explain this apparent divergence between public opinion and elite 
decision-making, Freeman argues that pressure groups described as the ‘organised 
public’ have managed to gain the ear of policy-makers more successfully than the 
diffuse, disorganised and dissenting voices of the public at large. This is evident in 
the statement that “politicians will be more responsive to the organised public than 
to the unorganised, poorly articulated views of the general electorate” (Freeman, 
2002, p. 79). His construction of the organised public as a lobbying body on behalf 
of expansionist immigration policies requires some unpacking.  
 
Firstly, Freeman discusses the effects of pro-business organisations seeking cheap, 
flexible labour for employment in low-skill industries. He argues that this lobbying 
group has successfully utilised access to political elites to shift immigration policy 
towards a position that suits their own requirements. Secondly, he cites the influence 
of migrant groups seeking representation for their communities and a greater degree 
of cross-border openness. Freeman suggests that such groups are better placed to 
gain the ear of policy-making elites than the disorganised strata of popular opinion 
that tends to oppose increasingly open borders (Freeman, 2002). In Freeman’s work, 
small factions with much to gain from expansionist immigration policies are 
represented as organising in the pursuit of group-specific aims, whilst diffuse costs 
are expected to be spread across large sections of the wider population who are less 
able to formally articulate their discontent (Freeman, 1995). However, this raises the 
question of whether elites in sub-state settings would be subject to the same type of 
pressures, given that immigration policy is usually devised at state-level or through 
participation in supra-national associations (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014). 
 
In order to evaluate Freeman’s claims, it is necessary for us to begin by examining 
evidence that suggests the public at large are predisposed towards restrictive policies 
for the regulation of immigration. Survey data certainly suggests that large numbers 
of people, particularly throughout the majority of Western European states, favour 
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tighter controls on immigration. These views are generally expressed in terms of 
fears over greater competition for employment, pressure on welfare systems, and 
security concerns (Artiles and Meardi, 2014). Some of these concepts will be explored 
in more detail later in the thesis, but for our purposes, at this juncture, it is necessary 
to simply illustrate the extent of this anti-immigration sentiment through examining 
quantitative research carried out in this area.   
 
The majority of surveys carried out in EU countries suggest that Freeman’s claims 
about negative public opinions towards expansive immigration can be upheld. For 
instance, polls carried out in the UK in 2008 and 2013 suggested that over 70% 
would like to see immigration reduced, in both cases over 50% specified that 
immigration should be ‘reduced a lot’ (Blinder, 2015). Research carried out across 
the EU mirrors this trend with public opinion in Greece (86%) and Italy (80%) most 
strongly in favour of curtailing immigration (Pew, 2014 [online]). However, several 
conclusions drawn by Freeman have been called into question through the work of 
Statham and Geddes (2006). Their research into immigration debates suggests that 
political elites actually play the primary role in setting the tone and content of public 
discussions on immigration and that civil society actors are comparatively weak. 
Furthermore, their work contends that the public tend to take cues on immigration 
from the various shades of elite rhetoric present in the debate.  
 
Statham and Geddes begin with the proposition that civil society organisations can 
only impact on policy-making if they have sufficient access to communicative 
resources to raise their profile in mainstream media. This prompted them to review 
British newspaper articles that dealt with immigration issues between 1990 and 2004. 
Their enquiries were focussed on establishing whether political elites or civil society 
actors were most prominent in setting the agenda for such discussions, and whether 
the sentiment of their statements could be described as restrictive or expansionist.  
 
Using quantitative coding techniques the authors established a strong argument that 
political elites had significantly greater access to communicative resources than civil 
society groups, and that they consequently played a pivotal role in setting the agenda 
of public debates on immigration. This is particularly evident in their findings which 
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noted that 60% of news articles on immigration were driven by political elites and 
that only 25% came from sources within civil society bodies (Statham & Geddes, 
2006, p. 253) Secondly, their work concludes that elites tended to be far more 
restrictive in their approach than their characterisation in the work of Freeman would 
suggest.  
 
What is interesting for our purposes here is the role that political elites play in driving 
the agenda. While elites are generally assumed to adopt vote-maximising strategies, 
it is clear that they have a degree of autonomy in driving the debate forward in a 
particular direction due to their privileged access to communicative resources 
(Statham & Geddes, 2006). It must also be noted that these political elites do not 
operate in isolation, but that they represent political parties and obtain their mandate 
for policy-making through obtaining democratic endorsement from the voting public 
(Lipset, 2000).  
 
While the work of Geddes and Statham serves to suggest an elite bias in public debate 
on immigration issues, what is missing here is a more detailed breakdown of how 
such debates function in the arena of inter-party conflict. Their work touches on this 
in places when they suggest for instance that Labour Party statements tend to be 
broadly more expansionist than Conservative Party narratives. However, there is very 
little detail provided on the inter-party dynamics driving political debates over 
expansionist or restrictive approaches to immigration policies.  
 
This is an area that remains under researched and would benefit greatly from a more 
rigorous process of qualitative enquiry. While the work of Geddes and Statham does 
serve its stated aim of tackling the flaws in Freeman’s argument, they follow him in 
offering very little empirical detail on the specific content and tone of these debates 
across and within political parties. In order to fully illustrate the complex nature of 
these discussions, it requires us to focus not just on the relationship between broadly 
defined political elites, civil society organisations, and public opinion, but to dissect 
such debates within the context of inter-party conflict. It is here that elite positioning 
on such issues can be more fully understood. Such political narratives are not formed 
in a vacuum, but in the maelstrom of day-to-day democratic conflict. Often when 
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restrictive or expansive approaches are discussed, the debate turns to the economic 
effects of immigration. In order to outline some of the key controversies related to 
this issue, the section will review a selection of the key economic arguments related 
to immigration. 
2.3.1 Economic Arguments  
Opponents of immigration have often chosen to frame their arguments in terms of a 
negative assessment of the economic impact that migration has upon native born 
workers. Such arguments tend to suggest that while employers may benefit from an 
increasingly flexible labour market, that the local population bears the associated 
costs, through lack of access to potential employment and through falling wages. 
This has been a common theme in the rhetoric of populist right-wing parties seeking 
to exploit immigration as an electoral issue (Bale, 2003). Similar narratives have 
been adopted by a wide-range of anti-immigration groups throughout Europe (Van 
Spanje, 2010). The next section will consider the extent to which such claims are 
supported by findings in academic and governmental research. 
 
Academic enquiry into the economic effects of immigration has usually focussed on 
two key areas. Firstly, upon the impact on employment prospects for local workers. 
Secondly, studies have been carried out into the effects of immigration on wages in 
sectors marked by high levels of migrant labour. At this point it becomes useful for 
us to consider some of the key pieces of research in this area in order to illustrate 
the true complexity of this aspect of the immigration debate.  
 
The majority of economic analyses of immigration tend to support the theory that 
migrants follow a ‘rational actor’ approach, moving from areas with limited 
employment prospects and low levels of prosperity, to regions with high demands for 
labour and the possibility of more substantial wages (Chiswick, 2000). It is also 
assumed that migrant labour will then move on in search of new opportunities when 
formerly prosperous economic settings are afflicted by economic recession and an 
associated lack of employment opportunities (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005). Such 
theories are correct if taken in very broad terms, migrant flows tend understandably 
to move in accordance with the whims of economic demand for labour in specific 
geographic locations and particular sectors of industry (Mayda, 2005). If this is the 
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case, then large-scale immigration could be described purely in terms of its ability to 
plug gaps in sections of the labour force, and the case could be made that immigrants 
are required to meet the needs of employers in particular sectors. However, the 
picture is more complex than the model described in these macro-level economic 
analyses.  
 
Research suggests successful migrants will often return to their countries of origin 
following periods in host states of less than five years, despite the fact that wages 
may be lower in their home economy. This contravenes the simplistic rational actor 
calculations articulated in a number of economic theories of immigration. Work 
carried out by Dustman and Weiss suggests that once new skills are learned, and 
new forms of social capital are obtained in the receiving state, that immigrants are 
likely to utilise them in their countries of origin despite the possibility of higher wages 
in the host society (Dustman & Weiss, 2007).  
 
At first sight it may seem that large numbers of immigrants would significantly affect 
average wages in unskilled positions. However, a review of the evidence suggests 
that though immigration does tend to impact negatively upon wages in unskilled 
sectors of the economy, such processes are somewhat limited in their effects. In a 
review of the impact of immigration upon wages in unskilled positions carried out by 
Nickell & Salaheen (2008), the evidence suggested that a 1% rise in immigration in 
a particular occupation would lead to a 0.5% reduction in wages at the most and that 
such effects would be concentrated in specific industrial sectors (Nickell & Salaheen, 
2008, p. 10). While these figures are suggestive of immigrants placing pressure on 
wages to some degree, particularly for unskilled workers in certain industries, they 
are unlikely to have a profound impact on these sectors of the economy. The next 
factor we must address is what evidence there is to suggest that immigration will 
impact negatively upon the employment prospects of local workers. 
 
The majority of research in this area suggests that immigration does not significantly 
affect employment outcomes for native workers (Dustmann et al, 2005). In 2012, 
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research carried out a piece of 
statistical analysis that correlated migrant national insurance registrations against 
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unemployment benefit applications from the local population and suggested that 
there was little evidence of a relationship between the two (Lucchino et al. 
2012). Furthermore, research suggests that in times of economic downturn, 
immigrants will suffer disproportionate levels of unemployment in comparison to 
domestic workers. For instance, during the economic crisis of 2007-2008, 
unemployment rose significantly faster among immigrant workers than amongst the 
native population across the EU-15 (Dancygier & Donnelly, 2012).  
 
The data taken from these pieces of research seems to suggest that immigration has 
generally been beneficial for the functioning of host economies. Furthermore, there 
is little evidence to support claims that migrant labour has a strongly negative effect 
on the wages or employment prospects of the domestic population. However, 
immigration remains a deeply contentious issue for some sections of the electorate. 
If the drivers behind this are not economic in nature, might they relate to questions 
about solidarity and diversity in the receiving states? This issue is explored most 
thoroughly in debates that pertain to welfare and redistribution systems in the host 
societies. 
2.3.2 Immigration and Welfare 
Much contemporary discussion of immigration politics revolves around the issue of 
redistributive welfare programmes provided in Western states. There is a perception 
that is often articulated by opponents of expansive immigration policies that migrants 
arriving in prosperous Western states, from less affluent regions in the global 
community, do so in order to take advantage of generous welfare programmes not 
available to them in their countries of origin (Bale, 2003; Van Spange, 2010). In the 
U.K., this has given rise to terms such as ‘benefits tourism’ (Migration Observatory, 
2014).  However, the majority of evidence derived from academic and governmental 
research suggests that migrants are net contributors to social welfare systems. 
 
For instance, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) released figures in 2015 
that suggested that 6% of working age non-UK nationals were in receipt of a DWP 
benefit, compared with 14% of working age UK nationals (cited in Migration 
Observatory, 2016). While EU migrants working in the UK are marginally more likely 
than native born workers to claim ‘in-work’ benefits such as housing benefit, this 
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actually reflects the fact that migrants tend to work in low-paid, low prestige jobs 
that are less attractive to sections of the local population, but nonetheless vital to 
the functioning of the economy (Portes, 2015).  
 
One of the core questions that has emerged in academic debates over immigration 
has revolved around the relationship between welfare, solidarity and diversity in 
receiving states (Miller, 2000; Goodhart, 2004; Joppke, 2007). Here, the work tends 
to focus on the extent to which large-scale immigration may impact negatively upon 
popular support for redistributive programmes. In essence, the question raised in 
these texts is whether homogeneity is a necessary component of solidarity. The 
starting point of this debate requires us to consider the work of T.H Marshall in the 
field of citizenship theory. For Marshall, the rights of citizenship evolved in a three 
stage process, beginning with civil rights in the 18th century, through to political 
rights in the 19th century, culminating with social rights in the 20th century 
(Marshall, 1963). Social rights in the work of Marshall refer to the formation of 
nationally based welfare systems of the type that emerged in a number of European 
states in the post-war era.  
 
For Marshall, social rights were dependent upon “a direct sense of community 
membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which was a common possession” 
(Marshall, 1963, p. 96). His argument assumes the existence of an unproblematic 
national tie that will enable the development of the common bonds necessary to 
support the costs of large-scale redistributive measures. However, his work pays no 
attention to the obvious internal diversity within liberal democratic nation-states. The 
description of a homogenous citizenry does not take account of internal regional or 
multinational diversities and makes no allowance for immigrant minorities in such 
societies. However, this understanding of the relationship between diversity and 
solidarity has become a prominent feature of arguments aimed at limiting 
immigration.   
 
This is evident in a number of places such as the work of Goodhart who argues that 
“in a world of stranger citizens taxpayers need reassurance that their money is being 
spent on people for whose circumstances they would have some sympathy. For that 
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reason, welfare should become more overtly conditional” (Goodhart, 2004, p. 7). 
Similarly, Joppke has argued that globalisation has undermined the concept of social 
rights in diverse societies. His argument about the tension between immigration and 
redistributive measures is captured in his suggestion that “With the ethnic 
diversification of society the basis for social rights becomes brittle” (Joppke, 2007, p. 
39). This argument is fleshed out most thoroughly in the work of David Miller who 
has argued in a series of texts that immigration has the effect of diluting cultural 
homogeneity in liberal democratic societies, thereby eroding the possibility for a 
sense of shared solidarity between citizens (Miller, 2000; Miller, 2005; Miller, 2008).  
 
Miller begins from the premise that a shared sense of national solidarity is necessary 
for the proper functioning of a redistributive welfare state. His argument proceeds to 
suggest that increasing diversity of the type caused by immigration has a corrosive 
effect on bonds of national solidarity due to a lack of trust and fellow feeling between 
different racial, ethnic and religious communities (Miller, 2008). This leads Miller to 
conclude that immigration should be subject to reasonably high levels of restriction 
in order to protect the redistributive mechanisms associated with welfare states. This 
sentiment is best expressed in his assertion that “a culturally divided society without 
a source of unity to hold its constituents together would be unlikely to support a 
democratic welfare state” (Miller, 2008, p. 9). It is fair to say that Miller’s arguments 
amount to a delicate and nuanced critique of expansive immigration policies. In his 
texts he makes a case for significantly limiting immigration without offering support 
for the xenophobic narratives that have tended to characterise this debate in other 
quarters. However, his arguments are subject to a number of key weaknesses. 
 
Firstly, Miller’s theoretical claims that increased cultural diversity will weaken support 
for redistributive programmes do not take account of the realities of long-standing 
ethnic and cultural fissures that exist in the majority of nation-states. The culturally 
homogenous nation-state is a construct created for processes of nation building that 
has limited historical basis in the majority of sovereign, territorial units of governance 
(Mycock, 2012).  Were homogeneity a necessary precursor to obtaining popular 
support for redistribution, how would a multinational entity such as the U.K. 
overcome the barriers created by internal diversity? Such arguments fall into the 
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same trap as Marshall, imagining the existence of a homogenous citizenry. This 
ignores the fact that solidarity and diversity are clearly not mutually exclusive 
concepts as proven by the experiences of a number of multinational societies.  
 
Secondly, Miller contends that immigration should be restricted not to maintain 
welfare systems themselves, but rather to maintain popular support for redistributive 
programmes. His claim being that widespread perceptions of outsiders abusing 
generous welfare packages may undermine popular support for redistributive 
programmes. It is certainly true that there is evidence of widespread public 
opposition to immigration based on the perception that migrants tend to claim 
benefits in host states. In the UK, polling data collated by Ipsos-Mori revealed the 
extent of this common public concern. In this survey 62% of respondents felt that a 
major problem with expansive immigration policies was linked to the perception that 
immigrants were claiming benefits and entitlements that they had not contributed 
towards (Duffy & Frere-Smith, 2014 p. 50).  
 
Whilst the research suggested that this association between immigration and welfare 
abuse was most pronounced in the UK, similar sentiments were expressed in surveys 
carried out elsewhere in the EU (Duffy & Frere-Smith, 2014). This evidence may seem 
to support Miller’s contention that immigration should be curbed in order to maintain 
social solidarity in such states. If there are widespread perceptions that benefits are 
being unfairly abused by ‘outsiders’ this may have the potential to further erode 
support for such redistributive mechanisms.  
 
However, given the net contribution of immigrants to welfare states due to their high 
levels of employment, it is perhaps more sensible not to exclude people on this basis. 
The reality is that the majority of immigrants tend to be young, economically active, 
educated elsewhere at no cost to the host state, and most commonly they return to 
their countries of origin before they reach retirement age (Jacobsen, 2013). If we 
consider research into the fiscal effects of A8 migrants resident in the UK it becomes 
apparent that 90% of male and 74% of female A8 migrants are in employment, in 
contrast to 78% and 71% of the native population respectively (Dustmann et al. 
2009). Curbing immigration in order to maintain popular support for welfare systems, 
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may actually serve to undermine such services through depriving the state of the tax 
revenues raised by immigrants working in the host economy. Consequently, it seems 
strange to seek to limit immigration on these grounds. We will now turn to consider 
the implications of these debates in the arena of inter-party politics.  
2.3.3 Immigration and Political Parties 
Having now reviewed a substantial body of literature pertaining to immigration 
policies, it is becoming apparent that these texts undoubtedly serve to highlight 
important themes in contemporary political debates. However, as with our discussion 
of approaches to cultural accommodation, they seldom consider the manifestation of 
these controversies as they appear in the realm of party politics. Questions about 
whether the state should restrict migratory flows are a central consideration when 
discussing the politics of immigration, yet these decisions are very likely to be 
influenced by strategic calculations associated with inter-party competition.  
 
When we discuss the impact of immigration upon the economic prospects of the 
domestic population and upon communal solidarity within the host state we are 
getting into the practical aspects of immigration politics. Yet, this literature tends to 
make little mention of the communicative role played by political parties or their 
influence in the actual formulation and implementation of policy. This highlights a 
distinct gap in the existing research into the politics of immigration. However, there 
are some pieces of literature that have emerged in order to bridge this divide. The 
thesis will now turn to investigate research that is explicitly focussed upon the 
relationship between party competition, cultural pluralism and immigration. 
2.4 Party Politics and Immigration 
When assessing literature that is explicitly focussed on party competition, we find 
evidence of a series of promising overlaps between the politics of immigration and 
the activities of political parties. However, what is notable here is that the majority 
of this work tends to engage with the effect of extreme right parties on inter-party 
positioning. This literature seems to focus exclusively on state-level party systems, 
defined by a left/right axis of ideological positioning. Before we turn to discuss some 
of the particular pieces of research that comprise this canon, it is useful for us to use 
this opportunity to consider some foundational theories of inter-party positioning and 
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to highlight the difficulties that immigration causes for traditional axes of party 
competition. 
 
One thing that emerges when engaging with literature on the politics of immigration 
is the difficulty in relating such issues to classic theories of party competition. Before 
this can be fully explained, we need to lay some theoretical groundwork through 
discussing some of the existing literature on political parties. This process will help 
us to highlight why immigration does not fit neatly into traditional ideological 
contours. When discussing inter-party competition it is instructive for us to begin with 
the work of Anthony Downs (1957). Downs outlined a theory of political parties that 
was centred on rational actor models borrowed from the world of economics. For 
Downs, parties were best understood as “a team of men who seek office solely to 
enjoy the income, prestige and power that go with running the government 
apparatus” (Downs, 1957, p. 137). In pursuit of these ends, elites would agree on 
policies and sell them using narratives that were calculated to accrue the widest 
possible popular approval. In this sense, parties are described simply as vehicles for 
the pursuit of office.  
 
The approach taken by Downs is perhaps a little too simplistic to cover all drivers of 
inter-party positioning. However, his work does capture an important feature of party 
competition: the creation of narratives that serve to differentiate one political 
grouping from another. Such shared discursive structures are necessary to forge a 
degree of unity between party members as they pursue collective goals. Ideology, in 
this context, represents a means by which voters can classify political parties along 
some form of continuum thereby relieving the individual citizen of the need to have 
in-depth of knowledge of each party’s policy preferences. This kind of spatial 
positioning theory, utilising a linear ideological framework, has become a keystone 
in the study of party systems. 
 
Influenced by Downs, a number of scholars came to posit approaches for 
understanding party behaviour and the formulation of party narratives through 
reference to ideas such as ‘issue ownership’ or ‘dominance and dispersion’ (Budge & 
Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996). These approaches followed a Downsian 
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perspective on parties but highlighted a more sophisticated understanding of how 
ideological narratives were formed. These characterisations of party behaviour 
illustrate an important feature of inter-party competition, with some parties perceived 
to be strong in certain areas and less capable in others. Consequently, within party 
systems, each group is expected to place emphasis on certain areas that highlight 
the strength of their particular arguments.  
 
This enables the party to obtain support from a section of the public due to the 
perception of their dominance in that policy region (Petrocik, 1996). By contrast, 
when one group has achieved a degree of ownership in some area of political salience, 
others may seek to avoid that area and to focus on creating narratives in policy areas 
where they feel able to gain an advantage (Riker, 1996). Consequently, party 
positioning very often takes the form of placing greater or lesser emphasis on certain 
issues depending on whether it is possible to achieve ascendancy in that policy area.  
 
The majority of literature on party systems tends to assume the existence of a linear 
left/right axis that divides the parties and provides the backdrop against which their 
spatial positioning can take place (Durverger, 1964; Sartori, 1976). However, more 
recently there has been evidence of a post-materialist shift in Western politics that 
has served to undermine the primacy of the traditional left/right axis in party 
competition (Inglehart, 1981). This theory argues that, increasingly, issues outside 
of the left/right axis have come to form key political battlefields that cross and stretch 
traditional forms of ideological positioning. Issues such as environmental politics or 
immigration are two classic examples that do not fall neatly into simplistic theories 
of party competition (Green-Pedersen, 2007). Given our particular focus on 
multinational diversity and immigration, it makes sense at this point to highlight the 
manner in which these issues contravene traditional, ideologically defined party 
boundaries.  
 
Centre-left parties have traditionally tended to combine a focus on protecting wages 
and working conditions for the industrial working class with a cosmopolitan outlook 
on international cooperation (Wheatley, 2015). By contrast, parties of the right have 
usually advocated free-market economics combined with a stronger position on 
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national identity and territoriality (Bobbio & Cameron, 1996). Immigration pushes 
both of these ideational combinations to a logical breaking point. Firstly, parties of 
the left may struggle to endorse immigration when there is a widespread perception 
that it could harm wages for the local population, this creates an inevitable tension 
between a cosmopolitan outlook and a protectionist ideological strand. Parties of the 
right may tend to welcome additional pools of flexible labour brought by immigration, 
whilst struggling with the potential implications for national unity (Freeman, 2011).  
 
Consequently, immigration does not fit naturally into preconceived notions of 
left/right party competition. Furthermore, it highlights the extent to which traditional 
centre-right and centre-left parties have become bound by their own ideological 
orthodoxies, making it difficult to manoeuvre in the political terrain created by large 
scale immigration. By contrast, the extreme populist right has flourished in the 
context of large scale immigration (Bale, 2003). This party family has served to 
provide the basis for a number of instructive studies into party politics and 
immigration in European states. The following section reviews some of these pieces 
of literature to provide an indication of the main themes under discussion and also to 
highlight the limitations of this body of research.  
2.4.1 Anti-immigration parties 
One of the few pools of literature that explicitly connects party positioning with the 
politics of immigration is found in texts that consider the effects of radical, populist, 
right-wing parties on inter-party dynamics (Bale, 2003; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Van 
Spange 2010; Mudde, 2012). Such parties are generally defined by an anti-
immigration narrative, meaning that any study of their impact must place a degree 
of focus on immigration politics. The following section will outline some of the key 
findings from this body of research in order to highlight the relatively limited scope 
of this canon. It will be shown that studies on the systemic effects of extreme right 
parties have built a sizeable literature on immigration as a stimulus in party 
positioning processes. However, these investigations have tended to be conducted 
using quantitative techniques. These approaches have served to paint over some of 
the most important details in order to boil down party positioning to statistical 
averages. It will be suggested that consequently, these studies do not capture the 
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essence of inter-party competition as it is played out in the parry and riposte of 
narrative formulation (Finlayson, 2012).   
 
Populist right-wing parties are undoubtedly perceived to be on the rise in a number 
of European democracies (Bale, 2003; 2008; Mudde, 2012). This has spawned a 
sizeable body of literature that investigates the effects of the populist right on party 
systems throughout the region. Literature on these parties suggests that while their 
form varies according to the political context within which their operations take place, 
that three core ideological components unite these groups, thereby providing the 
recognisable characteristics of a ‘party family’, these traits are: nativism; 
authoritarianism; and populism (Mudde, 2012). Examples of this type of party have 
appeared in a range of European party systems with differing degrees of success. 
Examples include The Golden Dawn party in Greece, the Sweden Democrats and the 
Danish People’s Party in Scandinavia, these are in addition to the longer-standing 
European radical-right parties such as The Freedom Party in Austria and the Front 
National in France (Chakelian, 2017). 
 
While such parties have had limited participation in governments across Europe, their 
effect upon the behaviour of other parties has become a key area of interest for 
political scientists, particularly as hard-right populists have seen significant increases 
in their electoral support in certain European countries (Van Spange, 2010). It is 
often assumed that radical-right parties would have the greatest effect upon centre-
right parties through outflanking them on areas traditionally understood to be 
foundational features of their political platform. However, in practice, radical-right 
parties have tended to do well in working class areas and to place significant electoral 
pressure on the centre-left (Bale, 2008; Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2011).  
 
These studies also suggest that even in European party systems that have not 
witnessed any significant surge in support for right-wing populist parties, there is a 
tendency for centre-right parties to adopt restrictive narratives on immigration. By 
contrast, left-of-centre parties will more commonly avoid immigration as a political 
issue, except where there is a threat from the radical-right. In these instances, 
centre-left parties will harden their stances on immigration leading to the adoption 
59 
  
 
of increasingly restrictive narratives and policy formulations (Alonso & Claro da 
Fonseca, 2011). 
 
The majority of these studies into party behaviour utilise forms of quantitative 
analysis based on analysing manifestoes and observing the frequency of pro/anti-
immigration statements that can be found in the texts. For example, one such study 
is evident in the work of Odmalm (2014). Odmalm carries out a comparative 
investigation in to the politics of immigration in four countries: the UK; Sweden; 
Belgium; and the Netherlands. His project studied party manifestoes between 2001 
and 2010 in order to pin down trends emerging in the field of immigration politics. 
Odmalm’s study suggests that parties will adopt stances on immigration that fit with 
their broader ideological preferences, but the decision to implement a quantitative 
approach to the analysis of manifestoes means that there is limited engagement with 
the actual discursive themes adopted by the political parties.  
 
His research supports his hypothesis that parties will adopt narratives on immigration 
that suit their preferred areas of discussion. However, his decision to express this in 
numerical format means that the actual content becomes obscured to some extent. 
Firstly, the work makes it difficult to assess the extent and form of party positioning 
on immigration. Secondly, it does not capture the dynamics of actual party 
competition as narratives take shape through processes of discursive conflict. This 
requires the use of a more in-depth, qualitative approach that will enable us to map 
the contours of inter-party debates on immigration politics. 
 
It must also be noted that these studies focus exclusively on state-level party 
systems, neglecting sub-national units of governance. This leaves us with no real 
insight in to how immigration politics impacts on inter-party positioning below state-
level. This is problematic as devolved party systems often host very different forms 
of inter-party competition to those at state-level, particularly where there is a strong 
ethno-regionalist tone in such institutional settings (Lijphart, 1975; Horowitz, 1985). 
For instance, when Alonso & Claro da Fonseca (2011) were carrying out their study 
into immigration politics they explicitly chose to leave ethno-regionalist parties out 
of the study stating that “We decided not to consider ethno-regionalist parties in our 
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analysis because their minority nationalism overlaps with some of the categories we 
use to define the immigration issue dimension” (Alonso & Claro Da Fonseca, 2011, 
p. 873).  
 
This omission suggests a gap in the literature that would make it difficult to arrive at 
theories of immigration politics that are transferable across differing types of party 
system. Indeed the overlap between sub-state nationalism and immigration is one of 
the more interesting things to investigate in this area. Without exploration of the 
party politics of immigration in polities marked by ethnic division, a gap will remain 
in our understanding of how immigration politics finds expression in the democratic 
inter-play of ideological positioning. Some attempt to fill this void has been made in 
the literature of a small number of scholars that have placed explicit focus on the 
party politics of immigration in sub-state systems. We shall now examine this small 
pool of literature and outline some the key findings and the limitations of this canon. 
2.4.2 Sub-State Politics of Immigration 
Most of the literature on the party politics of immigration has not engaged with sub-
state settings. Still less consideration has been given to the manifestation of 
immigration politics in the context of party systems riven by the fault-lines of bi-
nationalism (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014). This may be because in sub-state 
units of governance there is very little tendency for the local institutions to formulate 
immigration policy. It is perhaps understandable that immigration does not form a 
major fault-line in inter-party conflict in such contexts. However, issues such as 
discrimination and cultural accommodation form important aspects of party 
competition within sub-state polities characterised by internal ethnic division. Such 
matters are clearly of importance in the Northern Irish context due to the historical 
communal division in the territory, yet they also overlap with issues related to the 
politics of immigration.  
 
This crossover between bi-national issues and immigration potentially creates new 
complications in long-standing political debates. For instance, where party 
competition is marked by the presence of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties 
(SNRP), it is likely that approaches to immigration would be hostile if there was a 
perception that migrants excessively diluted claims to ethnic homogeneity, or positive 
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if it boosted the demographic weight of the territory in question (Jeram et al. 2016). 
Immigration-generated diversity provides the opportunity for ethno-regional parties 
to present themselves as accommodating of difference, but it also has the potential 
to undermine their appeals to regional autonomy based on claims to ethno-national 
self-determination (Adam & Deschouwer, 2016).  
 
Given our understanding of how inter-party positioning takes place, we would expect 
parties to adopt narratives associated with the politics of immigration and to blend 
them with traditional ideological refrains (Odmalm, 2012; 2014). This is likely to be 
influenced to a significant extent by the prevalence of civic and ethnic nationalisms 
present in the operations of inter-party positioning (Banting & Soroka, 2012). Civic 
nationalists are more likely to present an inclusive approach to immigrants, whereby 
they can become equal citizens through residence and participation. Ethnic 
nationalists are more likely to see migrants as outsiders and to advocate protectionist 
measures for the domestic population (Wisthaler, 2016). Crucially, these 
developments are only likely when the parties in question see an opportunity to gain 
a competitive advantage from pursuing either a welcoming or protectionist line of 
argument (Petrocik, 1996). It is also likely that in some instances we will find 
examples of political parties seeking to sidestep issues that do not lend support to 
their wider narratives (Riker, 1996).  
 
One of the few contributions to the study of immigration politics in the context of 
sub-state polities is found in the work of Hepburn (2009; 2011), Zapata-Barrero 
(2012) and their collaborative efforts (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014). Their 
connection with a wider pool of research was encapsulated in an edited volume in 
which Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero establish a conceptual framework for the study 
of immigration politics in the context of sub-state settings. Other contributors then 
offered specific case studies drawn from the study of appropriate territories. Further 
to this, a special edition of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, built upon this 
collection through providing a series of similar regional case studies (see Jeram et 
al., 2016). These collections have forged an interesting new pathway in the study of 
immigration politics and this thesis owes a debt of gratitude to this collective body of 
work.  
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In the Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero volume, the editors first set out conceptual 
frameworks for the analysis of sub-state governance based on the seminal work of 
Dahl (1961), in Who Governs. They begin by arguing that one the key fault-lines in 
the politics of immigration is likely to revolve around centre/periphery considerations. 
This means that state-wide organs of governance will clash with devolved institutions 
over policy competencies for immigration and integration issues. It is assumed that 
because immigration policies tend to be decided at the state-level, and integration is 
a devolved matter, that there will be conflicts along a state/regional fault-line. 
Secondly, the text investigates the party politics of immigration in a number of sub-
state territories, thereby enabling us to establish patterns in the content and form 
that inter-party positioning may take in such contexts (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 
2014).  
 
The volume is instructive in a number of ways, it asks a series of pertinent questions 
and offers some tentative answers on subjects that are close to the issues examined 
in this thesis. Two of the most relevant case studies in the volume are those carried 
out in Scotland and Belgium. The former is a study into the party politics of 
immigration in the context of a devolved institutional setting within the United 
Kingdom, the latter is a study into similar dynamics in a dual-bloc, ethnically defined 
party system. In the case of Scotland it is argued that anti-immigration narratives 
have not become operationalised in inter-party conflict due to the dominance of 
centre-left parties and the reality of somewhat limited immigration into the territory 
(Hepburn & Rosie, 2014). The key point in this contribution is to highlight the 
disparity between the state-level parties that were advocating strong restrictions on 
immigration and the concerns of the regional branches that were operating in a 
different context. The study of Belgian immigration politics highlighted a much closer 
connection between regionalist parties and anti-immigration posturing. It was argued 
that this was due to the polarising effects of extreme right parties operating in both 
national electoral blocs (Dandoy, 2014). 
 
The findings from these case studies represent steps towards an understanding of 
the key drivers of party positioning in relation to diversity and immigration in 
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receiving territories. They go some way towards filling the gap that is left by the 
dominance of studies that take place in state-level party systems and left/right 
ideological spectrums. However, the majority of the authors acknowledge the need 
for more research to be carried out in these areas if we are to proceed towards more 
generalizable patterns. For instance, following an investigation into the specific 
context in Flanders, Deschouwer and Adams state that their work represents “the 
story of one case in one country. Yet the findings are an invitation to further explore 
the ways in which political parties, and SNRPs in particular, deal with immigration 
and integration” (Adam and Deschouwer, 2016). It may be that the particularities of 
such case studies are so distinctive that it is fruitless to seek to establish general 
patterns of immigration and diversity politics in sub-state settings, but it is impossible 
to establish this without significant bodies of in-depth research adding to the existing 
stock. However, it is more likely that with sufficient data collected, patterns will begin 
to emerge more clearly in such areas of enquiry. 
 
Northern Ireland represents a unique context for a study of this kind, but it may shed 
light on other areas of study. Similarly to Scotland, Northern Ireland has had 
relatively low levels of immigration in comparison with other parts of the U.K. and 
policy competency for these areas remains with the state-wide institutions of 
governance in Westminster. However, there are distinct differences due to the fact 
that the political parties that operate at state-level do not organise to any great 
extent in Northern Ireland. The political parties in Northern Ireland are a unique 
product of the local context. The devolved party system in Northern Ireland has 
similarities with the Belgian situation containing mutually exclusive, ethnically 
defined, electoral blocs operating within a consociational institutional framework. 
However, despite the political extremism clearly exhibited throughout the history of 
Northern Ireland, there has been limited evidence of proto-fascist organisations 
making electoral headway in the region (McAuley, 2013). 
 
The most relevant piece of research into the effects of immigration on party politics 
in Northern Ireland was carried out by Gilligan et al. (2011). The authors investigate 
the extent to which immigration has offered the possibility for new approaches to 
cultural pluralism in the territory. The study draws on survey data in order to 
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characterise the positions of political representatives. The research suggests that 
nationalists and centrists were more likely to support expansive policies towards 
immigration than unionists, but that representatives of all parties agreed that 
immigration was likely to change attitudes towards difference in Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, they note cross-party consensus on the strong rejection of racism.  
 
The authors recognise that taken as a singular source of data, the evidence derived 
from surveys may gloss over nuances in the positioning of the political parties. This 
is evident in their suggestion that “The difficulty in interpreting the responses 
indicates that there is a need for qualitative research that explores attitudes towards 
the place of ethnic minorities and immigrants in Northern Ireland” (Gilligan et al. 
2011, p. 15). This study seeks to contribute to this process through carrying out a 
qualitative piece of research that delves into party narratives as they emerge in the 
realm of ideological positioning in Northern Ireland during a period of increasing 
immigration. The study will contribute data to the body of research into the 
relationships between sub-state nationalists and immigrant communities, and will 
add richness to the specific study of migration politics in Northern Ireland. 
2.5 Conclusion and Research Questions 
The politics of diversity and immigration has arisen in various guises across a vast 
and expansive literature. Each of these pools of literature is marked with its own 
range of intricate controversies, creating complex family trees of interwoven debates. 
In this chapter we have provided an overview of some of the key issues related to 
the politics of immigration and cultural accommodation as they have emerged in the 
context of academic literature. We have outlined three primary areas of academic 
investigation: theoretical controversy on the accommodation of cultural diversity; 
policy debates on the expansion and restriction of immigration; and investigations in 
to party political manoeuvring on issues that explicitly relate to immigration. These 
bodies of literature play an essential role in outlining the key issues at stake when 
we begin to discuss the politics of immigration and diversity in Northern Ireland.  
 
The first section of this chapter saw us discuss underlying theories about the correct 
approach to the accommodation of cultural pluralism in diverse societies. Four 
positions were discussed: assimilation; difference blind liberalism; multiculturalism; 
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and interculturalism. It was argued that despite a degree of normative appeal 
associated with assimilation and difference blind liberalism that they did not offer 
equality of citizenship in diverse societies. The chapter argued in favour of 
multiculturalism as a counterweight to the pervasive nature of cultural swamping and 
group-based discrimination that is present in many societies marked by diversity. A 
further range of criticisms derived from the intercultural school were also given 
consideration, though it was suggested that multiculturalists had mounted an 
effective defence of their theory. Furthermore, it was argued that these debates 
focussed primarily upon the relationship between the citizen and the state, paying no 
attention to the operation of political parties in navigating controversies related to 
the accommodation of diversity. This thesis will seek to bridge this gap through 
outlining the manner in which such debates become operationalised in the arena of 
party competition in Northern Ireland. 
 
Secondly, we have reviewed literature that explicitly focusses on some of the key 
issues driving immigration policy debates. This included the overarching policy 
approaches of expansion and restriction, before moving on to some of the more 
detailed debates on economics and social solidarity. However, once again these 
debates seemed to take place in academic literature with very little reference to 
political parties. The literature tends to focus on a perceived distance between elite 
preferences and public opinion but without placing significant attention on how 
differing factions of political elites approach these issues in the context of inter-party 
debate. Again, this is something that will be considered in the realm of inter-party 
positioning processes in the Northern Irish context.   
 
Thirdly, we have considered the body of literature that explicitly examines the party 
political dimensions of immigration debates. We have seen that this literature 
revolves nearly exclusively around the effects of populist right-wing parties on party 
systems across European states. Further to this, we have detailed the dominance of 
quantitative forms of analysis driving these investigations. Finally, the section 
considered the small body of work that places focus on the operation of immigration 
politics at sub-state level. The authors of these texts provide a lightly detailed 
overview of the main contours of immigration politics in such locations. Such studies 
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provide a useful template for our investigation into the politics of immigration and 
diversity in Northern Ireland, but their primary focus is upon understanding the 
dynamics of centre/periphery relationships. 
 
These three pools of literature are useful in helping us to chart the primary contours 
of immigration politics as they have emerged in receiving states. However, except 
with reference to the effect of populist radical-right parties, very little of this research 
considers the inter-party dimensions of these debates. There is even less work that 
considers the implications of immigration politics in the context of an ethnically 
divided party system. This is problematic, as political parties act as a vehicle for the 
formulation and dissemination of narratives on key political issues. The collective 
array of discourses on a particular issue or constellation of issues that arise from the 
back and forth of inter-party conflict, effectively sets the range of democratic options 
available to citizens and provides the discursive context in which political decisions 
are made. Furthermore, successful political parties are able to influence policy 
outcomes through direct access to the offices of state or less formally through 
participating in parliamentary institutions.  
 
If we are to work towards an understanding of how immigration affects inter-party 
debate and how ideological positioning affects the dissemination of narratives on 
immigration, then it is vital to carry out in-depth investigations in a range of different 
party systems. This thesis will contribute to this process through examining the 
politics of diversity and immigration as they emerged in Northern Ireland during a 
period of increasing inward migration. The thesis asks three primary questions, each 
of which will be investigated using an in-depth form of qualitative analysis on party 
narratives in Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014.      
  
 What can Northern Ireland tell us about the manner in which immigration 
debates impact on ideological positioning in an ethnically defined party 
system? 
 What impact has immigration had upon cultural politics in the ethnically 
defined party system in Northern Ireland? 
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 Has immigration-generated diversity had a significant impact on inter-party 
debates related to racism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland? 
 
The first question considers the actual positions adopted by the parties on 
immigration and focusses on the extent to which issues such as economics, welfare 
and social solidarity feature in the narratives of the parties. The second question 
allows us to consider the manner in which ethnically defined parties, with long 
histories of making claims on behalf of a particular national group, will engage with 
cultural diversity in a changing context marked by increasing immigration. For this 
purpose, it will be particularly useful to look at the manner in which parties approach 
language policy in the context of widening linguistic pluralism. The third question, 
enables us to investigate the manner in which racism and sectarianism are discussed 
in party narratives. This will place focus on the relationship between long standing 
controversies related to inter-ethnic division and new issues that have arisen as a 
result of immigration into the territory. 
 
At each stage of enquiry, we will consider what these findings mean in the light of 
theoretical work on inter-party positioning. It will be suggested that political parties 
adopt rational strategies for optimal performance in inter-party conflict. In particular, 
the thesis will highlight the tendency for political parties to survey the wide and 
complex field of immigration politics and to emphasise areas that support their 
broader ideological and strategic objectives. The next chapter will now turn to discuss 
the key methodological decisions that have been taken in order to carry out this 
research. This includes justification of the case study approach and of the methods 
employed in order to capture the discursive nuances of inter-party positioning on 
issues related to diversity and immigration. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Research Process 
3.1 Introduction 
This study focusses upon party positioning around immigration and cultural pluralism 
in Northern Ireland during a period of demographic change between 2004 and 2014. 
In order to carry out this project there will be a significant emphasis placed on the 
scrutiny of political narratives as they emerge in the case study. While a great deal 
of political science literature engages more or less explicitly with case studies and 
upon the analysis of language, be that upon the linguistic frameworks employed by 
individual orators, political parties, institutions, or policy documents, there is a 
tendency in such research to provide a limited methodological overview of the data 
collection and the analytical processes (Hay, 2002). The issue here is not that political 
scientists have not been carrying out in-depth, rigorous forms of data collection and 
analysis, but rather that there has been a tendency to limit the review of 
methodological processes in the write up, instead focussing nearly exclusively on the 
findings of the research.  
 
This potentially leaves the work open to charges of an ‘anything goes’ approach 
(Anataki et al. 2002). For instance, Riesigl describes much of the linguistic analysis 
employed in political science as ‘under-theorised’ and prone to ‘amateurism’ (Riesigl, 
2008, p. 96). While the amateur label is perhaps unfair to many of the political 
scientists involved in these processes of linguistic analysis, it is reasonable to say 
that the majority do not devote the same amount of time to methodological 
considerations as we often see in other social science disciplines. In order to be sure 
to highlight the research processes underpinning the thesis, this chapter will briefly 
outline some of the key methodological decisions that have been taken during this 
project. In this endeavour, the chapter seeks to tread a path between the under-
reporting of method found in some texts and the unnecessarily detailed ‘research 
journey’ approach that is often found in social science literature. 
 
The chapter begins by outlining how Northern Ireland will be used as a case study in 
the thesis and the particular approach of using a single territory, time-bound study 
in order to locate relevant data that will answer our research questions. This will 
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include a brief discussion of some of the more pertinent academic literature on case 
study research in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this 
methodological approach. The chapter then moves on to justify the decision to focus 
on political language in order to characterise the positions of the Northern Irish 
parties. This section will refer to some of the pre-existing literature on the study of 
political language in order to outline the manner in which parties utilise linguistic 
frameworks to differentiate themselves from electoral rivals, and to present their 
platform to the wider citizenry in pursuit of popular support (Freeden, 1998; 
Finlayson & Martin, 2008; Finlayson, 2012). 
 
The final section includes a self-critical overview of the data collection and the 
analytical procedures that have been employed in the research process for this thesis. 
This includes some brief reflection upon actual research experiences before outlining 
the approach to thematic analysis that has been used to make sense of the data 
gathered during the project. The purpose of this section is to provide a degree of 
transparency to the thesis so that others working in the field may critically evaluate 
its utility as a contribution to knowledge. In some cases, the chapter will admit to 
points of weakness on the part of the researcher, in others it is bold enough to 
recognise areas of success. However, it is difficult to be a fair judge of one’s failings 
and accomplishments. Consequently, it is understood that the researcher should 
explain their methodological choices so that others may consider the validity of the 
research. It is for this reason that care has been taken to provide a clear and concise 
audit of the investigative processes throughout this chapter. 
3.2 Using the Case Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the manner in which political parties 
operating in an ethnically defined party system will react to the demographic changes 
brought about by increasing immigration. In order to investigate this, it is necessary 
for us to draw on a detailed case study. The particularities of Northern Ireland during 
the period under consideration help us illuminate the key factors underpinning the 
politics of immigration in the interlinked contexts of an ethnically divided party 
system and a sub-state level of government. The specific details of the Northern Irish 
context in this period will be outlined more thoroughly later in the thesis, but for our 
purposes at this stage, the chapter will offer a general overview of case study 
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research. What follows is an outline of how the case study will be utilised and why 
certain methodological decisions have been made.  
 
The thesis will be carrying out a single setting case study looking at the evolution of 
party positioning over a defined period of time. The case study approach has most 
commonly been used in political science to examine a phenomenon across a number 
of geographic territories, in order to establish areas of commonality that allow for the 
theorisation of the study object (Peters, 1998; Calvert, 2002). Most notably, this 
methodological approach came to the fore in studies of democratisation in regions 
such as South America and Eastern Europe (Stepan & Linz, 1996; Munck & Leff, 
1997). Some scholars have argued that the study of a single case does not allow for 
comparison and generalisation (see Campbell & Stanley, 1966). However, the single 
case study is useful for carrying out in-depth research on a particular phenomenon, 
in a specific context. It allows us to establish arguments based on empirical data that 
can form the basis of at least partial comparison with other test-cases at a later stage 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
Most particularly, this research will provide a useful basis for comparison with other 
case studies into the impact of immigration politics in the context of sub-state 
institutional settings. We have already summarised some of the case studies that 
would provide pertinent comparison with the Northern Irish experience when we 
discussed the body of research associated with Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014) 
and Jeram et al. (2016). In particular, the cases of Scotland and devolved settings 
in Belgium provide areas of crossover with this study (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014; 
Dandoy; 2014). The former highlights an example of responses to immigration in a 
sub-state system within the United Kingdom, the latter illustrates similar dynamics 
an ethnically divided party system. It must of course be noted that Northern Ireland 
has its own particular characteristics that would make it difficult to apply an exact 
comparison with another case study, though it shares features in common with a 
number of settings.  
 
The history of recent ethnic conflict provides just one reason why Northern Ireland 
does not correspond neatly with either the Scottish or Belgian experiences of 
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immigration. With this in mind, it could make sense to compare Northern Ireland with 
other post-conflict societies and the effects of immigration on the party politics of 
such locations. For instance, a useful comparison could be made with political 
responses to immigration in the Basque Country (Jeram, 2014). Northern Ireland 
may not provide the basis for an exact comparison with any of these other territories. 
However, it clearly has certain areas of correlation in terms of immigration, sub-state 
party systems, and societal division that make it suitable for comparing certain 
dynamics as they emerge in a number of different settings. In order to contribute to 
existing bodies of research, this study will focus on elements of consensus and conflict 
in the party system that have arisen as a result of immigration in Northern Ireland 
over a ten year period between 2004 and 2014.  
 
One of the most important things to outline at this stage is the significance of using 
2004 as a starting point for our collection and analysis of data. We begin with a series 
of premises drawn from pre-existing literature in order to make a number of 
assertions about immigration politics in Northern Ireland prior to 2004. Firstly, before 
the expansion of the EU to include the A8 countries, immigration was very scarce in 
Northern Ireland, meaning it was of limited political significance (Russell, 2012). 
Secondly, approaches to the accommodation of diversity were primarily focussed 
upon negotiating differences between the two primary communities with very little 
political attention paid to minority groups in the territory (Little, 2003). Finally, racism 
was not considered to be a major issue by political parties, due to a perception that 
racial discrimination did not exist in Northern Ireland, or was overshadowed by 
sectarianism (Hainsworth, 1998; McVeigh, 1998). However, 2004 witnessed the start 
of a distinct change in migratory traffic into the territory.  
 
While 2004 represents a turning point in Northern Ireland’s experience of immigration 
and diversity it is important to note that prior to this there were a number of ethnic 
minority communities residing within Northern Ireland, many of whom were already 
engaged in struggles for greater recognition (see Hainsworth, 1998). However, it is 
reasonable to say that from this period onwards, Northern Ireland witnessed 
significantly larger flows of inward migration than it had previously experienced. 
Furthermore, in this period, issues such as racism increasingly came to the fore as a 
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social problem in Northern Ireland, highlighting the need for a robust political 
response in order to tackle hate crimes, discrimination and the marginalisation of 
minority groups (Rolston & McVeigh, 2007). 
 
This correlation of factors provides the ideal setting for us to investigate the 
responses of the political parties to these changes in demographic context. The case 
study will focus primarily on the period 2004-2014 in order to chart trends in party 
behaviour with relation to immigration, diversity and racism in this time-frame. The 
significance of 2014 as a cut-off point is threefold. Firstly, in 2014, PSNI statistics on 
race hate crimes in Northern Ireland saw near parity with the number of crimes 
carried out due to sectarian motivations; capturing a vital moment for political 
leadership in the tackling of racism in Northern Irish society (PSNI, 2016). Secondly, 
by 2014, Northern Ireland had the lowest migration rate of any region of the U.K., 
illustrating an obvious statistical end-point of this short period of increased 
immigration (Russell, 2016). Finally, this timeframe captured the most prolonged 
period of devolved governance in the territory with the Assembly and the executive 
functioning from 2007 onwards. However, in the concluding chapter of the thesis, 
some attention will be given to developments that have occurred in the intervening 
period, this will serve to bring the thesis up to date at the time of writing. 
 
We must also outline in detail exactly what will be studied in order to provide us with 
an indicator of the party responses to these demographic changes. The thesis seeks 
to compare and contrast the narratives of the major parties on three issues: 
immigration; diversity; and racism. Hence, the study will be focussing on the 
language used by the parties in reference to these areas during this period. The thesis 
collates material from a number of representative sources and employs a form of 
thematic analysis on the linguistic data. However, before we proceed to outline in 
greater detail the exact data collection processes that have taken place during this 
research project, it is necessary for us to justify the decision to focus on the study of 
political language. This will be achieved through outlining the relevance of language 
to the operations of party competition and its importance in constructing democratic 
choices for the wider citizenry. 
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3.3 Parties, Ideology and Language 
It is the contention of this thesis that political parties utilise language in order to 
differentiate themselves from electoral competitors and to sell their platform to 
potential voters (Sartori, 1976; Ware, 1995). The manner in which parties define 
themselves is through a process of linguistic positioning that serves to mark out their 
particular ideological niche in relation to electoral competitors (Finlayson, 2012). 
Furthermore, ideological structures created by party narratives represent a shortcut 
by which the electorate make sense of the choices available to them at the ballot box 
(Downs, 1957). Consequently, if we are to understand the positioning processes of 
political parties, it is necessary to study the language of party representatives. In 
particular, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to study the language of 
party elites when referring to the core areas of immigration, cultural accommodation 
and racism. In order to capture the subtleties of these positions as they emerge in 
language a qualitative analytical approach is essential. However, we must first 
provide a brief discussion of the relationship between ideology and party positioning 
as it is understood in this thesis. In this endeavour, it is useful to begin by looking at 
some theoretical conceptualisations of ideology. 
 
In the work of Freeden, ideology is defined as “particular patterned clusters and 
configurations of political concepts” (Freeden, 1998 p. 54). This articulation of 
ideology has the benefit of being sufficiently light in touch to encompass the wide 
ranging nature of conceptual constellations that can be characterised as ideologies, 
be that liberalism, socialism, conservatism, environmentalism, feminism and so on 
and so forth. What makes all of these widely divergent ideational structures, each 
with its own linguistic components and differing degrees of conceptual unity, 
ideologies; is that they form discursive frameworks for interpreting key aspects of 
political concern. This linguistic underpinning of ideology is well captured by Hall who 
argues that “Language is the medium par excellence through which things are 
‘represented’ in thought and thus the medium in which ideology is generated and 
transformed” (Hall, 2006, p. 35)  Such clusters of ideas represented in discrete 
linguistic constellations are utilised by political parties in shaping a shared platform 
that guides their sense of collective action, their responses to unfolding events, and 
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to some extent, their policy preferences when holding political office (Schwarzmantel, 
2008). 
 
However, these ideological structures are not formed in isolation. They are a response 
to circumstance that is designed to mark the party’s distinctive appeal in the context 
of their political environment. The dynamic and competitive drivers of ideological 
formulation are summed up in Finlayson’s statement that “Ideological thought and 
expression are never simply a ‘working out’ of a series of concepts or propositions 
but a dynamic interaction of predispositions with both opponents and events, 
mediated by political actors who must make choices about how to understand and 
persuasively present a case they must perform” (Finlayson, 2012 p. 758). In this 
quote, Finlayson captures the active and reactive nature of ideological formulation 
but also brings our attention to the outward facing, performative actions associated 
with ideologies as they are presented to the electorate. 
 
Ideologies are not merely central to defining group identity within parties, they 
constitute a broad collection of interwoven narratives that the party must try to sell 
to potential voters in the pursuit of popular support. Democratic politics in particular, 
places the need for political entrepreneurs to find wider support for their ideological 
frames of reference than that of their adversaries (Van Dijk, 1998). This means 
finding a way to explain a political concept that makes it intelligible and digestible to 
voters and preferable to that of electoral rivals. The manner in which political parties 
are formed around discursively fashioned conceptual hubs, and the requirement for 
parties to sell their particular ideological brand through the vehicle of communication, 
serves to highlight the essential need for the study of language in order to gain 
understanding of parties and party systems. Ideological frameworks serve both to 
define the parties as distinctive entities, and to delineate the range of democratic 
choices available to citizens at the ballot box.  
 
Consequently, political parties are defined by their manipulation of discursive 
frameworks. They simultaneously reflect the prevailing political context, and shape 
it to some degree, through marketing their ideological perspective (Lipset, 2000). 
The more successful parties could be argued to reflect most clearly the wishes of the 
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public, but their privileged access to communicative resources allows parties to 
influence the perceptions of a wider audience of citizens (Statham & Geddes, 2006). 
It is for this reason that we place our focus on political parties, and use the study of 
discursive themes, to help us characterise ideological positioning on the key areas of 
immigration, cultural accommodation and racism.  
 
In research literature, there are a number of notable approaches that have been used 
for the study of political language. One of the most commonly used methods is 
discourse analysis as discussed in the work of Fairclough (2001). Fairclough draws 
on Foucauldian theoretical roots in order to examine the manner in which power 
relationships are constructed and maintained through operations in language (see 
Foucault 1976: 1982). However, discourse analysis is the study of language ‘beyond 
the sentence’, which is to say that it focusses on meanings or ideas that may not be 
explicitly articulated, but are located in the text or speech in less obvious ways (Linde 
& Labov, 1975). This type of study often focusses on choices of grammatical 
construction or word selections and omissions in order to establish the functions of 
linguistic communication in particular situations. Hence, its primary use is to study 
veiled operations of power in language. This makes it unsuitable for our aim of 
characterising the positioning processes of political parties as they seek to recruit 
popular support. This research will focus on what the parties say they stand for and 
then interpret this according to theories of party competition, rather than trying to 
locate meanings beyond the sentence itself through grammatical deconstruction. 
 
Another popular method for researching political communication is found in the 
rhetorical approach. Rhetoric, represents a particular style of communication that is 
often used in order to persuade people of the validity of certain interpretations of 
events and proscriptions for action. In the context of democratic politics, it is best 
understood as a form of communication in which political entrepreneurs seek to sell 
their particular ideological discourses on areas of societal concern to the voting public 
(Martin, 2014). The term is rooted in the participatory politics associated with the 
ancient Greek city states: principles of rhetoric were studied to a significant extent 
in the work of Aristotle (2004). His texts sought to outline the key systems that 
governed such linguistic exchanges. In particular, Aristotle outlined three primary 
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types of appeal made within rhetorical argument: ethos, which pertained to the 
speaker or writer themselves; logos, which refers to appeals to logic and rationality; 
and pathos, which made emotional appeals upon the listener (Aristotle, 2004). This 
approach to the understanding of rhetoric has recently re-emerged in a significant 
canon of research that carries out rhetorical political analysis on various aspects of 
British party politics. (Finlayson & Martin, 2008; Crines, 2013; Atkins & Finlayson, 
2013).   
 
This thesis will study rhetoric, but will not employ a rhetorical analysis. These types 
of analysis are an interesting addition to the study of political language, but their 
primary focus is on the techniques employed by the orator in order to persuade an 
audience. This is to say that these analyses focus on the performative aspects of the 
language used rather than simply observing the patterns of meaning within the text. 
Where discourse analysis seeks to delve into the subtext of language in order to 
provide insight into power relationships, rhetoric dissects the delivery of the message 
and the devices used to persuade audiences. Both of these approaches are valid, but 
neither is suitable to our stated aim of mapping out the contours of inter-party debate 
on the issues of immigration, cultural accommodation and racism. For this, we need 
to study what is actually said. We are less interested in what is not said, or how 
something is said. Consequently, the thesis has chosen to employ a flexible and 
pragmatic approach to the study of political language, commonly referred to as 
thematic analysis.     
3.4 Thematic Analysis 
The analytic method employed in this thesis is a simple but effective form of thematic 
analysis. The approach is deductive in nature and guided by existing theories of party 
competition. Thematic analysis revolves around establishing patterns of meaning 
within qualitative data. Some proponents of thematic analysis argue that it is a 
methodological process in its own right, where others see it as a technique that 
accompanies a range of different qualitative methodologies (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun 
& Clarke, 2017). In this thesis it will be used as a stand-alone method, though it is 
understood that forms of thematic analysis can feature in other approaches to coding 
and thematising data. By taking this direction, we can proceed with analysis without 
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becoming encumbered by the theoretical baggage associated with a number of other 
qualitative methodologies (Braun & Clarke, 2006).   
 
Thematic analysis involves a series of key stages that should be followed in order to 
carry out a rigorous and comprehensive dissection of linguistic material. Firstly, it is 
necessary to become fully acquainted with the data corpus, this can be achieved 
through regular reading, listening and transcribing of interviews and other source 
materials. Secondly, it is necessary to break the data down into fragments through 
a coding process that places labels on key phrases (Charmaz, 2011). Thirdly, these 
codes are reviewed in order to find recurring patterns within the data corpus that 
collectively form discursive themes. Finally, the process pieces the themes together 
so that they provide a satisfactory, logically presented account of the meanings 
expressed in the data. It is essential that these findings must be presented in a 
fashion that answers our original research questions (Guest et al. 2012). 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) identify a number of potential ‘pit-falls’ that may arise in 
the practice of thematic analysis. The sections below, detailing the analytic process, 
will serve to illustrate how these potential problems have been avoided in this study. 
Firstly, the authors argue that some uses of thematic analysis will be insufficiently 
detailed and as such will take vast chunks of data as codes in themselves without the 
fragmentation process associated with a detailed analysis. Secondly, they argue that 
analysts should not take interview headings themselves to become part of the coding 
framework. Thirdly, they state that researchers should avoid what they term to be 
‘superficial’ codes, based on very little evidence within the data. Finally, they suggest 
that some researchers ‘mismatch’ actual meanings and codes due to their 
preoccupation with a particular line of argument.  
 
Most of these items are self-explanatory and can be avoided by sufficient focus and 
rigor in the analytic process. One area that should be considered further is the role 
that the original interview schedules should play in the allocation of analytic codes. 
Braun and Clarke suggest that this should be avoided. However, when carrying out 
a deductive form of enquiry, the researcher will have created the interview schedule 
with a view to establishing whether certain patterns will emerge from the 
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investigation. While the coding and thematising process will doubtlessly serve to 
highlight further depth and complication in the responses, it is not clear that the 
researcher should dispense with the possibility of using interview schedules as a 
partial guide to their analytical processing. 
 
As outlined earlier, the key aim of this project is to observe the impact of increasing 
immigration on party competition in the Northern Irish party system during a period 
of changing cultural demography. Consequently, the analysis used in this thesis was 
guided, to some extent, by general theories of party competition and literature on 
the particular context of Northern Ireland. An attempt to forget the conceptual 
foundations that had underpinned the interview schedules in pursuit of unattainable 
objectivity would have been a flawed and pointless endeavour. Hence, the analysis 
proceeded in a deductive fashion, looking for examples of consensus and conflict 
within the data across a range of issues. However, these were very broad headings 
that preceded data analysis. As coding took place, greater levels of complexity 
emerged from the data itself. What follows is a more in-depth account of the research 
process with a particular focus on the fragmentation and the reassembly of data. 
Finally, examples of some of the findings will be expressed using a diagrammatic 
format. Before we do this, it is necessary to provide an overview of the practical 
process of data collection. This will be discussed in the following section. 
3.5 The Research Process 
In order to gain a clear picture of the manner in which immigration has impacted on 
party positioning during the period studied, it has been necessary to bring together 
a number of sources of linguistic content that collectively enable us to characterise 
the positions taken by each party on the primary issues. This process has involved 
the dissection of party documents such as election manifestoes; press releases; 
contributions made in relevant Assembly debates; media sources; and a series of 
semi-structured interviews that were carried out with party representatives between 
2013 and 2014. Using these sources in addition to interview data also aids 
triangulation and increases confidence that an in-depth picture of the chosen case 
study develops. 
 
 
79 
  
 
The questions under consideration in this study relate to the manner in which political 
parties in Northern Ireland have adapted to changing patterns of immigration in the 
territory. Consequently, the study focusses upon the language of elected 
representatives from the major parties in order to collate useful data. Initially, 
documentary sources were studied in order to sketch a limited overview of party 
positioning on the key issues; the process then moved on to seeking out direct 
contact with party representatives.  The aim was to establish contact and build 
relationships with MLA’s in order to facilitate the collation of data from this target 
group.  
 
A goal was set to capture a cross-section of views that would enable the thesis to 
characterise key features of each party’s narratives on immigration politics, cultural 
pluralism, and racism. Interview schedules were built loosely on a handful of key 
conversational areas such as immigration, welfare, employment, discrimination, and 
language politics. Politicians were asked to discuss their views on these key topics in 
interviews that lasted usually between thirty minutes and one hour. Before 
participants were interviewed in this process, they were provided with an overview 
of the key research aims and asked to fill in a consent form in order to ensure that 
interviewees were fully briefed on what issues were likely to come up in the study 
and could provide informed consent for their participation.  
 
In total, twenty six in-depth interviews were carried out with MLA’s from across the 
party spectrum. This included interviews with eight Irish nationalists, seven non-
aligned MLA’s, and eleven unionists. This balance provided an overrepresentation of 
non-aligned MLA’s in terms of their proportion within the Assembly, though it also 
reflects a keenness to participate from APNI politicians that is instructive as to which 
of the parties confidently approach the issues discussed in this thesis. However, this 
imbalance was remedied to a significant extent by the glut of information in the public 
domain about relationships between the ethnically defined parties and a relative 
paucity of information about non-aligned perspectives.  
 
This data collection process was continued until a noticeable degree of ‘saturation’ 
became evident whereby sources were repeatedly articulating similar types of 
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arguments, meaning that additional collection was unlikely to provide much in the 
way of fresh substantive content (Seidman, 2012). The themes discussed in the 
interview data were also compared with party representatives’ contributions to 
relevant Assembly debates in order to triangulate the findings against another pool 
of data. Additionally, representatives from civil society organisations working on 
behalf of ethnic minority communities were consulted in order to establish their views 
on the relationships between the major parties and the concerns of immigrant 
groups. This provided a useful perspective and a basis for comparison with party 
narratives that will be utilised in places when the thesis turns to discuss the findings 
of the research process. What follows is an overview of how participants were 
approached and some of the access difficulties that arose during this process.  
3.5 Gaining Access 
One of the key challenges in this process was persuading politicians, who had full 
schedules, to give up their time to participate in a study that would offer them little 
immediate benefit and may highlight problematic features in their party's approach 
to immigration, cultural accommodation and racism. Challenges of this nature are 
faced by researchers seeking access to political elites in even the most benign 
circumstances (Goldstein, 2002). The particular time period in which data collection 
took place was marked by a political crisis in Northern Ireland, which saw loyalist 
groups come out on to the streets to protest against new rules limiting the number 
of days that the Union Flag would fly above Belfast City Hall (McDonald, 2013). This 
situation served to highlight the enduring importance of the ‘two traditions’ paradigm 
in the politics of Northern Ireland but had a negative impact on the researcher’s 
ability to gain access to politicians in order to interview them.  
 
Often in this period, interviews were cancelled or postponed, with the offices of the 
participants generally stating that more pressing issues had arisen. Furthermore, 
APNI participants nearly exclusively requested to remain anonymous in this period. 
This was understandable given that the party was being targeted by the protestors, 
and some of the issues raised in the interviews touched on sensitive cultural 
concerns. Due to the high number of interviewees requesting anonymity in this 
period, a decision was taken to reference all participants anonymously, thereby 
achieving balanced treatment of all respondents. In order to overcome these 
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difficulties of gaining access, it was necessary to employ an organised, methodical 
and relentless approach to contacting the offices of interview targets by letter, e-
mail, and telephone calls. This strategy made it possible to obtain sufficient numbers 
of quality, in-depth interviews with MLA's from across the party spectrum. The 
process provided a valuable store of useful data, particularly when coupled up with 
the findings derived from collecting and examining evidence from other sources. 
 
However, gaining access to interviewees is only the first challenge in the process. 
Executing semi-structured interviews comes with its own set of unique problems for 
the qualitative researcher. Fortunately, when assembling and carrying out semi-
structured interviews there are vast bodies of literature that can be employed to 
provide theoretical and practical guidance for the researcher (for example Grbich, 
2007; Bryman, 2008; Silverman, 2013; Holiday, 2016). However, this literature is 
general in scope and does not always capture the particular challenges in elite 
interviewing in a divided society (McEvoy, 2006). The following section will provide 
an overview of some of the particular difficulties that arose and the measures that 
were employed in order to overcome them. Firstly, we will discuss general problems 
related to semi-structured interviewing and then consider the particular issues 
associated with carrying out elite interviews in a divided society. 
3.6 Interviews 
While more structured interviews offer the researcher an easily repeatable process, 
they lack the ability to capture the richness, depth and the range of perspectives 
obtainable from the semi-structured interviewing format (Kin, 2011). When 
employing a looser approach to interviewing, it is necessary for the researcher to 
begin with wide-ranging, open-ended questions that allow the interviewee sufficient 
space to express themselves. The researcher must maintain a delicate balance 
between steering the interview to retain a degree of focus upon core research aims, 
whilst leaving sufficient conversational space for the interviewee to bring in things 
that they feel are pertinent to the discussion as it takes place (Russell, 2013).  
 
This balance is difficult to achieve and its application is perhaps more of an ideal to 
be strived for than a perfectible possibility. The difficulty for the researcher carrying 
out less structured interviews is the requirement placed upon them to engage in 
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intense listening in order to make sense of the participant’s discussions, while 
maintaining a certain level of focus on established research aims (Bryman, 2008). 
This requires great attention to detail and a high degree of conversational dexterity 
on the part of the researcher. Carrying out these interviews was a learning process 
in which the early examples fell into difficulties such as asking questions that were 
overly verbose. This would have the effect of either guiding the responses in a certain 
direction, or eliciting very short answers. As the process unfolded, interviews became 
less tightly constrained. This enabled the respondents to steer the conversation in a 
direction of their choosing and uncovered useful streams of data by highlighting the 
conversational priorities of the interviewee rather than those of the researcher.   
 
When interviewing elite politicians, it is necessary for the researcher (particularly a 
novice researcher) to appreciate some degree of power differential. Firstly, it is 
important to ensure that the interviewee is fully briefed on the aims of the research 
and the type of questions that will arise in the interview. Once this is established it 
is necessary to ask questions that fit within these boundaries (Lilleker, 2002). The 
politicians were participating voluntarily, following ethical guidelines, they were 
instructed that their consent for the data to be used could be withdrawn at any time. 
Consequently, it was useful to establish some degree of trust from the participants 
before proceeding to ask potentially controversial questions (Leech, 2002). As a 
result of these considerations, the interviews tended to start with the least 
threatening questions such as asking how they became involved with their party and 
would move through to some of the more challenging questions at the end. Typically, 
the interviews would finish with discussions of racism, unless they were prompted 
earlier in the interview by the participant. This approach enabled free flowing 
conversation to be established before the schedule shifted onto the potentially 
difficult issues under examination. 
 
Additionally, there were considerations related to the study of an ethnically divided 
party system. McEvoy (2006) notes that participants had the potential to view 
interviewers as biased due to their ethnic origins. In the Northern Irish case, such 
issues are most acute if the researcher is perceived to be associated with one of the 
primary ethnic groupings resident within the territory. As an outsider this was less of 
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an issue, though it became apparent that it was necessary to avoid using certain 
terminologies with particular respondents. This became manifest around how to label 
Northern Ireland, with some nationalists discussing ‘the six counties’ and the ‘north 
of Ireland’. To use such terms could potentially offend unionist participants, but were 
helpful in gaining the trust of nationalist respondents. Consequently, the terminology 
employed by the interviewer was moulded to some extent in order to match the likely 
perspective of the participant. Simple measures such as this were helpful in avoiding 
contentious breakdowns in communication that would have had a negative effect on 
the relationship between the interviewer and the participant.  
 
Finally, the interviews required a degree of validation against other sources. Whilst 
the semi-structured interview offers in-depth accounts of how the participants 
perceived the issues under consideration, such responses do not necessarily follow 
party lines. Given that this research is principally interested in characterising the 
responses of parties, rather than individuals, it was necessary to ensure that the 
interviews correlated with the broader narratives of the parties being investigated. 
For this purpose, a further process of research was carried out that focussed on 
establishing party narratives in the public domain. Data was obtained from sources 
such as Hansard records of debates within the Assembly, contributions made in media 
outlets, and policy documents that discussed approaches to the accommodation of 
difference in the territory. By comparing the interview data with this wider body of 
material, a degree of triangulation could be achieved that ensured such narratives 
reflected common patterns within inter-party debate (Davies, 2001). Once the 
relevant data was obtained, the results were transcribed and then the process of in-
depth analysis began. 
3.7 Analysing the data 
In the first stage of analysis it was necessary to bring together all of the data that 
had been derived from the various sources. It was split up roughly according to its 
association with each of the major political parties. With this complete, the next step 
was to set about reviewing the data with a view to disassembling it and applying 
codes to the relevant chunks of text. The coding process was informed by wider 
reading on immigration politics, theoretical approaches to the accommodation of 
cultural pluralism, racism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland, and the positioning 
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strategies of political parties that were discussed at length in the literature review 
section of the thesis. In this sense, a deductive coding process took place in which 
these interpretative frameworks were employed in order to make sense of the data. 
The main issues identified in the literature provided a broad framework for beginning 
to code the interview data. 
 
The coding process began simply by reading and rereading interviews and other data 
sources in order to become familiar with the data and to start to understand the 
issues that had been captured in the interviews. When data sources seemed to speak 
to the study’s research questions they were marked up with codes using the 
comments feature on Microsoft Word. Below are some examples of how this took 
place using sections of interview data with unionist politicians during discussions on 
language policy. These examples illustrate the manner in which codes were applied 
to sections of the semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, the excerpts serve to 
suggest the variety of responses that could arise even when discussing similar issues 
with members of the same party. Both of the fragments below highlight certain 
discursive strategies employed in order to block further funding for the Irish 
language, yet different arguments are used across the two texts to justify this 
position. The first interviewee cites primarily economic arguments against further 
funding, the second focuses upon the suggestion that the Irish language has become 
weaponised in a cultural war prosecuted by Irish nationalists. However, both invoke 
minority languages as a further defensive mechanism to bolster their broader 
arguments. The codes applied, then, reflect the main issue (Irish language) and the 
different perspectives on its funding (economic vs. cultural).  
 
85 
  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – DUP 1 Interview Excerpt 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – DUP 3 Interview Excerpt 
 
Using this coding strategy it was possible to demarcate statements relevant to the 
research questions as they arose within the data. The codes were brought together 
for comparison using and excel spreadsheet (for an example of this see appendix 4). 
When certain codes recurred in the data, it became possible to establish themes that 
carried across different texts. These themes served to highlight important discursive 
features that underpinned the positioning strategies employed by the different 
parties, though in some cases these themes crossed party boundaries, highlighting 
areas of overlap on certain issues. In order to illustrate how codes led to the 
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development of themes, it is useful to provide a diagrammatic example that outlines 
the ways that the codes became themes at this stage of the analysis. Codes were 
grouped in order to develop particular themes (see figure 3.1). In this instance we 
see codes brought together that show how certain respondents sought to gain 
ownership over the issue of racism. These codes were largely applied to Sinn Féin 
respondents who were using racism as a means to prosecute attacks on political 
unionism. Others codes are derived from the smaller parties’ narratives on the failure 
of the OFMDFM to tackle racism. Due to the manner in which different parties were 
seeking to exploit racism as a component in party positioning strategies, this theme 
was labelled ‘Racism Issue Ownership’. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Racism Issue Ownership 
 
The diagram above represents one of the themes related to what then became a  
core concept of ‘Racism’. Below we can see the wider range of themes associated 
with this core concept. The full list of core concepts, themes and codes can be found 
in tabular format at the end of this chapter (see tables 3.1, 3.2 & 3.3). 
 
Theme 
Racism 
Issue 
Ownership
Code 1: Anti-
Irish racism  
Code 2: 
Loyalist/Racist 
Connection 
Code 3: Lack of 
Leadership fom 
Unionists
Code 4: Proctive 
on racism
Code 5: Low-
level Racism
Code 6: 
Frustration/Lack 
of Progress
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Figure 3.2 – Racism: Core Concept and Associated Themes 
 
As the thesis progresses through the final chapters in which the findings are 
presented in a more detailed fashion it will become possible to outline the full range 
of discursive strategies that were employed by the parties in relation to each of the 
issues under consideration. These chapters will offer an in-depth insight into the 
codes and themes and core concepts that were established during the analytic 
process. In order to provide an overview of these findings at this stage, it is useful 
for us to provide a table illustrating the key themes and the codes that emerged 
during analysis. The tables below offer a concise review of the outcomes of the 
analytic process. 
 
Core Concept Key Discursive Themes Codes Consensus/ Conflict 
Immigration Expansive/Restrictive  Welfare and public services Unionists vs 
Nationalists/Non-
Aligned 
    Immigration mythologies Nationalist/ Non-
Aligned 
    Abuse of welfare Minority of unionists 
  Work and 
Employment  
Strong work ethic of 
migrants 
Cross-party consensus 
    Irish emigration Nationalist only 
    Undesirable jobs Cross-party consensus 
Core 
Concept: 
Racism
Theme 1: 
Rejection 
of Racism
Theme 2: 
Racism 
Issue 
Ownership
Theme 3: 
Racism 
Avoidance 
Straegies
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   Immigrants take local jobs Minority of unionists 
    Immigrants drain public 
resources 
Minority of unionists 
 
Table 3.1 – Immigration Themes  
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Core Concept Key Discursive Themes Codes Consensus/ Conflict 
Cultural 
Accommodation 
and Language 
Cultural Impact Dilution narratives Smaller Parties 
  Sari, samosa, steel-band 
approach 
Larger parties 
 Language Politics 
(Irish) 
Irish belongs to everyone Nationalists 
  Unionists bigoted Sinn Féin 
  Not enough budget Unionists (civic) 
 Language Politics 
(Ulster-Scots) 
Lack of parity with Irish Unionists (ethnic) 
  Fund but parity not possible Nationalists 
 External Minority 
Languages 
Recognise full scale of 
diversity 
APNI 
  Matter for private sphere Sinn Féin 
  Support migrant languages 
not Irish 
Unionists  
 
Table 3.2 – Cultural Accommodation and Language Themes 
 
Core Concept Key Discursive Themes Codes Consensus/ Conflict 
Racism/Anti-
Racism 
Rejection of Racism Condemnation of racists Cross-party consensus 
  Racism linked with 
sectarianism 
Cross-party consensus 
  Racism is a big problem Nationalist/Non-aligned 
 Racism: Issue 
Ownership 
Anti-Irish racism  Sinn Féin 
  Loyalist/racist connection Sinn Féin 
  Lack of leadership from 
unionists 
Sinn Féin 
  Proactive on racism Sinn Féin/APNI 
  Low-level racism APNI 
  Frustration/Lack of progress Smaller Parties 
 Racism Avoidance 
Strategies 
Racism second tier to 
sectarianism 
Unionists 
  Ethnic cleansing of 
Protestants 
Unionists 
 
Table 3.3 – Racism Themes 
 
90 
  
 
The findings chapters were based on the core concepts headings in the tables above. 
Consequently, the three findings chapters focus on expansive and restrictive 
approaches to immigration, accommodating diversity, and racism/anti-racism. The 
chapters then turn to elucidate the fault-lines that emerge between the parties and 
to offer explanations based on theories of party competition. Each chapter marks out 
aspects of conflict and consensus between the parties in relation to the key issues 
during the period under consideration. In order to support the arguments made in 
these chapters, significant space is given to discursive examples that arose within 
the data.     
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a working, pragmatic account of the methodological 
decisions that have been taken in order to carry out this piece of research. It has 
self-consciously trodden a path that enables us to understand how these research 
methods have helped us to arrive at answers to the questions outlined in the thesis, 
without becoming excessively enmeshed in theoretical controversies related to 
competing methodologies. It has been shown that the Northern Irish experience of 
migration between 2004 and 2014 will be utilised in order to study the politics of 
immigration, diversity and racism in an ethnically divided party system. With this 
established, it was necessary to devote some attention to theoretical accounts of the 
ideological positioning processes that underpin party competition and voter choice in 
the context of multi-party democratic systems. It has been argued here that due to 
the importance of language in defining political parties and thereby shaping party-
systems, we must focus on the manipulation of linguistic frameworks if we are to 
understand how the parties have adapted to the realities of increasing immigration. 
 
The chapter then turned to outline the core principles of the approach to thematic 
analysis that has been used in this thesis. This included an overview of the manner 
in which the data were collected in order to facilitate the study. Also we have 
discussed some of the key challenges faced by a researcher carrying out interviews 
with elite politicians in the context of a divided society. We then turned to outline the 
process by which these sources were dissected in order to establish a framework of 
codes across the linguistic resources, before reconstructing the fragments around 
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meaningful themes. The next chapter will now provide further detail on why it is that 
Northern Ireland makes a suitable case study for this investigation. For this purpose, 
we will outline the specific historical context related to the history of inter-ethnic 
conflict in the province, the evolution of an ethnically divided party system, and the 
changes in migratory trends into the territory that emerged during our period of 
study. 
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Chapter Four: Diversity and Immigration in 
Northern Ireland 
4.1 Introduction 
Given the limited body of research that has been carried out into the impact of 
immigration on diversity politics in ethnically divided, sub-state party systems and 
our aim to try and remedy this through the use of a detailed qualitative investigation, 
it is necessary for the thesis to outline the case study that has been selected for this 
purpose. Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014 has been selected as an 
illustrative example for a number of reasons that will become clearer as the chapter 
unfolds. The territory represents an ethnically divided, bi-national society with a 
recent history of conflict over its constitutional status (Horowitz, 2001). This conflict 
was mediated in the late 1990s using a consociational institutional framework 
designed to promote cross-cutting affiliation at elite level (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006a; 
2006b). The party system in Northern Ireland reflects these underlying divisions in 
the society with ideological competition primarily defined by constitutional and 
cultural fault-lines (Tilley et al. 2008; McGlynn et al. 2014).  
 
The particularities of this type of party competition in Northern Ireland serve to 
provide a suitable test-case in which we may seek to observe the behaviour of 
politicians operating in an ethnically defined party system. Prior to the peace 
agreement, very few immigrants chose to work or settle in the territory. It was more 
common for people to leave the region in search of opportunity elsewhere (Gilligan, 
2008). However, with the peace agreement in place and the expansion of E.U. 
freedom of movement principles to the A8 countries in 2004, this trend was reversed, 
with significant numbers of migrants choosing to work and settle in Northern Ireland 
(Russell, 2012). This combination of an ethnically defined party system and a period 
of increasing immigration provides an ideal setting for us to investigate the core 
themes under consideration in this thesis. 
 
The chapter will proceed in three broad stages as it outlines in greater detail the 
particularities of this case study. Firstly, we will consider some of the divisions that 
affect Northern Irish society. The chapter will utilise existing research to highlight the 
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national and constitutional dimensions of societal division. Additionally, focus will be 
placed upon the political implications of the religious and cultural components of 
societal segregation.  
 
Secondly, our attention will turn to the nuances of party competition in Northern 
Ireland as it has evolved in this divided context. Most particularly, this section will 
outline the bi-national fault-line that underpins party conflict in Northern Ireland, 
before discussing the dual party systems that have evolved in the province and the 
various forms that non-ethnic, counterbidding parties have taken in this context 
(Coakley, 2007). This will include a section that addresses electoral trends since the 
peace agreement. This will take into account debates over the merits of 
consociationalism and the rise of ‘tribune’ parties as the primary political groups in 
the territory (Mitchell et al. 2009). This will provide the reader with a sense of some 
of the key ideological contours and electoral trends that have shaped recent party 
politics in Northern Ireland.  
 
Finally, the chapter turns to address the extent of immigration into the province 
during the period 2004-2014. It will be argued that while the numbers of immigrants 
entering Northern Ireland may be relatively small compared with other places in the 
United Kingdom, it has undeniably impacted on cultural demography in Northern 
Ireland since 2004. The chapter will review policy documents aimed at the 
management of difference as they have emerged in this changing context. It will be 
suggested that such policy frameworks have been ill-equipped to deal with an 
increasingly diverse society due to their excessive preoccupation with issues that 
derive from Northern Ireland’s particular history of societal division. Finally, the 
chapter moves on to discuss the emerging body of literature that has explicitly 
engaged with issues related to cultural pluralism in the context of an increasingly 
diverse Northern Ireland. This will serve to outline some of the existing findings in 
this body of research and gaps in our current understanding. The first section of this 
chapter will now progress to discuss the particular importance of nationality, religion 
and culture in the context of Northern Irish society.  
94 
  
 
4.2 Northern Ireland: ‘Divided Society’ 
4.2.1 National Identity and the Constitutional Issue 
The distinctive characteristics of contemporary Northern Irish politics are rooted in a 
long and complex history of conflicting nationalisms. Northern Ireland has become, 
and remains, a divided society due to a legacy of historical conflict between two 
distinct national communities; one described as Catholic/Irish/Nationalist and the 
other as Protestant/British/Unionist. Northern Ireland as a political entity was 
founded in 1921, in an attempt to grant self-determination to Irish nationalists by 
establishing the twenty-six county Irish Free State in the rest of Ireland, whilst 
appeasing the Northern Protestant population of the remaining six counties. The 
Protestant community in these areas considered themselves to be British, and were 
generally opposed to being governed by an Irish Catholic majority (Dixon, 2008).  
 
The six counties of Northern Ireland, in which Protestant unionists formed a majority, 
remained subject to British sovereignty with their own parliament and significant 
autonomy from Westminster. The devolved administration was dominated by 
unionists due to their in-built democratic majority. This partition theoretically offered 
the British community the security they sought from domination in an independent 
Ireland. However, the divide left a significant minority of Irish Catholics within the 
confines of the new sub-state. This group was largely opposed to partition, many saw 
the Northern sub-state as an illegitimate continuance of British colonialism in Ireland 
and sought the reunification of the Island under a single authority in Dublin (McGarry 
& O’Leary, 1995). This situation led to the outbreak of ethnic conflict at various points 
in the history of Northern Ireland, the most protracted of which was fought by 
paramilitary groups from within both of the primary communities and the British state 
between 1969 and 1998 (Dixon, 2008). The result of this conflict was the collapse of 
the devolved administration in Northern Ireland and increased segregation between 
the two communities.  
 
Northern Ireland’s history of constitutional instability has contributed to a situation 
whereby national identity takes on a particular significance that is not found in other 
parts of the U.K. Britishness and Irishness have come to be understood in 
95 
  
 
oppositional terms in the territory. Furthermore, national identity is commonly 
intertwined with religious background, adding a primordial dimension and an 
exclusivity that is uncommon in contemporary Western Europe (Moxon-Brown, 
1991).  Immediately prior to the outbreak of ‘the troubles’, Richard Rose carried out 
a survey on identity in Northern Ireland that suggested religion and nationality were 
not joined by a simplistic binary relationship. For instance, his work suggested that 
20% of Protestants considered themselves to be Irish, and 20% of Catholics 
considered themselves to be British (Rose, 1971, p. 208). As the conflict progressed, 
and the local institutions of governance were suspended, national identification 
became more polarised along ethnic lines. By 1986, only 3% of Protestants surveyed 
stated Irish as their national identity and only 6% of Catholics identified as British 
(Whyte, 1991 p. 69). In a context of inter-group confrontation with no civic outlet for 
communal tensions, identity has fuelled violence and violence has hardened identity.  
 
The peace agreement explicitly recognised the centrality of national identity to the 
conflict and sought to guarantee the preferences of members of both communities 
when it stated that it was: 
  
The birth right of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and 
be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly 
confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by 
both governments (GFA, 1998).  
 
The agreement sought to recognise the bi-national fault-line in Northern Ireland, but 
to maintain British sovereignty in the region unless constitutional change was sought 
by a democratic majority at some point in the future (Horowitz, 2002). However, if 
the effect of inter-communal conflict was to bolster ethnic exclusivity in national 
identity, it seems reasonable for us to ask what patterns have emerged in national 
identification since the peace agreement? For this purpose, we will turn to more 
recent research into national identity in Northern Ireland in order to examine aspects 
of continuity and change.  
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An interesting development in patterns of national identification in Northern Ireland 
has been the increasing evidence of people choosing to describe themselves as 
‘Northern Irish’ rather the ‘British’ or ‘Irish’ (Garry & McNicholl, 2015). The 2011 
Census data revealed that 29% of people self-identified as Northern Irish and that 
this category included a significant number of both Protestant and Catholic 
respondents (McKeown, 2014). This has prompted suggestions that these data 
represent growing areas of commonality between the two primary national 
communities and the withering of exclusive understandings of nationality in the 
territory. Furthermore, research suggests that those who self-identify as Northern 
Irish are more likely to exhibit tolerant attitudes to people with different religious 
backgrounds (Lowe & Muldoon, 2014).  
 
However, it is not clear that this shift represents an increasing sense of connection 
between the primary communities in the territory. The term Northern Irish could 
apply equally to a person stating the fact that they consider themselves Irish, but 
resident in a Northern part of the island, or could refer to someone that considers 
themselves to be a resident in a legitimately British territory. It is not clear that 
Northern Irishness represents anything other than a rebranding of more traditional 
forms of identity. Further research is needed to unpack this terminology and to 
establish what is meant by ‘Northern Irish’ when used by members of different 
cultural communities. In the work of Garry and McNicholl (2015) there is a tentative 
suggestion that, particularly for Catholic respondents, a Northern Irish identity 
correlates with political moderation. Growth of an inclusive approach to national 
identity may suggest the gradual dilution of communal separateness, but in practice, 
Northern Ireland is still heavily segregated according to religious background. The 
following section will address some of the key issues related to this ethno-sectarian 
division in the territory.  
4.2.2 Ethno-Sectarian Segregation 
Religion represents a key point of division between the primary communities in 
Northern Ireland. Some scholars have cited religion as the root cause of antagonism 
in the territory (Hickey, 1984; Bruce, 1994; O’Brien, 1994). Even commentators that 
prefer to see the conflict in terms of a dispute over national self-determination 
recognise the importance of religion as a marker that enables demarcation between 
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the competing groups (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). While the Northern Irish conflict 
was clearly not a ‘holy war’ it is useful to characterise religion as a boundary between 
the two primary ethno-national groups (Mitchell, 2006; Coakley, 2007). 
 
In terms of residential segregation in Northern Ireland, it is estimated that around 
35 to 40% of the population live in neighbourhoods that are nearly entirely Protestant 
or Catholic housing estates (Hughes et al. 2007). Social housing is estimated to be 
further split down ethno-sectarian fault-lines with approximately 93% of public 
housing in single community areas (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011). Sectarian boundaries 
in some urban areas are reinforced through the use of murals, flags and in some 
cases painted kerbstones. The use of national symbols of identity to provide territorial 
boundaries for sectarian enclaves, serves to highlight the intertwined nature of 
national conflict and religious division in Northern Ireland (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006).  
 
This territorial dynamic between ethnic groups has been intensified by demographic 
shifts within the communal balance in Northern Ireland. The urban Protestant 
population is waning through low birth rates and a tendency to migrate to suburban 
areas; the Catholic population by contrast tends to be younger and with higher birth 
rates (Nolan, 2012). This situation has served to heighten a sense of decline and an 
accompanying anxiety in certain sections of the loyalist community, particularly those 
that live at ‘interface’ areas (Shirlow, 2006). However, demographic shifts have not 
necessarily been accompanied by territorial adjustment, meaning that many 
traditionally Catholic areas are now overcrowded, and that a significant number of 
Protestant urban spaces are underpopulated.  
 
Territorial boundaries between the groups are reflected and reinforced by limited 
contact in other areas of life. For instance, there is very little crossover between the 
communities in terms of inter-group intimacy with 87% of NILT respondents (1998-
2005) stating that their partner or spouse was of the same religious background to 
themselves (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011). Schooling in Northern Ireland is largely divided 
along confessional lines with the vast majority of Protestant children educated in 
conventional state schools and 90% of Catholics attending a denominational school 
(Turner et al. 2013). Perhaps the most striking emblems of societal division are 
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evident in the ‘peace walls’ that physically split sections of Belfast up in to ethnically 
homogenous districts (BIP, 2012). 
 
This sectarian segregation has taken on extra salience due to the history of socio-
economic inequality between the two ethno-national groups and some degree of 
inter-group discrimination. While the extent of discrimination has been the subject of 
academic controversy, (see Rose, 1971; Whyte, 1991; Gudgin, 1999; Dixon, 2008) 
it is reasonable to suggest that there was discrimination that deprived the Catholic 
community of equal access to employment and social housing during the era of 
Protestant ascendancy. Additionally, the security forces of the Northern sub-state 
were primarily Protestant and did not serve both communities equally as citizens 
(Whyte, 1986). Nationalists have tended to argue that discrimination is the cause of 
violence in Northern Ireland and in some cases go so far as to suggest that the 
Catholic community suffered under an apartheid style regime in the Northern sub-
state (Farrell, 1980). Unionists, by contrast, have argued that either there was no 
discrimination or that its extent was massively exaggerated by nationalists for 
political purposes (Gudgin, 1999). 
 
If we consider unemployment rates between the two groups it would certainly 
suggest that there has been evidence of inequality, though it would be harder to 
argue that this was purely the result of ethno-sectarian discrimination. For instance, 
according to the 1971 census, 6.6% of Protestant males were unemployed in 
comparison to 17.2% of Catholic males (Osbourne, 2003, p. 343). Certainly, this 
statistic will have been influenced by the fact that Catholics were largely denied 
opportunities to participate in the security forces or certain roles in public 
administration due to the perception that they were potentially disloyal. However, 
this was mirrored by the fact that many in the Catholic community deliberately chose 
not to participate in the organs of the Northern sub-state. In private industry, the 
majority of employers did tend to be Protestant, potentially offering greater 
opportunity for anti-Catholic discrimination in the allocation of employment. 
However, the gap in employment rates between the two primary communities has 
narrowed significantly in recent years. The graph below illustrates convergence of 
unemployment rates between Protestants and Catholics between 1992 and 2015: 
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Figure 4.1 – Unemployment Rates: 1992-2015 (NISRA, 2015) 
The same piece of research suggests near parity in median wages between Catholics 
and Protestants in contemporary Northern Ireland. This is expressed in the graph 
below: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Wage Comparison: 1992-2015 (NISRA, 2015) 
 
This evidence seems to suggest that in terms of employment opportunities the gap 
between Protestants and Catholics has diminished in salience. On balance, it is 
difficult to chart the actual extent of inter-communal discrimination. However, it is 
fair to say that most commentators agree that there was historic discrimination in 
the Northern sub-state, and Catholics tended to suffer disproportionately. However, 
contemporary research clearly suggests that such forms of inequality have largely 
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dissipated in recent years. More recently the debate over inequality has changed with 
elements in both of the primary communities making claims about discrimination 
related to cultural recognition in the territory. This mutual sense of victimhood is one 
of the key driving forces behind the parity of esteem framework set out in the Belfast 
Agreement, which mediates amongst other things, cultural equality in the territory. 
We shall now move on to discuss some of the key aspects of cultural conflict in the 
territory. 
4.2.3 The ‘Two Traditions’ and Parity of Esteem 
In addition to nationality and religion, an interlinked dimension in the societal division 
is found in cultural conflicts that explicitly set the symbols of British unionism against 
those of Irish nationalism in a zero-sum game. The importance of this cultural conflict 
is recognised in the Good Friday Agreement which states that: 
 
the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be 
exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity 
of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full 
respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom 
from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and 
equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities 
(GFA, 1998) 
 
As the constitutional issue diminished in political salience following the Agreement, 
one of the key fault-lines in political debate has been a cultural stand-off between 
unionism and nationalism. McAuley and Tonge recognise this when they argue that 
"A cultural war pitting Irish language and culture against Ulster-Scots traditions is 
now conducted by ethnic entrepreneurs, displacing the older virulent territorial 
combat" (McAuley & Tonge, 2009, p. 280). It is certainly the case that Sinn Féin has 
built much of its agenda around the promotion of Irishness, most notably seeking 
greater public funding for Irish language programmes. Furthermore, at times Sinn 
Féin has explicitly equated the promotion of Irish speaking with a reduction in the 
Britishness of Northern Ireland (O’Reilly, 1999). The SDLP similarly supports state 
backing for the Irish language, though it holds less relevance to the party’s ideological 
platform than in the case of Sinn Féin (Evans & Tonge, 2013).  
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One of the most important features of this cultural stalemate is the extent to which 
members of the primary communities feel that the settlement protects and respects 
their cultural traditions. Many unionists feel that their particular cultural symbols do 
not receive the same level of esteem as those of nationalists. For instance, in the 
2002 NILT survey when asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “I 
am confident that my own cultural tradition is protected in Northern Ireland these 
days”, 71% of Catholic respondents either agreed or strongly agreed; only 34% of 
Protestant respondents agreed or strongly agreed (MacGinty & Du Toit, 2007, p. 26). 
The significance of this distinction is that it has served to underpin a form of cultural 
deadlock in the politics of the territory. 
 
In response to this perceived diminution of Britishness in Northern Ireland, unionists 
have forged counter strategies based on the protection of cultural unionism. 
(McGlynn et al. 2014). The cultural politics of unionism are best described as a rear-
guard action that is being fought on several fronts simultaneously. As Irish 
nationalism has increasingly stepped on to the front foot in terms of demands for the 
promotion of the Irish language, unionists have adopted defensive positions to 
prevent what they consider to be the corrosion of Britishness in Northern Ireland. 
Firstly, political unionism has supported Orange culture through opposition to the 
rulings of the parades commission that are perceived to restrict the freedom of the 
Orange Order to hold contentious parades (Tonge et al. 2014). Secondly, there has 
been support for the cultural icons of Britishness such as the flying of the Union Flag 
above Belfast City Hall (Melaugh, 2013). Thirdly, there has been a degree of revival 
around the linguistic and cultural traditions associated with Ulster-Scots (McCall, 
2002). Each of these approaches collectively combines to constitute the defensive 
politics of cultural unionism.  
 
The first section of this chapter has outlined some of the key fissures in Northern 
Irish society and the intertwined relationship between nationality, religion and 
cultural difference in the territory. Of course, we must be careful when attempting to 
characterise societal division in the context of a relatively short piece of writing. In 
addition to the simplistic boundaries described in the text above there are the same 
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levels of societal complexity and interwoven levels of self-identification that 
characterise any population of people (for a more in-depth articulation of this view 
see Cassidy & Trew, 1998; Rolston; 1998; Little, 2003). However, due to the 
centrality of constitutional issues and ethno-sectarian identification in the politics of 
Northern Ireland, it is necessary for the thesis to utilise the ‘two traditions’ approach 
in order to outline important features of the case study. To help us illustrate the 
manner in which societal division has served to delineate the parameters of party 
competition in Northern Ireland, the next section will turn to discuss some of the key 
ideological groupings that collectively comprise the political spectrum in Northern 
Ireland.   
4.3 Party Competition in Northern Ireland 
The party system and the operations of inter-party conflict in Northern Ireland are 
deeply complex, with a range of different factors dictating the form and content of 
inter-party positioning. The following section goes on to highlight some of the key 
distinctions between the major parties in Northern Ireland with reference to three 
primary ideological blocs and the parties within these broad groupings. This will begin 
with a discussion of some of the key divisions within unionism, before moving onto 
the nationalist bloc, and then to a discussion of the APNI as the most significant non-
aligned party. The final section will consider key trends in party competition utilising 
academic literature on consociationalism in order to illuminate the relevance of recent 
developments. The purpose of this section is to highlight the particular features of 
the party system in Northern Ireland that make it a suitable setting for our 
investigation into the politics of immigration in the context of an ethnically divided 
polity. The first sub-section will consider some of the primary features of the unionist 
wing of the ideological spectrum. 
4.3.1 Unionism 
Unionism can be divided into two broad ideological traditions: liberal unionism, which 
advocates ties with the United Kingdom in terms of material advantages and loyalty 
to the civic institutions of the British state; and Ulster loyalism that sees the value of 
the union in terms of a defensive mechanism for protecting the northern Protestant 
community from domination in a predominantly Catholic island (Todd, 1987). The 
former approach is understood to be a civic form of nationalism, the latter focussed 
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on ethnic protection and opposition to the cultural ‘other’. This binary approach has 
the disadvantage of glossing over a range of other positions within unionism and 
should not be taken as a comprehensive guide to contemporary unionist thought 
(Aughey, 1997). However, this does not undermine its utility as a broad definitional 
boundary that can help us to make sense of some key distinctions within the unionist 
movement.  
 
Further to this fissure, unionism has also been subject to internal division over 
constitutional preferences for governance in Northern Ireland. Some have advocated 
direct rule from Westminster, others have argued for devolved power-sharing 
institutions, and a final strand have sought devolved governance without power-
sharing mechanisms, preferring the reintroduction of a majoritarian system that 
guarantees a unionist legislative majority (Breen, 1996). As a general rule, though 
not exclusively, civic unionists have preferred power-sharing or direct rule, with 
majority rule more closely associated with ethnic unionism. 
 
The dominant party within the unionist bloc was traditionally the UUP who managed 
to combine elements of both ethnic and civic unionism within the confines of a loosely 
federated party structure. The UUP was able to maintain a strong degree of unity 
between differing ideological factions for most of its history for two reasons. Firstly, 
unionism was guaranteed electoral ascendancy due to the nature of electoral politics 
in Northern Ireland in between 1921-1970, in which the Unionist Party dominated 
the devolved institutions (Dixon, 2008). Secondly, within the unionist bloc there was 
little threat from internal competition. However, from the late 1960s challenges to 
the UUP began to arise in the form of ethnic outflanking by the VUPP and 
subsequently, the DUP (Evans & Tonge, 2005). 
 
The DUP came into existence in opposition to the perceived liberal measures taken 
by the ill-fated O’Neill administration. The party was strongly opposed to making 
concessions to the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and wholly against the 
prospect of power-sharing arrangements proposed in the Sunningdale Agreement of 
1973 (McDaid, 2013). The DUP was a much clearer representation of the Ulster 
loyalist ideological strand and represented a formidable force for internal opposition 
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within unionism. The tightly organised party structure and the charismatic leadership 
of Iain Paisley stood in stark contrast to the loosely structured, establishmentarianism 
of the UUP (Bruce, 1994). Despite making significant in-roads into support for the 
UUP amongst evangelical, rural Protestants, and urban, working-class loyalists, the 
party remained very much secondary to the UUP throughout most of its history. 
However, underlying tensions in the UUP came to the fore when faced with difficulties 
in implementing the provisions of GFA. It was at this point that unionism became 
more fragmented, ultimately allowing the DUP to outflank more moderate unionists. 
 
The Protestant/unionist electorate were quite evenly split over the Agreement which 
was perceived to offer too many concessions to violent republicanism; it is estimated 
that just 57% of Northern Irish Protestants voted in favour of the Agreement (Hayes 
& McAllister, 2001). Issues such as the slow pace of the decommissioning of IRA 
weapons and evidence of continued military activity on the part of dissident 
republicans, heightened discontent amongst the unionist community and provided 
the perfect context in which the rejectionist stance adopted by the DUP could flourish 
(Mitchell et al. 2001). 
 
The chapter will return later to discuss in more detail some of the developments that 
have taken place within unionism in the post-agreement era. For our purposes at this 
stage, it is necessary merely to highlight some of the dominant ideological strands 
within the unionist tradition, and to note that these differing visions have served to 
underpin inter-party competition in the unionist bloc. Recent developments suggest 
that ethnic unionism has achieved a significant degree of intra-bloc ascendancy due 
to the DUP becoming the dominant party within the bloc (McAuley et al. 2011). We 
will now turn to examine similar processes of ideological positioning within the 
nationalist party system. 
4.3.2 Nationalism 
The nationalist spectrum has been traditionally split between two broad positions: 
constitutional nationalism; and republicanism. Both schools favour a united Ireland, 
but there have been significant differences over the strategic approaches advocated 
to achieve this end. Republicans have traditionally considered the British presence in 
Ireland to be that of an exploitative, colonial power. As a result, their demands have 
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been for immediate British withdrawal and they have considered violence a legitimate 
tactic to achieve this end (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). By contrast, constitutional 
nationalists have argued against the use of violence to remove the British, instead 
focussing on equal rights for the Catholic community and progress towards a united 
Ireland by obtaining democratic consent from the people of Northern Ireland (Murray, 
1998).  
 
Since the 1970s, the two primary parties associated with Irish nationalism in 
Northern Ireland have been the SDLP and Sinn Féin. The SDLP have represented the 
constitutional nationalist position and Sinn Féin have been the political 
representatives of violent republicanism. However, the story of these two parties 
throughout the peace process and in the early days of power-sharing has been one 
of ideological convergence in which Sinn Féin have adopted the key principles 
associated with constitutional nationalism (Tonge, 2005). The following section will 
highlight some of the key areas in which these parties have overlapped as the peace 
process unfolded.  
 
The SDLP was formed out of the civil rights movement of the late 1960s, the party 
was originally intended to be a social democratic entity, with nationalism not central 
in its ideological platform (Murray, 1998). The SDLP sought to appeal across 
communal boundaries, obtaining support from working class voters of Protestant and 
Catholic backgrounds. However, the party’s membership and electoral support was 
nearly exclusively Catholic in origin (Evans & Tonge, 2000). As the party progressed 
it became more clearly Irish nationalist in its outlook. A particular aspect of its appeal 
was its strong rejection of violence as a means to achieve Irish self-determination, 
placing the party in direct opposition to the violent republican movement (Hume, 
1980). 
 
The SDLP advocated a distinctive intellectual approach to overcoming conflict in 
Northern Ireland. The collapse of the Sunningdale agreement due to unionist 
opposition in the early 1970s, led Hume and other leading figures in the SDLP to 
pursue an ‘external strategy’ towards achieving peace in Northern Ireland (Darby, 
2003). This was to recognise that focussing purely on internal aspects of the conflict 
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could not deliver lasting peace due to the corrosive nature of unionist intransigence. 
The party advocated a ‘three strand’ approach to the accommodation of political 
differences in Northern Ireland: firstly, a ‘north-north’ dimension to promote power-
sharing structures for internal governance of Northern Ireland; secondly, a ‘north-
south’ dimension that would focus on cooperation and consultation between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and finally, an ‘east-west’ dimension that enabled 
meaningful dialogue between Ireland and Great Britain (McLoughlin, 2011). These 
three strands became central features of the GFA and served to illustrate the powerful 
influence of the SDLP on the peace process. However, the party won an ideological 
battle whilst sacrificing an electoral advantage to Sinn Féin.  
 
In its early days Sinn Féin operated purely as a communication device for the 
reinvigorated IRA that was operating in Northern Ireland at the outbreak of the 
troubles. Their stated aim was the creation of a thirty-two county socialist republic in 
Ireland free from British colonial interference. As the conflict evolved, the party came 
to greater prominence within the republican movement. As a stalemate became 
evident in the conflict, it was increasingly apparent that a united Ireland would not 
be achieved by force of arms and that political strategies were a necessary adjunct 
to the use of violence.  
 
The hunger strikers of the early 1980s helped to create widespread public sympathy 
for the republican movement and Sinn Féin leaders saw an opportunity to turn this 
goodwill into electoral support. At this point, Sinn Féin adopted the ‘armalite and 
ballot box’ strategy (Hannigan, 1985). This meant that the party supported the 
military campaign of the IRA whilst pursuing electoral success. This shift brought the 
party closer to the democratic mainstream than previously, when rejection and 
abstention from electoral contests had been the cornerstone of their political 
strategy. This was the first step in a process throughout the 1980s and 1990s that 
saw Sinn Féin make increasing progress towards participation in democratic politics.  
 
These shifts are evident when we survey the party’s Towards a Lasting Peace 
document, in which they call for the British government to convince unionists to 
support Irish unification and for consultation processes between the sovereign 
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governments in London and Dublin (Sinn Féin, 1994). Ultimately, as the peace 
process unfolded, Sinn Féin came to adopt the vast majority of the SDLP’s policies. 
The party endorsed power-sharing with unionists, accepted the need for a democratic 
majority in Northern Ireland to support any potential island-wide reunification and 
condemned republican paramilitary activity (Bean, 2007). This was doubtlessly a 
victory for the principles of constitutional nationalism, but this ideological 
convergence served to completely disarm the SDLP in inter-party conflict. The effects 
of this ideological repositioning will be discussed later when we consider party 
competition in the post-agreement era. At this point we will turn to consider the most 
significant non-aligned party currently operating in the Northern Irish party system. 
4.3.3 Non-Aligned Parties 
While party competition in Northern Ireland is often characterised in terms of a binary 
fissure between nationalist and unionist, there have always been non-aligned parties 
seeking to provide an alternative to ethno-national politics. These parties have 
admittedly been very limited in success, often finding themselves squeezed between 
the dominant political formations arising from within the ‘two communities’. 
Instances of non-aligned parties that have failed to garner sufficient electoral support 
include The NILP, a democratic socialist party, affiliated with the British Labour Party 
that operated in Northern Ireland between the 1920s and the late 1980s, and the 
NIWC which was formed to pursue greater representation for women during the 
peace process (Edwards, 2009; Cowell-Meyers, 2014). However, the most significant 
non-aligned party during the conflict and since the Agreement has been the APNI.  
 
The APNI was another political vehicle that arose during the fallout from the civil 
rights movement and the breakdown of devolved governance in Northern Ireland 
during the early 1970s. Following on from O’Neill’s failed attempts to implement a 
legislative programme based on liberal unionist principles, a number of leading 
figures within the unionist movement sought to promote a liberal agenda through the 
activities of a pressure group called the New Ulster Movement (NUM) (McAllister and 
Wilson, 1978). The group quickly attracted a large support base and some within the 
group saw the potential to create a viable political party based on liberal unionist 
values.  
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The APNI originally argued in favour of maintaining the union, but purely in terms of 
the economic and liberal merits of association with the United Kingdom. However, 
the party eschewed the ethnic protection narratives associated with unionist 
traditions. Further to this, the APNI advocated the consent principle, theoretically 
allowing for the possibility of constitutional change, should the majority of people in 
Northern Ireland agree to it. More recently, the party has sought to present a more 
neutral approach to the union, but in practice this has still meant tacit support for 
the constitutional status-quo. This neutral position was tested, and arguably broken, 
when three APNI MLA’s designated as unionist in order to prop up David Trimble’s 
administration in 2001 at a time when his own party was split over support for the 
Agreement (Hunter, 2001). However, this tactical shift was only for a short period 
and once the immediate danger to the devolved institutions had passed, the APNI 
members resumed their non-aligned position within the chamber (Eggins, 2015). The 
party remains the most viable and stable non-aligned party operating within the 
devolved institutions.  
 
The chapter has now outlined the three key ideological groupings that collectively 
constitute the pillars of Northern Irish party politics. Though we have yet to consider 
the institutional setting within which party competition takes place. There is a need 
for us to consider this framework because specific institutional formulations serve to 
inhibit or to incentivise certain trajectories in inter-party positioning (Durverger, 
1964). It is for this reason that much of the existing literature on party competition 
in Northern Ireland is built around the analysis of consociationalism and its ability to 
manage ethnic tensions in a divided society (Horowitz, 2001; Mitchell et al. 2001; 
2009, McGarry & O’Leary, 2006a; 2006b, Dixon, 2008; Tilley et al., 2008; Wilford, 
2009). We will now provide a critical discussion of the main arguments related to this 
controversy and use this section as a means to highlight some of the recent trends 
in party competition in the territory.   
4.3.4 Consociationalism 
Consociational democracy is a type of constitutional framework designed to govern 
ethnically divided societies in a stable fashion. It rests on the principle that communal 
antagonism can be overcome by elite cooperation (Lijphart, 1975). However, it is a 
controversial method for managing ethnic tensions. Critics of the theory argue that 
109 
  
 
the system actually entrenches traditional divisions within an institutional framework, 
and that it lacks the motivational incentives to moderate conflict in an ethnic party 
system (Horowitz, 1985). By adopting such an institutional framework, the 
Agreement clearly recognises claims to autonomy and demands for self-government 
on the part of the primary national groups in the territory (McGarry & O’Leary, 
2006a). Such measures bear clear similarities to the type of group-rights espoused 
for the accommodation of sub-state national minorities discussed in multicultural 
literature (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). This makes it particularly interesting to 
consider what the impact of widening diversity brought about by immigration would 
be likely to have on cultural accommodation in such a setting. However, before we 
delve deeper into the debate about consociationalism, we will begin by outlining some 
of its defining features.  
 
There are four core elements of the consociational model. Firstly, executive power 
sharing: placing elites from each community in the government, thereby ensuring 
that all groups have a stake in decision-making processes. Secondly, cultural 
autonomy: this recognises the validity of each group’s identity providing assurances 
that matters of cultural significance to each group will be governed according to their 
own unique traditions and heritage (Lijphart, 2004). Thirdly, proportionality: in the 
electoral system and in the allocation of fiscal resources. This principle seeks to 
confirm that each bloc is treated fairly according to their relative size within the 
community as a whole. Finally, veto rights: in order to prevent any group from 
dominating the legislative process. The veto principle delivers either agreement or 
deadlock. Consequently, this is expected to force groups to seek consensus and to 
protect the rights of minorities (O’Leary & McGarry, 2006a). The consociational model 
is clearly reflected in the institutional settlement of the GFA, which contains 
parliamentary measures to ensure cross-community support, mutual veto 
mechanisms, and the selection of the executive from the largest parties, 
proportionally, according to their share of the vote (Wilford, 2009). However, the 
model has attracted significant criticism from a group of academics that can be 
broadly categorised as civil society or social transformation theorists.  
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The critique essentially rests on motivational failings in the electoral dynamics of 
consociationalism and the rejection of cultural autonomy due to its potential to 
promote segregation. For instance, Taylor (2006) argues that the requirement for 
MLA’s to designate as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ reinforces barriers between 
political groupings and effectively designates non-aligned representatives to a 
secondary tier of importance within decision making bodies. Dixon (2012) describes 
consociationalism as a form of ‘voluntary apartheid’ and claims that it serves to 
favour ethnic hardliners at the expense of moderates (Dixon, 2012, p. 107). Wilford 
argues that the workings of the consociational institutions have led to a stand-off 
whereby ethnic parties nominally share power but fail to offer joined-up government 
in the territory (Wilford, 2009). At this point it becomes useful to consider empirical 
data from the Northern Experience of consociationalism in order to consider the 
validity of these criticisms. 
 
Developments in party politics since the Agreement seem to provide evidence to 
suggest that the system has served to reward ethnic hardliners and to marginalise 
moderates and non-aligned parties. For instance, within the nationalist bloc there has 
been a significant swing towards Sinn Féin at the expense of the SDLP. The SDLP, 
between 1997 and 2007, saw their share of the vote drop by 8.9 %. In the same 
period, the Sinn Féin vote increased by 7.4%, making them the largest nationalist 
party in the Assembly (Ark, 2017). Electoral shifts within the unionist bloc are even 
more striking. Since 1997, the electoral balance has shifted radically in favour of the 
DUP. Between 1997 and 2007 the UUP vote decreased by 17.8%, while the DUP’s 
share increased by 16.5% (Ark, 2017). These patterns have largely stabilised with 
Sinn Féin and the DUP continuing to dominate electoral contests in the region. 
 
The designated ‘other’ bloc has also been squeezed in this period, the NIWC lost 
representation in the Assembly, meaning that for some time the APNI was the only 
party offering a non-aligned perspective in the chamber. The early Assembly elections 
saw the APNI vote reduced to an incredibly low-level, but more recently the party 
has regained lost ground. A second non-aligned voice has emerged in the form of the 
Northern Ireland Green Party who gained their first seat in the Assembly in 2007, 
receiving 1.7% of first preference votes (ARK, 2017). This dipped to 0.9% in 2011, 
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though the party retained its seat. In 2016 and 2017, the party saw its share of the 
vote rise to above 2% and was able to secure two seats in the Assembly on both of 
those occasions (ARK, 2017). Whilst this certainly represents progress for the Green 
Party, it can hardly be understood as a significant shift away from the dominance of 
ethnic politics in the territory.  
 
Taken in its simplest form, this electoral data suggests a victory for ethnic outbidding. 
For instance, if we consult the work of Horowitz it is argued that this type of 
centrifugal dynamic is inevitable in ethnically structured party systems when it is 
stated that “By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands 
on government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinist elements 
within each group, parties that begin by merely mirroring ethnic divisions help to 
deepen and extend them” (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291). However, proponents of 
consociationalism have formulated a counter argument, stating that in the case of 
Northern Ireland there is a more complex, underlying, centripetal dynamic in 
operation. This theory states that extreme parties have profited through the use of 
‘ethnic tribune appeals’ (Mitchell et al., 2009 p. 397). This is to suggest that the DUP 
and Sinn Féin maintain strong negotiating stances on communal issues, but have 
become more pragmatic in pursuit of electoral success and governmental office. This 
has become evident with shifts such as Sinn Féin’s endorsement of the PSNI and the 
DUP side-lining its more overt rhetoric on Catholicism (Tonge, et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, it is argued that voters are not rewarding these parties for extremist 
behaviour, but because they are considered to be the most effective negotiators on 
behalf of their respective communities (Mitchell et al. 2009). 
 
For a reasonably sustained period there was evidence of increasing accommodation 
between these traditional hard-liners. For instance, the adoption of more conciliatory 
modes of expression and the use of symbolic gestures such as Martin McGuiness’ 
decision to shake The Queen’s hand on her visit to Belfast, or Peter Robinson’s 
attendance at the Catholic mass of a murdered police officer. Both of these events 
would have been unthinkable less than a decade earlier (see Clarke, 2011; McIntyre, 
2012). However, more recently this relationship has broken down amid pressures on 
the DUP First Minister Arlene Foster over the ‘cash for ash’ scandal and the withdrawal 
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of Sinn Féin support for the executive (Osbourne, 2017). Furthermore, the issue of 
state support for the Irish language has impacted significantly on the cultural 
deadlock between the tribune parties and continues to prevent the formation of an 
executive. Subsequent attempts to restore power-sharing in the devolved institutions 
have so far failed to make serious progress (McAleese, 2017). 
 
Despite the apparent deadlock at executive level between Sinn Féin and the DUP, an 
interesting shift in strategy has recently emerged on the part of the smaller parties. 
While the consociational system entitles members of the smaller parties to participate 
on a proportional basis in the executive, the UUP and the SDLP have recently opted 
to remain outside of the executive and instead act as parties of opposition against 
the dominant tribune parties. As leaders of their respective parties, Colum Eastwood 
and Mike Nesbit both launched attacks on the failure of the Sinn Féin/DUP led 
coalition that had dominated Northern Irish politics since 2007. Nesbit stated that 
“We have had 10 years of the DUP and Sinn Féin in Stormont Castle. People must 
ask themselves, 'do we want more of that or do we want change?'” (cited in Breen, 
2016). Eastwood made similar statements when he was invited to address the UUP 
conference in 2016, he argued that “They believe the symbolism of their coalition 
suffices, and offer nothing more. They’re all guff and no governance. Even with 55 
press officers, 16 special advisers and their new press secretary they struggle to 
fabricate the illusion of progress” (cited in McBride, 2016). 
 
These sentiments were echoed by APNI leader David Ford when rejecting the 
sensitive Justice Ministry portfolio. In explaining his decision he stated that “Alliance 
does not want more stop-start politics but rather is concerned with taking Northern 
Ireland forward faster. We sought reassurances the DUP and Sinn Féin agreed with 
us on fundamental reforms to benefit our community. However, judging by their 
response, that is not the case” (cited in Williamson, 2016). While Alliance do not have 
the numbers in the Assembly to form part of an ‘official opposition’, it seems likely 
that the future of Northern Irish politics will see the smaller and larger party 
distinction become increasingly important. It is early days for this new type of 
oppositional politics and given the uncertainty surrounding the ability of Sinn Féin 
and the DUP to overcome the current stalemate in negotiations over a new portfolio 
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for government in Northern Ireland, it remains to be seen what impact this 
development may have (McDonald & Walker, 2017).   
 
On balance, this evidence seems to suggest three key things that are of importance 
to critics and supporters of consociationalism. Firstly, there is a clear trend towards 
support for ethnic hardliners in Northern Ireland. This is encapsulated by the electoral 
dominance of Sinn Féin and the DUP. Secondly, it must be noted that these parties 
have become more moderate in this period. Both Sinn Féin and the DUP have 
dispensed with some of the more overtly divisive components of their electoral 
platform and made moves towards the political centre. Thirdly, the limits of 
consociationalism have been highlighted by the periods of executive deadlock that 
have emerged in this context, particularly over issues related to the accommodation 
of cultural diversity. This suggests that consociationalism has a moderating tendency, 
but by rewarding communal defence strategies it hinders progress in tackling political 
issues that require cross-communal compromise.  
 
This section has served to outline some of the key developments in party competition, 
providing a brief history of the primary parties and a discussion of key ideological 
trends. However, so far we have not yet begun to discuss immigration in any detail. 
The reality is, that literature on party politics in Northern Ireland makes very little 
mention of diversity outside of the primary traditions. However, there are some 
exceptions to this rule (Hainsworth, 1998; Gilligan et al. 2011). For our purposes it 
is necessary to provide an overview of the extent to which immigration has impacted 
on Northern Irish society and to consider what effects these developments have had 
on inter-party positioning. Consequently, the next section will now seek to outline 
some of the key developments in Northern Ireland that have arisen as a result of 
increasing immigration into the territory. 
4.4 Immigration in Northern Ireland 
4.4.1 Patterns of Immigration 
Northern Ireland has traditionally been understood as a society affected by outward 
migration. During the period of ‘the troubles’, Northern Ireland experienced high 
levels of emigration, with very little immigration compared to other territories 
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throughout the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Western Europe. In this respect, 
Northern Ireland’s experience of migration is far closer to that of the Republic of 
Ireland (Russell, 2012). Consequently, literature on the accommodation of diversity 
in Northern Ireland has tended to focus upon managing the conflict between the two 
largest ethno-national groups, with little interest in other forms of ethnic pluralism 
(Finlay, 2007). However, excessive focus on this binary fissure has served to overlook 
the true depth of cultural diversity and to set-back important debates on immigration 
and integration in the territory (Hainsworth, 1998). Ethnic diversity outside the two 
primary communities has long been ignored or overshadowed, with the concerns of 
the majority groups dominating the political agenda. 
 
In recent years this has become increasingly problematic as Northern Ireland has 
become more diverse in its demographic composition. Two primary factors have 
precipitated this significant shift in migratory patterns in the province. Firstly, the 
period of relative peace between the major paramilitary organisations in Northern 
Ireland. Secondly, changes have arisen as a result of the E.U. expansion that allowed 
greater freedom of movement between Western Europe and the A8 accession 
countries (McGarry et al. 2008).  
 
In research papers written for the Northern Irish Assembly, Raymond Russell outlines 
three distinct periods in Northern Ireland's recent history of migration (Russell, 2012; 
2016). Initially, during the 1970s and 80s, Northern Ireland experienced significant 
outward migration as a side-effect of ethnic conflict. In the 1990s and in the early 
part of the 21st century, migration flows became more balanced leading to a period 
of parity between inward migration and those leaving Northern Ireland. There were 
pronounced spikes in the numbers of inward migrations associated with key events 
in the peace process, such as the IRA ceasefire of 1994 which saw large numbers of 
people returning to Northern Ireland as ethnic conflict became less heated. Finally, 
following the GFA and the expansion of E.U. membership to include the A8 members, 
there followed a sustained period of significant inward migration into Northern 
Ireland, which then tailed off to some extent following the financial crisis of 2008. 
This precipitated dips in immigration during 2010 and 2012 when more migrants left 
the territory than those who entered, but in these periods there were still significant 
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numbers of foreign workers resident in the territory.  This is captured in the graph 
below which serves to highlight these changing patterns: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Net International Migration: 2000-2014 (Russell, 2016) 
 
One of the most striking statistics is evident if we consider that 10% of Children born 
in Northern Ireland in 2009 had mothers from outside of the UK and Ireland (NISRA, 
2011). Furthermore, a study conducted by NISRA detailing the number of languages 
other than English spoken by pupils in Northern Irish schools illustrates the pace of 
shifts in the cultural landscape. For instance, in 2005 no pupils spoke Polish as their 
first language, by 2009 this figure had grown to 834. Additionally, there were growing 
numbers of Lithuanian, Filipino, Portuguese, Slovakian, and Latvian speakers, to list 
but a few (NISRA, 2011). Overall, 110,000 migrants are estimated to have entered 
Northern Ireland between 2000 and 2009. Given that the total population of Northern 
Ireland is only around 1.8 million, this suggests the significance of these changes for 
the accommodation of diversity in the territory (Russell, 2012).   
 
While these statistics seem to point to a seismic shift in the landscape of cultural 
diversity in Northern Ireland, it is important to qualify this by outlining the transient 
nature of economic migration. Since the financial crisis of 2008, inward migration has 
slowed significantly and in some cases reversed as migrants and indigenous young 
people have sought to find better employment prospects elsewhere. NISRA estimates 
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that approximately 24,000 A8 migrants have settled in Northern Ireland on a more 
or less permanent basis, primarily concentrated in a handful of urban areas (NISRA, 
2011). However, despite the reasonably small numbers that have chosen to make 
Northern Ireland their home in the longer term, the impact this has on the wider 
society should not be underestimated. Russell identifies the importance of this 
development when he states “While many have returned to their country of origin, a 
significant proportion have decided to remain.  And it is those who settle in Northern 
Ireland to bring up their families who will transform and irreversibly change our 
society” (Russell, 2012).  
 
What literature there is on the impact of immigration in Northern Ireland has tended 
to focus on racism and anti-racism, language politics and a small group of research 
contributions that look into attitudes towards immigration (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007; 
McMonagle, 2010; Gilligan et al. 2011). These pieces on immigration, racism and 
language issues in Northern Ireland overlap in crucial areas with the central concerns 
of this study. The following section will outline some of the key findings in these 
bodies of research in order to provide context for our later analysis of primary data. 
4.4.2 Immigration and Political Parties: Existing Research 
As migration into Northern Ireland began to gather pace following E.U. expansion, a 
small canon of research emerged that considered the particularities of immigration 
politics as it had developed in the Northern Irish context. One of the few pieces that 
has actually explored party responses to immigration is found in the work of Gilligan, 
et al. (2011): ‘Fractures Foreigners and Fitting in: Exploring Attitudes towards 
Immigration and Integration in ‘Post Conflict’ Northern Ireland’’. The article was 
based on quantitative techniques and compared data taken from the NILT survey 
(2006), with original survey material collected by the researchers between 2007 and 
2008. The piece presents a number of findings that are helpful in interpreting some 
of the data that has emerged in this study. In places the findings of this thesis serve 
to corroborate and to expand upon some of their conclusions. Their results serve to 
demarcate a number of important fault-lines of conflict and consensus in the politics 
of immigration as it has been played out in inter-party debate in Northern Ireland. 
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Firstly, their research suggests a degree of correlation between nationalists and APNI 
representatives in contrast to the separateness of unionists, this is something that 
will be highlighted further as we carry out our own review of the research findings. 
Secondly, the piece highlighted evidence of a split in political unionism which saw a 
small number of representatives that were strongly in favour of greater restrictions 
upon immigration, again this is something that will be returned to as the research 
findings of this thesis unfold (Gilligan et al. 2011).  
 
These factors are both instructive in helping to make sense of the qualitative findings 
of this thesis and provide a foundation upon which to build as we present the results 
of this project. However, the authors themselves note that there are weaknesses with 
adopting quantitative approaches for this area of enquiry. Their work comes with a 
call for further research of a qualitative nature to be carried out in order to flesh out 
the statistical skeleton outlined in their article. One of the key strengths of this thesis 
is that it will serve to provide greater support to some of these pre-established 
concepts and to further this limited pool of research. 
4.4.3 Racism and Sectarianism 
The issue of racism in Northern Ireland has given rise to a reasonably substantial 
body of research (see Hainsworth, 1998; McVeigh, 1998; McVeigh & Rolston, 2007; 
Geoghegan, 2008a: 2008b; Knox, 2011, Gilligan, 2017). This literature discusses 
various facets of debates on racial discrimination in Northern Ireland, touching in 
places on the responses of political parties to issues of racism in Northern Ireland. In 
doing this, the work raises a number of points that are instructive to this thesis.  
 
Academic debate on racism and sectarianism in Northern Ireland has tended to focus 
on whether sectarianism should be considered to be a form of racism, or as an 
exceptional and distinctive form of hatred that is peculiar to British/Irish relationships 
(Gilligan, 2017). While racism is often understood to be related to biological 
characteristics and sectarianism stems from religious differences, the issue becomes 
problematic when the concept of ethnicity is brought into the discussion. For instance, 
McVeigh states that most conceptions of racism account for ethnic differences as a 
driver of discrimination in addition to physical characteristics (McVeigh, 2014). He 
further argues that religion acts as an ethnic marker in the Northern Irish context 
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and that hate crimes and discrimination often classified as sectarianism are actually 
underpinned by ethnic and not religious differences. Consequently, McVeigh supports 
the classification of sectarianism as a sub-set of racism in order to bring Northern 
Ireland into line with wider international standards of human rights. However, other 
commentators have argued that sectarianism and racism should be understood as 
distinctive issues. 
 
Brewer (1992) argues that racism and sectarianism should be seen as separate 
entities. His argument is that even though the two issues overlap in places, race is a 
visible form of social stratification and that sectarianism represents an issue that 
requires in-depth knowledge of the particular historical antagonism in Northern Irish 
society to be understood. Geoghegan makes a similar point when he states that 
sectarianism is defined by a complex relationship between religion and politics, while 
racism is based on the assumption that people can be divided into groups according 
to biological characteristics (Geohegan, 2010). Both Gilligan (2017) and McVeigh 
(2014) counter these arguments citing the importance of ethnicity in driving 
sectarianism. They claim that because ethnicity is of a greater importance than 
religion in determining sectarian behaviour, it is appropriate to understand these 
forms of bigotry as a variety of racism.      
 
However, Gilligan and McVeigh seem to be united by a desire for conceptual clarity 
at the expense of glossing over practical differences related to racism and 
sectarianism. McVeigh argues that keeping sectarianism separated from racism has 
the effect of removing it from current human rights standards in international law. 
Hence, the desire to retain some level of distinction between the two issues is 
tantamount to tolerating a degree of sectarianism. Gilligan argues that “Geoghegan’s 
choice of definition of racism seems to have been adopted because it allows him to 
clearly differentiate racism from sectarianism, not because of it applicability for 
analysing Northern Irish society” (Gilligan, 2017, p. 27). However, it will be argued 
in this thesis that to equate racism and sectarianism too closely has the effect of 
swamping issues related to ethnic minorities within the long-standing communal 
dispute that divides the majority communities.  
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Sectarianism is deeply pervasive in Northern Irish society providing sharp definition 
to the communal schism in the territory. We have already discussed earlier in the 
chapter the manner in which sectarianism divides housing, education and the 
provision of public services in certain parts of Northern Ireland. This type of division 
is clearly distinct from the issues that are faced by members of ethnic minorities 
seeking to navigate their new surroundings with limited understanding of the 
particularities of sectarian geography in Northern Ireland. Where racism and 
sectarianism do overlap, there are pre-existing terminologies that can be invoked in 
order to describe their parallel nature. For instance, discrimination, prejudice and 
hate-crime are all terms that can be utilised in order to capture the similarities in the 
expression of racism, sectarianism and indeed other forms of bigotry such as 
homophobia. While Gilligan and McVeigh make a good case that the ethnic dimension 
of sectarianism enables its categorisation as a type of racism, failing to recognise 
their differences is potentially harmful to the needs of ethnic minorities (Yu, 2011). 
 
In terms of its effects on political debate, the relationship between racism and 
sectarianism has been explored in a number of texts. Firstly, there is a recurring 
suggestion that political parties have been slow to react to the realities of racism in 
Northern Ireland (Hainsworth, 1998). This is evidenced by the fact that ethnic 
minority support groups fought to gain racial equality legislation in the late 1990s 
through campaigning within the United Nations rather than seeking to utilise the 
dysfunctional political framework that governed Northern Ireland in this period 
(McVeigh, 1998). As politicians had largely failed to provide leadership in this area, 
minority communities took it upon themselves to lobby for this legislation outside the 
arena of Northern Irish politics. This lack of interest on the part of political parties 
has been argued to derive from the erroneous assumption that Northern Ireland is 
not affected by racism due to the prevalence of sectarian issues in the territory 
(McVeigh, 1998)  
 
It must be stated here that racism has undoubtedly had a lesser impact on Northern 
Irish society historically than the sectarian divisions that have affected the territory. 
Of course, racism cannot be said to demarcate the society in the same manner in 
which historical sectarian rivalries have shaped Northern Ireland. However, in recent 
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years, hate crimes motivated by racism have come to nearly match the number of 
similar crimes committed with sectarian motives in the province. The chart below 
serves to illustrate the near convergence in terms of figures related to hate crime 
offences committed with racist or sectarian motivations between 2005 and 2014: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Hate Crimes: 2005-2014 (PSNI, 2016) 
 
Given the high profile nature of some of these racially motivated attacks in recent 
years, it seems unlikely that politicians in Northern Ireland would be able to argue 
that racism is not a significant political issue. In 2009, following a number of attacks 
on members of the Roma community living on the Lisburn Road in Belfast, the city 
became labelled in the popular media as a centre for racial hatred in Europe 
(Macdonald, 2009). The frequency of these types of crime diminished to some extent 
between 2009 and 2012 before beginning to climb again in the period between 2012 
and 2014 (Kilpatrick, 2014). More recently, there have been pipe bomb attacks 
perpetrated upon the homes of Roma families living both in Derry and in Belfast, 
suggesting a degree of crossover between paramilitary activity and racism in certain 
parts of Northern Ireland (Young, 2016). Given the profile of these incidents, it could 
perhaps be expected that it is now less possible to relegate racism to a second tier 
consideration to that of sectarianism in Northern Ireland.  
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In practice, a significant majority of racist attacks have occurred in areas that have 
been traditionally considered to belong to loyalist communities (McVeigh & Rolston, 
2007). Furthermore, there has been clear evidence in some cases that loyalist 
paramilitary organisations have been behind some of the more disturbing high-profile 
incidents (Knox, 2011). However, it must be noted that some loyalist groups have 
launched campaigns to tackle racism within their communities (Geoghegan, 2008a). 
However, the connection between racist incidents and loyalist areas cannot be 
discounted (Macdonald, 2006). This is most likely to be accounted for by the 
combination of two inter-related factors. Firstly, as discussed earlier, the relative 
decline of the Protestant population in urban parts of Northern Ireland has had the 
effect of heightening propensities towards territorial defensiveness in these areas. 
Secondly, one of the symptoms of the declining Protestant population has been 
increased availability in housing stock in these areas (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). 
Conversely, nationalist areas tend to be marked by high demand and limited numbers 
of private rental properties. Consequently, the members of immigrant communities 
seeking residence in Northern Ireland have tended to settle predominantly in loyalist 
areas. This combination of territoriality and demographic change has clearly 
heightened the possibility for racism to flourish in these locations. While there are 
accounts of similar racist incidents in Catholic areas (see Macdonald, 2014), the 
weight of numbers clearly suggests the significance of such issues for sections of the 
loyalist community. 
 
One of the key aims of this thesis is to establish how political parties have approached 
racism in light of such debates. Furthermore, the study will investigate whether 
parties purely focus upon the high profile attacks or whether they engage with the 
totality of racism in its pervasive low-level forms. As the thesis progresses, a 
significant focus will be placed on this key area of public concern in order to assess 
the extent to which the denial and diminution of racism has continued in elite 
discussion, and the manner in which the parties have responded to this new context. 
However, before we proceed to consider the findings of the research in relation to 
these issues we must offer some consideration to the issue of cultural accommodation 
in the context of an increasingly diverse Northern Ireland. 
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4.4.4 Culture and Language 
In this chapter so far, we have outlined some of the key ethno-sectarian divisions in 
Northern Ireland, discussed the manifestation of diversity in the party system, and 
reviewed some of the changes in cultural demography that have been brought about 
by immigration into the territory. Two of the potential areas in which we may expect 
to see immigration bring political change to Northern Ireland are in approaches to 
cultural diversity generally and more specifically in minority language debates. It is 
reasonable to state that in academic literature and in policy documents, Northern 
Ireland has increasingly been recognised as a diverse society. Furthermore, ethnic 
minorities have proven adept at creating civil society organisations to promote group 
interests and to provide a hub for their communities (Geoghegan, 2008a; 2008b).  
 
A significant change for the recognition of diversity in Northern Ireland came with the 
census of 2001 which captured results based on ethnicity and helped to identify the 
range of cultural pluralism outside the ‘two traditions’. Whilst this may not have been 
a major breakthrough in terms of new governmental initiatives, it recognised the 
implications of diversity for the formulation of future policy in the territory. The 2001 
census recorded that there were small, yet significant, Indian and Chinese 
Communities resident in Northern Ireland. Overall, around 14,000 respondents 
identified as belonging to an ethnic minority outside of the primary traditions 
(Geoghegan, 2008a, p. 96). These changes have prompted some academics to 
question the extent to which changing patterns of diversity have impacted upon the 
‘two traditions’ understanding of ethnic accommodation in the territory (Finlay, 2007; 
Geoghegan, 2008a; 2008b; McMonagle, 2010; McMonagle & McDermott, 2014).  
 
For instance, Finlay (2007) discusses the adoption of new approaches to cultural 
pluralism in the territory, but concludes that in the political sphere, multicultural 
narratives have amounted to little more than a re-articulation of bi-national 
grievances aired between the primary communities. Geoghegan investigates 
multicultural initiatives prompted by civil society organisations at grass-roots level 
and concludes that despite attempts made to reach out across cultural boundaries, 
there is an ‘awkwardness’ associated with the lack of cross-communality in these 
enterprises. To put this more clearly, he describes a nationalist multiculturalism and 
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a unionist multiculturalism being played out in two separate communities with very 
little overlap (Geoghegan, 2008b). Similar issues have come to be reflected in the 
policy documents aimed at managing diversity in Northern Ireland. Such frameworks 
recognise widening diversity, but are limited in scope due to the overarching 
dominance of internal issues related Northern Ireland’s historic communal division 
(Knox, 2011). 
 
A key indicator of the relatively limited embrace of migrant diversity in Northern 
Ireland is evident when we turn to discuss minority languages in the territory. 
 
In its linguistic composition, Northern Ireland remains overwhelmingly Anglophone; 
minority language debates have tended to focus Gaélic and Ulster-Scots. However, 
language diversity has increased significantly since immigration has become more 
commonplace in the territory (McMonagle, 2010). Therefore, it might seem 
reasonable to assume that debates around minority language rights could move 
outside of the confines of Irish and Ulster-Scots funding and take into account a 
broader spectrum of linguistic diversity. However, recent research carried out by 
McMonagle (2010) and McMonagle & McDermott (2014) seems to suggest that this 
has not been the case. They explicitly cite the influence of political parties as a barrier 
to this when they state that  
 
Although policy debates have acknowledged that increasing linguistic diversity 
has occurred, the competing interests of the political parties have tended to 
act as a barrier to the actual implementation of policy and legislation that fulfil 
the real needs of the languages in question (McMonagle & McDermott, 2014, 
p. 247).  
 
McMonagle and McDermott refer here to a stand-off that sees republicans point the 
finger of blame at British colonialism for the demise of the Irish language; unionists 
counter this with a suggestion that the language has become a political tool. Despite 
the fact that the St Andrews Agreement (2006) explicitly states that the government 
will introduce an Irish language act, so far the DUP has continued to block legislation 
in this area. 
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This stalemate over the legislative support for Gaélic dominates the arena of language 
policy discussion. This is despite the fact that the 2011 census revealed that there 
were about 50,000 people resident in Northern Ireland that spoke non-native 
languages. By far the largest population were Polish speakers who accounted for 
around 17,000 of these respondents (Migration Observatory, 2014). The impasse 
between the parties over the issue of minority languages remains in the foreground 
of political debate in the devolved institutions. At the time of writing, there is no 
executive in Northern Ireland due to the failure of the largest parties to agree terms 
on a language initiative (Macdonald, 2017). This type of impasse between the two 
tribune parties has been described by leading academics in the field as a ‘culture war’ 
and is increasingly likely to form a key fissure in the party politics of Northern Ireland 
(McDaid, et al 2013).   
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of the case study that will enable us 
to investigate the core concerns of the research project. It has outlined the central 
fault-lines of the communal divide in Northern Ireland, the manner in which 
underlying societal fissures have impacted upon the party politics of the territory, 
and the recent history of immigration into the territory in the period under 
consideration. Collectively, these factors combine to create the outline of a case study 
that allows us to test theories on the motivational incentives for parties to engage 
with the politics of immigration in an ethnically defined party system. 
 
When looking at societal division in the territory, it was necessary for us to consider 
the importance of national identity, religion and culture in Northern Ireland and the 
manner in which these overlapping areas of division have served to form an ethnically 
segregated society, in which group membership is defined in terms of a binary, 
oppositional format. Whilst this particular view of Northern Irish society serves to 
obscure the true depth and the complexity of diversity in the territory, it is necessary 
for us to articulate and categorise the key dimensions of this societal division in order 
to highlight the sense of distinction between the primary communities. With this 
established, we then moved to discuss the impact of ethnic division upon the 
particularities of party competition in the territory. 
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The chapter outlined the overarching ideological backdrop to party competition that 
is constructed around the constitutional issues that have historically divided the 
territory. However, it was necessary to highlight the existence of distinct party 
systems operating within this broader archway of ideological competition. Hence, the 
chapter turned to discuss the trajectories of intra-bloc competition. It is necessary to 
conceive of the Northern Irish party system in terms of a unionist bloc, a nationalist 
bloc and a non-aligned centrist pillar which is currently comprised of the APNI and 
the Green Party. With the key groupings discussed, the chapter then outlined aspects 
of the academic debate over consociationalism in the territory and recent electoral 
trends that have witnessed the hard-line parties emerge as the largest groupings 
within their respective electoral blocs. This evidence serves to illustrate the success 
of ethnic tribune appeals and the pressure placed upon the smaller parties, who have 
begun to exhibit signs of a joined up approach to tackling the ethnic tribunes by 
forming an official opposition within the Assembly. The importance of these 
developments for our study is that they highlight the dominance of culturally 
exclusive politics in the territory. Our questions revolve around what impact 
immigration would have upon competition in the context of an ethnically defined 
party system, which leads us now to review of the final section of this chapter.   
 
With the specifics of ethnic party competition in the Northern Irish context discussed, 
the chapter then turned to outline the key variation that makes this a useful case 
study when researching the effects of immigration on an ethnically divided party-
system. For this purpose we have detailed the changing nature of diversity in 
Northern Irish society that has been established through a sharp spike in immigration 
that began in 2004. Despite these demographic changes we have witnessed the fac 
that policy-making aimed at the management of difference is very much rooted in 
internal issues within Northern Ireland and focuses excessively on cultural celebration 
rather than the real barriers to integration faced by members of immigrant 
communities. Furthermore, we have reviewed the findings of the limited body of 
relevant literature that considers the impact of this new diversity in Northern Ireland 
in order to provide foundations for the study that takes place in this thesis. It has 
been shown that there is a small, but useful, body of emerging research into the 
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effects of immigration upon politics in Northern Ireland. These texts focus on 
attitudes towards immigration, approaches to diversity, and racism in the context of 
an increasingly diverse territory. This thesis will build upon these limited pools of 
research through examining the primary political narratives surrounding these issues 
during a key period of demographic change. The thesis will now turn to the reporting 
of results in order to provide a detailed and thorough discussion of conflict and 
consensus across the major parties in Northern Ireland with reference to immigration, 
cultural accommodation, and racism between 2004 and 2014.  
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Chapter 5: Immigration 
5.1 Results Overview 
Having outlined the foundations of our study of diversity politics in Northern Ireland 
during a period of changing cultural demography between 2004 and 2014, we will 
now turn to review the results that have emerged from our qualitative enquiry. This 
will enable us to consider the manner in which political parties have adapted to 
changes in cultural demography in the territory. The following three chapters will 
utilise the interview data captured in this process in conjunction with other sources 
such as Assembly debates drawn from the Hansard records, election manifestoes, 
and contributions to public media made by the representatives of the parties under 
consideration. This part of the thesis proceeds in three chapters in which we examine 
the key discursive themes that have emerged from our analysis of the data corpus.  
 
The key themes that will be presented are the discursive manifestations of fault-lines 
in ideological conflict and areas of partial consensus between the parties. Through 
outlining the chasms that separate the parties and the bridges that connect them in 
relation to immigration, cultural accommodation and racism, the thesis will map the 
terrain of diversity politics as it developed between 2004 and 2014. One of the key 
findings that consistently emerges during this analysis is a tendency for parties to 
modify issues related to immigration so that they can be utilised as either swords or 
shields in the prosecution of inter-party conflict. Numerous examples will be brought 
to the fore that highlight this tendency to enmesh matters related to immigration 
within long-standing ideological frameworks.    
 
The first results chapter considers party responses to immigration in light of our 
earlier literature review on immigration politics (Freeman, 1995; Statham & Geddes, 
2006). The primary focus of this chapter is to consider the degree to which the 
different parties adopt restrictive or expansive approaches to immigration and the 
particular discursive themes employed in order to support their stances. This covers 
the extent to which issues such as welfare and employment are utilised in the 
discussions of the parties. In broad terms, the chapter highlights a tendency for 
nationalists and non-aligned politicians to offer greater support for expansion than 
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unionist politicians: though there are splits within unionism in terms of support for 
immigration with modest controls and the adoption of strongly restrictive measures. 
Additionally, it will be shown that Sinn Féin, in particular, utilise immigration as an 
opportunity to highlight some of their favoured ideological refrains. These results 
serve to support the findings established in the work of Gilligan et al. (2011), though 
they add a greater degree of engagement with complex nuances of the discursive 
themes used to present such arguments.  
 
The second results chapter delves into party approaches towards cultural diversity in 
the changing context between 2004 and 2014. The chapter begins by highlighting 
the importance of interculturalism in policy documents aimed at managing cultural 
difference in Northern Ireland during our timeframe. It will be shown that 
multiculturalism and interculturalism are at the heart of such documents, yet the 
parties seem to lag behind this approach in their understanding of diversity in the 
territory (OFMDFM 2005; 2007; 2013). The chapter uses the issue of language policy 
in order to highlight the bi-national character of debates over the accommodation of 
diversity in the territory. It will be argued here that unionists, in particular, utilise 
minority languages as a shield to repel nationalist demands for greater state support 
for Gaélic programmes. It will be shown that only APNI representatives tend to 
embrace a truly inclusive approach to the accommodation of language diversity in 
Northern Ireland. This chapter highlights the specific tensions related to the 
accommodation of multiple diversities in a society marked by sub-state nationalism 
as discussed in the multicultural canon of literature (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2006; 
Modood, 2007) 
 
The third results chapter considers party responses to racism in Northern Ireland 
during the period of our study. It will be shown that there is a strong cross-party 
condemnation on racism but that this does not translate into unity between the 
parties. Sinn Féin representatives tend to utilise racism in the prosecution of political 
assaults on unionism. These attacks tend to equate loyalism with racism in Northern 
Ireland, to suggest that the sub-state itself is institutionally racist, and that political 
unionism has failed to offer leadership in this area. This promotes a bunker mentality 
amongst unionists who either seek to avoid discussions of racism or to invoke 
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defensive territorial narratives based on the perception of ethnic cleansing suffered 
by Protestant communities in some parts of Northern Ireland (Shirlow & Murtagh, 
2006). APNI members, by contrast, seek to shift debates on race politics to mount 
attacks on what they identify as political deadlock at the heart of government due to 
a stand-off between the OFMDFM parties on racism and sectarianism.  
 
At the end of each of these chapters, theories are discussed to explain the particular 
approaches adopted by the parties. For this purpose, we will employ an analysis 
informed by theoretical approaches to ideological positioning. Most particularly, the 
work of Downs (1957), Petrocik (1996), Riker (1996) and Finlayson (2012) are used 
as a means to help us dissect the reasons why the parties may adopt particular 
positioning strategies. In order to bolster these theories, evidence is cited from 
measures of public opinion in Northern Ireland that serve to illustrate the incentives 
driving parties to adopt certain conversational themes (NILT, 2007; 2008; 2010a; 
2010b). With these arguments outlined, this will provide a basis from which we can 
draw together the key evidential strands to support our conclusions in the final 
chapter. 
5.2 Introduction 
The first of the results chapters in this thesis considers whether increasing 
immigration leads to the formation of new ideological fault-lines in an ethnically 
divided party system. For this purpose, we will focus on expansive and restrictive 
approaches to immigration and the forms that these arguments take when articulated 
in the narratives of the political parties in Northern Ireland (Freeman, 1995; Statham 
& Geddes, 2006). In particular, the study is interested in the stances taken by the 
parties over the expansion or restriction of immigration, and the discursive patterns 
used to frame these arguments. The chapter will also seek to uncover the extent to 
which arguments on welfare, public services, and employment are invoked in these 
debates. Through examining these discursive themes, it will become possible to 
outline the key areas of cross-party consensus and inter-party conflict in relation to 
immigration. With this achieved, the chapter will turn to explain the driving forces 
behind these narratives using theories of ideological competition as a guide to aid 
our interpretations. Ultimately, the chapter will argue that the parties tend to frame 
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immigration issues within existing ideological structures in order to support their 
wider platform.  
 
However, before we can attempt to explain why the parties adopt particular positions 
on immigration, we need to spend some time examining the substance of the study. 
For this purpose, the chapter will outline the detailed and nuanced findings that have 
emerged from our investigation into immigration politics in an ethnically divided party 
system. This begins by appraising party narratives on restriction and expansion, 
before moving on to highlight some of the complex fault-lines that have emerged 
when discussing welfare, public services and employment. It will be shown that while 
there is generally a positive tone towards immigrants and the contribution that they 
have made to Northern Irish society, there are a number of interesting differences 
that emerge between the parties when we examine the manner in which such 
arguments are articulated.  
 
For instance, it will be shown that in a number of areas there is a clear distinction 
between the narratives adopted by nationalists and non-aligned members, and those 
articulated by unionist representatives. This trend is not absolute and there are 
notable exceptions, but there is clear evidence of correlation between the arguments 
of nationalists and those of the APNI that are not shared in unionist narratives on 
immigration. The findings derived from the analytic process serve to suggest that 
nationalists and non-aligned representatives share commonality in their assessment 
of migrants as a positive force contributing to the economy and supporting public 
services. The chapter highlights a less positive approach adopted by unionists and 
shows evidence of a split within unionism between a recognition of the economic 
benefits of migration and a certain reticence that emerges when welfare and 
employment are discussed. This division amongst unionists does not follow a simple 
line of party demarcation. Rather, it will be argued that significant minorities in both 
of the unionist parties are in favour of much firmer controls on immigration.  
 
The final section of the chapter will draw on Downsian theories of ideological 
competition, and wider literature on political parties, in order to explain these 
responses to immigration (Downs, 1957; Petrocik, 1996; Finlayson, 2012). It will be 
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suggested that despite evidence of correlation between the nationalist parties and 
the APNI there are different ideological drivers underlying these responses to 
increasing immigration. It will be argued that for Sinn Féin, immigration allows them 
to draw on pre-existing narratives that relate to the historic Irish diaspora. 
Contemporary immigration into Northern Ireland offers Sinn Féin the opportunity to 
bring forth this well-established linguistic paradigm and to use this to associate 
themselves with the new communities in Northern Ireland.  
 
Further to this, it will be argued that because the APNI’s long-standing narrative 
about moving beyond the two-traditions fits well with the realities of an increasingly 
diverse society, the party can easily accommodate immigration within this broader 
ideological framework. Through arguing in favour of increasing immigration, the APNI 
finds itself on comfortable ideological terrain discussing diversity outside of the two 
communities binary. It will be suggested that because the SDLP is a moderate 
nationalist party, it finds itself ideologically squeezed between Sinn Féin and the 
APNI. Consequently, the party’s narratives on immigration share similarities with 
both Sinn Féin and the APNI. It will be shown that the SDLP tends to place some 
degree of focus on the Irish history of emigration, whilst also seeking to invoke a 
wider vision of diversity in Northern Ireland.  
 
Finally, the chapter argues that the narratives adopted by the unionist parties are 
testament to the ideologically fragmented character of political unionism. The 
majority of UUP representatives discuss their endorsement of immigration in terms 
of a pragmatic assessment of the economic benefits of migrant workers. However, a 
significant number articulate doubts about the motives of migrants entering Northern 
Ireland and the potential impact of immigration upon the local population. The DUP 
is similarly divided with a significant focus upon the work ethic of migrants, but again 
a sizeable minority seem to favour much tighter restrictions on immigration. It will 
be suggested that this division is best explained by reference to overlapping and 
untidy areas of crossover between civic and ethnic unionism. This is to suggest that 
civic impulses within the unionist community welcome the material advantages of 
immigration into the United Kingdom, while ethnic elements are more protectionist 
in outlook (Todd, 1987). 
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5.3 Expansion or Restriction? 
One of the first things that must be mentioned before we proceed to our detailed 
presentation of the research findings is that the majority of politicians interviewed in 
this study, and the bulk of the data derived from other sources, spoke of a generally 
positive and welcoming approach to immigrants resident in Northern Ireland. The 
discursive themes outlined by the party representatives, when discussing 
immigration, tended to coalesce around three core approaches. Firstly, there were 
those that supported immigration and stated that they would like to see greater 
expansion in the future. These arguments tended to come from nationalist politicians 
and members of the non-aligned APNI. Secondly, there are unionists who endorse 
immigration but with some degree of qualification. Thirdly, there are those unionists 
who would like to see immigration curtailed to a significant degree in order to protect 
welfare provision and the economic prospects of the local population. The overall 
picture seems to suggest that in the confines of the Northern Irish party system, elite 
positioning on immigration is guided by the traditional workings of party competition 
in that vote-maximising strategies are adopted within the confines of established 
ideological structures (Downs, 1957). This evidence seems to counter Freeman’s 
thesis that elite strategies on immigration issues are divorced from the requirement 
to court public opinion (Freeman, 1995; 2002; 2011).  
 
If we turn to examine some of the arguments articulated by nationalists and non-
aligned politicians, we can begin to outline the contours of their general consensus 
upon the desirability of immigration. For instance, if we consider the following quotes 
— the first of which is taken from an interview carried out with an Irish republican, 
the second coming from a discussion with a member of the moderate nationalist 
SDLP, and the third from a non-aligned APNI representative — we can begin to 
identify certain similarities in their approaches to the politics of immigration. Firstly, 
let us consider this statement made by a representative of Sinn Féin: 
 
Well I think that the people who have made this place their home have 
contributed an awful lot to our society, immigration is something that should 
definitely be encouraged (SF3, 2013). 
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Similar discursive themes are present in this quotation from a member of the SDLP: 
 
I think that immigration has undoubtedly been a real benefit in Northern 
Ireland. I hope we see much more of it in the future (SDLP4, 2013). 
 
Obvious parallels are also apparent when we compare this quotation from a member 
of the APNI with that of the Irish nationalists above: 
 
Immigration is a social good that should be encouraged as far as possible. It 
works for the enrichment of Northern Ireland in many ways (APNI3, 2013). 
 
What unites these quotations is the suggestion that immigration into Northern Ireland 
is something that they would wish to see becoming more commonplace. This is not 
something that is obvious when we examine discursive themes emanating from 
representatives of the unionist parties. This distinction between unionists, and the 
other party representatives, serves to outline the contours of a key discursive schism 
associated with immigration politics in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, this evidence 
supports suggestions in existing research about the extent to which the nationalist 
and non-aligned parties find commonality when discussing immigration (McGarry et 
al. 2008; Gilligan et al. 2011). If we compare the quotations above with two 
statements made by unionist politicians, we can see evidence of a clear distinction 
whereby unionists are rather more measured in their support for immigration; 
arguing that it might be for the best if immigration was subject to further controls. 
The first statement below is taken from an interview with a member of the UUP: 
 
We are fortunate to be an island nation, we don't have as fluid a border as 
some people and maybe we should try to keep it that way (UUP5, 2013).  
 
This statement is clearly more reticent about the encouragement of immigration than 
the positions articulated by the nationalist and non-aligned politicians. A similar point 
is made more forcefully in the statement below that is derived from an interview with 
a representative of the DUP: 
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Well my view is that the EU statute about free movement needs to be radically 
changed, because at the moment, while it is may seem unlikely, there could 
be literally ten, fifteen, twenty five thousand people seeking work in Northern 
Ireland from Romania and Bulgaria within the next few years. That would 
radically transform job prospects for everybody (DUP2, 2013).  
 
This attitude within the unionist parties was further echoed in the public domain, with 
both parties arguing for greater controls over the extent of immigration into Northern 
Ireland. For instance, consider the following quotation taken from the UCUNF 
manifesto for the 2010 Westminster Election. This manifesto was the outcome of 
UUP’s ill-fated electoral pact with the Conservative Party and as a result reflects wider 
debates on immigration that were taking place in the U.K. at this time. However, 
despite this distinctive focus it was one of the competing platforms presented to the 
Northern Irish electorate during this democratic contest: 
 
We want to attract the brightest and the best people who can make a real 
difference to our economic growth. But immigration today is too high and 
needs to be reduced. We do not need to attract people to do jobs that could 
be carried out by UK citizens, given the right training and support. So we will 
take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of 
thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands. (UCUNF, 2010, p. 21). 
 
The DUP has articulated similar narratives, but there is also evidence that the larger 
unionist party has increasingly adopted a narrative on immigration tied in with a 
rejection of certain E.U. policies. For instance, the following quotation was taken from 
the DUP Manifesto for the 2014 European election: 
 
While we believe that free movement across the EU brings many economic 
benefits, it has also become apparent that the influx of immigrants can create 
many economic tensions. Diane Dodds believes that the costs of immigration 
are most keenly felt within our welfare system, especially in regard to health 
provision and social housing. We will advocate tighter controls on EU 
immigration into Northern Ireland (DUP, 2014, p.19). 
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What these quotations serve to illustrate is a tendency for nationalists and non-
aligned politicians to coalesce around certain discursive formations that contrast with 
unionist arguments. In this instance, it highlights the extent to which Irish 
nationalists and non-aligned politicians actively endorse wider and more expansive 
approaches to immigration: while unionists tend to be more restrictive in outlook 
when discussing this issue. The next section now turns to examine the issue of 
welfare in relation to the politics of immigration. Interesting patterns emerge here 
that serve to further highlight the discursive fault-lines that exist between unionists 
and the nationalist/non-aligned bloc.  
5.3.1 Welfare and Public Services 
Throughout most of the data reviewed in this thesis, narratives across the parties 
have tended to suggest that migrants did not enter Northern Ireland in order to abuse 
welfare systems. Furthermore, the majority of interview participants stated that 
when welfare has been accessed by immigrants, they have generally earned the right 
to do so through contributions made in the form of income tax payments. Similar 
sentiments are clearly expressed across ideological boundaries, with ardent 
nationalists and hard-line unionists finding areas of commonality. What is striking is 
the lack of discursive themes associated with the type of argument articulated by 
theorists such as Miller (2000), Goodhart (2004), or Joppke (2007). There is no 
suggestion that popular support for welfare would be undermined by immigration. 
This is perhaps because in the context of a divided society such as Northern Ireland, 
arguments based on the assumption of societal homogeneity clearly bear little 
resemblance to the history of the territory. In order to highlight some of the themes 
that characterise these discussions, let us begin by considering the following 
quotations; one from a DUP MLA and one from a Sinn Féin representative: 
 
I don't get the impression that there are large groups of people from outside 
Northern Ireland standing in line to receive unemployment benefit or any other 
form of benefit, so it hasn't become an issue (DUP3, 2013). 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed in a number of responses from MLA’s representing 
Sinn Féin: 
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The migrants that have settled here in Northern Ireland, aren't here to claim 
benefits. They come to work and actually contribute to welfare and services 
through the taxes that they pay in to the public purse (SF3, 2013). 
 
Comparable arguments were also articulated in the narratives of the smaller parties. 
This gives the impression that immigration politics does not form a major discursive 
fault-line in inter-party conflict. The parties tended to find large areas of overlap on 
these issues. However, despite this lack of overt conflict, it is possible to detect 
differences in the narratives of the parties as we delve deeper into discussions related 
to welfare and immigration.  
 
One particular branch of argument, that was commonly articulated by Irish 
nationalists and APNI representatives, is found in the suggestion that not only were 
immigrants net contributors to welfare systems, but that the safety net of state 
support should be widened to include migrant groups not currently allowed to access 
such provisions. This section serves to highlight a tendency on the part of nationalists 
to argue in favour of widening public provision to immigrants not covered by current 
legislation. The first statement we shall consider is made by an MLA representing 
Sinn Féin in an Assembly debate, where he refers to the provision of school meals 
for Roma community pupils despite the fact that they were not legally entitled to 
such provision. This decision was taken by Sinn Féin’s Catriona Ruane in her capacity 
as education minister:   
  
Does the Member acknowledge that at least one Minister, the Minister of 
Education, despite advice to the contrary from the Department and many other 
commentators, including some MLAs, ensured that provision was made for 
Romany children to receive free school meals? They were not entitled to that 
under the legislation and the state’s immigration provisions (Hansard, 2009a). 
 
Similar arguments seeking to widen forms of state support for migrant communities 
were commonly articulated in interview contributions made by representatives of the 
SDLP, for instance: 
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We have had the shameful situation where members of the Roma community 
who have no access to state support because of the transitional status of 
Romania, with relation to the European Union are arriving here and finding 
themselves outside of the system. What has been really admirable though is 
how the system has found ways to try and meet that community’s needs. 
Schools have still found places for the kids; GP’s have found ways of treating 
members of that community. I think we should be looking at more formal ways 
to support people like this (SDLP2, 2013). 
 
This area of consensus is something that was most commonly articulated by the 
nationalist parties, though in some cases it was mirrored in the discussions of the 
APNI. The APNI representatives also tend to place some degree of stress on 
immigrants supporting public services. This came in statements that were based on 
the impact of immigrants both in staffing and accessing public services. For instance, 
the quotation below is drawn from a contribution made in the Assembly by a 
representative of the APNI and refers to the role played by health workers from 
foreign countries: 
You cannot get much more front line than our nurses, and we commend them 
all for their dedication and devotion to duty over the years.  At a time when 
there is once again a lot of scaremongering around immigration, it is worth 
emphasising the vital contribution that is made to our health service by nurses 
from overseas.  All are extremely welcome to Northern Ireland, and we 
appreciate their work at all times. (Hansard, 2014a). 
Regarding the positive role played by immigrants as service users, see the quotation 
below that was taken from an interview with an APNI representative: 
In the school down the road from me, I think there are children that speak 
twenty eight different languages. Almost half of the children are from outside 
Northern Ireland. Had there not been an increase from members of ethnic 
minorities sending their children there, the school would have closed. So the 
migrant population has helped to keep the doors open. (APNI1, 2013). 
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This was an argument that was located most commonly in APNI narratives on the 
impact of immigration, though there were a handful of similar examples from other 
parties. These types of argument serve again to highlight areas of commonality 
between nationalists and non-aligned representatives in their strong endorsement of 
immigration and their keen support for the migrant population resident within 
Northern Ireland. In the following section we will see the tendency of nationalists to 
crossover with non-aligned members on another key area of immigration politics. In 
this instance, the discursive overlap revolves around ‘myth-busting’ narratives. 
5.3.2 Immigration Myths 
A number of discussions in the interview process related to welfare and migration 
turned toward an acknowledgment of the mythologies that surround immigration 
politics, particularly in some sections of mainstream media. The broad thrust of the 
following statements places explicit focus upon popular misconceptions associated 
with welfare and immigration. A degree of cross-spectrum consensus is notable in 
the quotations below which highlight the myth-busting narratives located in 
discussions on immigration with Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the APNI. The first quotation 
here outlines a perspective articulated by a representative of Sinn Féin: 
 
We should try to reject the idea that has been pedalled by some politicians and 
in the right-wing media that immigrants are bad or they're scroungers. That 
idea should be challenged at every opportunity. Frankly, I’m sick of hearing 
about things like ‘they come here with massive families to claim our benefits’ 
it just isn’t true! (SF3, 2013). 
 
A similar reference to the prevalence of immigration mythologies and a degree of 
frustration is evident in the following quotation from an SDLP respondent: 
 
It does get pedalled in the media that they are all vultures, they are here for 
dole or child-benefit, but most of these immigrants are hard-working people. 
This is fiction, the reality of the situation is that these people come over here 
to work and to improve their quality of life (SDLP, 2013).  
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Corresponding arguments were also expressed in the interviews carried out with 
politicians representing the APNI. The quotation below serves to highlight the degree 
of unity between nationalists and non-aligned members when discussing immigration 
mythologies: 
 
Immigrants come to make a contribution to society and many of them are 
involved in extremely important jobs. I think it's important that we cut through 
the myth that people aren't contributing and that they aren't involved in 
important roles in the community. We’ve all read the stuff in the newspapers 
about ‘benefit tourism’ and such like. Politicians in particular have a 
responsibility to tackle this stuff head on and to say ‘don’t believe everything 
that you read’ (APNI2, 2013). 
 
Some unionists outlined similar statements, recognising the existence of immigration 
mythologies but were less robust in denying the plausibility of these narratives. One 
such example is found in the statement below made in an interview with a 
representative of the DUP: 
 
I don't subscribe to what I sometimes describe as the ‘Daily Mail route’ which 
is to believe that migrant workers arrive here, with seventeen children and end 
up claiming thousands of pounds a week in benefits. I don't think that happens 
very often, despite some of the press coverage. At the same time there are 
instances, there is some evidence of that. (DUP3, 2013). 
 
Again, the evidence outlined in this section serves to highlight the clear and recurring 
tendency of nationalists and non-aligned representatives to share common ground 
when discussing a number of issues related to the politics of immigration. This 
correlation of views clearly crosses certain party boundaries as indicated by the 
quotations above. However, whilst the majority of nationalists, non-aligned 
members, and indeed, many unionists were positive in their assessment of the impact 
of migrants upon public provisions, a significant number of politicians from both of 
the unionist parties seemed to suggest a degree of suspicion about the motives of 
migrants entering Northern Ireland.  
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5.3.3 Abuse of Welfare 
A minority of unionist statements made references suggesting that immigrants 
came to places like Northern Ireland in order to make claims on welfare support 
systems. These statements were not exclusive to either of the unionist parties but 
featured at times in the narratives of both. The first quotation below was made in 
an interview with a member of the DUP when discussing the relationship between 
immigration and welfare; it clearly represents some degree of apprehension about 
the potential for migrants to abuse welfare provision: 
Migrant workers have excelled in some areas and that should continue to be 
the case, but that shouldn't mean opening up the doors so that anyone can 
come and possibly over a period of time begin claiming significant benefits that 
they wouldn't receive in their own country. I do think that there has been some 
level of abuse of the system and the generosity of welfare provision in the 
United Kingdom (DUP2, 2013). 
These types of narratives were expressed by representatives of both unionist parties. 
The similarities are evident when we consider the quotation below from a member of 
the UUP: 
There will be a small number of people, who arrive in Northern Ireland, work 
for a very short period of time, until they are eligible for benefits and then 
begin claiming benefits that they wouldn't get in their country of origin. That's 
the key, I don't think that should happen and in some cases I think it probably 
has. (UUP4, 2015). 
These sentiments were not only discussed in the face-to-face interviews but also 
arose in debates within the Assembly. For instance, in an Assembly debate on the 
adoption of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against the Trafficking 
in Human Beings (C.O.E. 2005), the following statement was made in opposition to 
the motion: 
 
Unfortunately, the Ulster Unionist Party cannot support the motion, as the UK 
Government has stated that the 1990 United Nations convention is not 
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com-patible with UK immigration law. The main difficulty is that, under the 
convention, the UK Government would not be able to control the conditions 
under which migrant workers can stay in the country […]. The ramifications of 
the UN convention would put extra stress on already strained public services. 
(Hansard, 2008). 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed in the chamber in the statements of some members 
of the DUP. This is highlighted in the following exchange between Stewart Dickson of 
the APNI and Sammy Wilson of the DUP on the regionalisation of welfare provisions 
to reflect local living costs: 
 
Mr Dickson: I believe that it is not appropriate to introduce the regulations at 
this stage. They are being put forward to combat what has been termed as 
benefit tourism, yet, when you examine the issue, there is very little evidence 
to suggest that this is a problem in Northern Ireland, let alone throughout the 
rest of the United Kingdom […]. The regulations, therefore, are designed to 
tackle a problem that is not a problem, but they will have a significant impact, 
as others have said, on UK and Irish citizens. 
 
Mr Wilson: I take the point that the Member makes that this may not be a 
huge issue in Northern Ireland at present.  However, it is an issue for other 
parts of the United Kingdom.  Does he accept that if the regulation here is 
different to other parts of the United Kingdom, the problem could shift from 
other parts of the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland, hence the reason for 
uniformity? (Hansard, 2014b). 
 
The exchange above is particularly useful as it serves to highlight the reactive 
dynamics between these narratives as they emerge in forums such as the Assembly. 
In reaction to the APNI member’s myth-busting narrative, the DUP member suggests 
that migrants are likely to move around in pursuit of more generous welfare 
packages. For our purposes at this stage, it is useful to highlight the tendency 
amongst a number of unionist representatives to suggest that immigrants further 
place strains upon public services. This tendency towards separateness on the part 
142 
  
 
of this group of pro-restriction unionists is something that will be highlighted further 
on a number of occasions as the thesis unfolds. The next portion of this chapter now 
turns to consider the related, yet distinctive issue of work and employment. 
5.4 Work and Employment 
The majority of party narratives on immigration share a strong degree of overlap on 
the economic desirability of immigration. This sentiment crosses ideological 
boundaries, establishing a core of consensus between all of the political groupings 
represented in this study. In order to highlight the width of this consensus, it is useful 
for us to draw upon a collection of examples that illustrate this type of argument 
articulated by each of the political parties. The following statements move from 
representatives of the hard-line, nationalist Sinn Féin across the ideological spectrum 
until we arrive at the unionist tribune party, the DUP. This collective body of 
quotations covers the entire party system and serves to highlight the breadth and 
depth of the cross-party consensus on this issue. Each of the statements are taken 
from Assembly debates between 2007 and 2009 during a period of significant inward 
migration in Northern Ireland. The first quotation comes from Sinn Féin MLA Francie 
Molloy speaking on the subject of human trafficking in a private members debate:  
 
Migrant workers have been good for the economy. It could be argued that 
many businesses in areas such as Dungannon and Cookstown would not have 
located there had it not been for migrant workers. Other businesses may have 
relocated when they were expanding because they would not have had the 
necessary workforce. (Hansard, 2008). 
 
Similar arguments are made here by Dolores Kelly of the SDLP during a debate on 
the racial equality strategy: 
 
Many of our hospitals and many industries within the agrifood sector would be 
unsustainable in the short to medium term if that labour force were not 
available. Migrant workers also contribute to the economy by spending their 
wages in Northern Ireland (Hansard, 2007a). 
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Anna Lo of the APNI has consistently spoken on behalf of migrants in her 
contributions in the Assembly. The quotation below is drawn from a debate on the 
rights of migrant workers and refers to the positive economic impact made by migrant 
workers in Northern Ireland:  
 
The majority of the migrant workers live in Belfast, Dungannon, Craigavon and 
the Newry and Mourne areas and have jobs in administration, manufacturing, 
food processing, hospitality and construction. Research from the European 
Commission and the UK shows that migrant workers have had a generally 
positive impact on the economy. (Hansard, 2009b). 
 
In this area of discussion, most unionist representatives shared in the cross-party 
consensus over the positive economic effects of immigration. This is evident when 
we turn to consider the statement below made by Esmond Birnie of the UUP during 
an Assembly debate on equality issues: 
It is important to say from the outset that migrant workers have performed a 
major service to our economy. In the short to medium term, that inward 
migration has allowed the Northern Ireland economy to continue to grow and 
not be held back by labour shortages, which might otherwise have become 
critical. (Hansard, 2006). 
Finally, we see the consensus on the economic benefits of immigration extend 
across the full party-spectrum, when we observe the quotation below made by 
Jimmy Spratt of the DUP, during a discussion of the Shared Future strategy: 
People of more than 60 nationalities are now contributing to our economy and 
society. In towns such as Portadown and Dungannon, major employers would 
be unable to operate without Portuguese and eastern European staff, 
particularly in the food manufacturing sector. (Hansard, 2007b). 
 
Each of these quotes, taken together, serves to demonstrate a general, cross-party 
consensus about the economic benefits of immigration in to Northern Ireland. This 
agreement transcends party divisions across the political spectrum. These narratives 
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on immigration politics are common to nationalist, non-aligned and unionist 
representatives. However, interesting patterns begin to emerge when we consider 
the emphasis that these narratives place upon the work ethic of migrants. At this 
point it becomes possible to discern differences emerging in the way that the political 
parties endorse immigration. The following section turns to examine a number of key 
arguments that have arisen in the research process about the work ethic of migrants, 
and the emphases that different parties have adopted in order to articulate their 
particular endorsement of migrant workers.  
5.4.1 Work Ethic 
When discussing their endorsements for immigration, most of the politicians that 
were interviewed in this process made at least some reference to their perception of 
the work ethic of migrants. However, what stood out was the sheer weight of 
emphasis that the two largest parties placed upon work ethic at the expense of other 
considerations such as the changing nature of diversity in Northern Ireland. At this 
stage in the analysis a number of different patterns emerged: some of which 
highlighted areas of cross-party consensus; and others that served to illustrate 
discursive fault-lines. Firstly, we will look at the broad consensus associated with the 
argument that immigrants in Northern Ireland have brought a strong work ethic. This 
correlates with earlier discussions suggesting that immigration was good for the 
economy but focusses on the specifics of exactly how migrants have created positive 
impacts through their own efforts.  
 
Unpicking these data allows us to highlight a key area of cross-party consensus. More 
interestingly, this evidence highlights a shared emphasis that is common to the 
dominant tribune parties. This discursive overlap is evident when we turn to consider 
the quotations below. The first statement arose during an interview with a member 
of the DUP: 
 
People in general see immigrants working hard and making a positive 
contribution.  I think there are a small group of people who have grave 
resentment against economic migrants but it is a tiny minority (DUP4, 2013). 
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This type of discursive theme is repeated to a greater or lesser extent across the 
party system. This is in evidence when we consider the next contribution made by a 
member of Sinn Féin: 
 
A large number of the Eastern Europeans seem to be concentrated in areas 
such as the poultry industry and agriculture generally. They play an important 
role, they are extremely good workers, the ones I know from my local 
community (SF3, 2013). 
 
This focus upon the work ethic of migrants is a key feature of narratives on 
immigration when discussed by the two largest parties in the region. What is 
interesting here is not that the smaller parties do not pay attention to the work ethic 
of migrants, but rather that representatives of the smaller parties tend to list work 
ethic as just one of many positive characteristics of immigrants; where the larger 
parties focus nearly entirely upon this area of the discussion. In the next chapter we 
will return to this distinction between the more successful tribune parties and the 
smaller parties when we begin to consider narratives related to the cultural impact 
of immigration. At this stage, it is sufficient to state that the tribune parties place 
nearly exclusive emphasis upon their admiration for the work ethic of migrants. 
However, there are further elements of cross-spectrum consensus in evidence when 
we appraise party narratives on the educational achievements of immigrant children. 
5.4.2 Educational Attainment 
A significant number of the politicians that participated in the study suggested that 
migrant children have had a positive impact in the field of educational achievement 
in Northern Ireland. This correlates with broader narratives about the work ethic of 
migrants, seeming to suggest an almost inter-generational effect that immigration is 
having upon Northern Ireland. A wide spread of representatives articulated these 
types of narrative. This is evident in the statements below. In order to avoid further 
repetition, a handful of quotations will be used to represent this general trend. The 
first quotation that we will consider came from an interview with a representative of 
Sinn Féin: 
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Many of us could learn from their work ethic and their approach to education. 
I note that a lot of ethnic minority children have only been over here for a few 
years maybe and they are often top of their class, or near the top in terms of 
examination results. I think it is very impressive (SF2, 2013). 
 
Non-aligned politicians often articulated similar narratives, again placing focus on the 
educational prowess of the immigrant children. This is apparent in the quotation 
below made by a representative of the APNI when discussing the impact of 
immigration: 
 
A lot of these pupils bring an energy to education which our local students 
don't match. I'm talking about at primary level, there are very hard-working 
Asian and also Polish students, who will work very, very hard to achieve a 
much higher level of attainment in their school work. (APNI3, 2013). 
 
Similar appraisals of the work ethic of migrant children were outlined by members of 
both unionist parties. The example below came from an interview with a member of 
the DUP: 
 
I'm very impressed with a number of their children that are in some of our 
local primary schools that are learning English rapidly as well as learning Polish 
at home. You get the feeling like they put in the time and effort, they go over 
and above (DUP3, 2013). 
 
When considering these areas of consensus about the desirability of immigration and 
the work ethic of immigrant communities, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
this represented a relatively uncontested area of political discussion. This is until we 
begin to highlight other discursive themes that serve to demarcate underlying 
ideological distinctions between the parties. One of the obvious manifestations of this 
is evident when we begin to unpick contributions made by nationalists and their 
attempts to relate the position of migrants in Northern Ireland to the experiences of 
the Irish diasporic community living and working abroad. 
147 
  
 
5.4.3 Irish Emigration 
While members of all of the parties often choose to praise the work of ethic of 
immigrants and particularly their children, we begin to see interesting distinctions 
emerge in the themes utilised by Irish nationalist representatives when discussing 
this issue. Their difference in emphasis serves to outline a vision of immigration that 
has a distinctly Irish dimension. Nationalist narratives shift focus to a discussion of 
the hardship experienced by the historic Irish diaspora that left the island in search 
of opportunities abroad, and their participation in difficult and dangerous occupations. 
This allows the nationalist parties to tie their endorsement of immigrant communities 
in with longer standing narratives about the historical difficulties faced by the Irish 
national community. This correlation between minorities and Irishness is a feature of 
Sinn Féin narratives in a number of areas under consideration in this study, but also 
emerges at times in statements made by the SDLP. The following quotations are 
taken from debates in the Assembly during the period in which immigration in to 
Northern Ireland was at its highest. The first example is taken from a contribution 
made by John Dallat of the SDLP in a debate on human trafficking: 
 
[…] the New World often forgets that the Irish built it. Irish people built the 
tunnels in Britain and the skyscrapers in America. However, even today, they 
cannot get the right to come and go as they should. The Irish people have 
enough history behind them to know not to do the same thing to the people 
who are building this economy. (Hansard, 2008). 
 
A more emotive account is articulated here in the following quotation from Sinn Féin’s 
Martina Anderson in the same debate: 
 
Women and men have been leaving their homelands in search of work ever 
since payment in return for labour was introduced. Nowhere is that more true 
than in Ireland. For generations, oppression, starvation and poverty forced our 
people to distant lands in order to survive. (Hansard, 2008). 
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The work ethic of Irish migrants tended to be invoked in order to establish areas of 
commonality with current immigrants, this was particularly frequent during 
interviews with Sinn Féin representatives: 
 
If you go to where these migrants work, they are often noted as being some 
of the hardest working people there. That was also one of the comments that 
was often made about Irish people that worked abroad. So you can see we 
have an awful lot in common with these people (SF3, 2013). 
 
Here, a connection is explicitly made between the circumstances of the new migrants 
entering contemporary Northern Ireland and the experiences of the historic Irish 
diaspora. However, emigration also proved a useful linguistic refrain that would help 
Sinn Féin make an anti-austerity case in response to the spending cuts imposed by 
the 2010 coalition government. The following quotations are taken from debates 
between 2010 and 2012 and show the adaptability of the emigration narrative as a 
linguistic resource in Sinn Féin’s ideological toolbox. This quotation was taken from a 
question posed by a Sinn Féin member to the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and 
Investment: 
 
Could the Minister let us know what concrete plans she has put in place to 
tackle the soaring numbers of unemployed young people here? Everywhere I 
go I hear family members talk about their young people who do not have jobs, 
and they ask what your Department is doing. There is mass emigration from 
this island. Could the Minister update me on her plans? (Hansard, 2011). 
 
Occasionally, but less frequently, similar issues were raised by members of the SDLP. 
For instance, the following statement was taken from an SDLP member’s contribution 
to a private members’ debate on unemployment: 
We now have 23·5% youth unemployment.  How are we going to tackle 
that?  What are our young people going to do?  Do we just let them 
despair?  Do we allow them to emigrate?  As many Members know, young 
people are going to Australia, Canada or elsewhere to get employment. 
(Hansard, 2012a). 
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Taken together, these quotations highlight a trend amongst Northern Irish 
nationalists to twist discussions about contemporary issues on to comfortable 
ideological terrain. Emigration features as a linguistic resource that can be adapted 
to meet the requirements of a number of different situations, it is particularly helpful 
in outlining a vision of commonality with immigrants entering Northern Ireland. 
Following on from these discussions related to the work ethic of migrants, many 
interview respondents from all parties would often tend to move towards 
conversations focussed around the types of roles that immigrants filled in the 
domestic economy. 
5.4.4 Undesirable Jobs 
The vast majority of respondents in this research process stated that rather than 
immigrants impacting negatively upon the employment prospects of the local 
population, they tended to take on roles that the Northern Irish work force did not 
want to accept. This was a recurring theme that was articulated by representatives 
of all of the parties consulted in this study. The quotations below serve to illustrate 
this widely held opinion. Again this tends to confirm a high degree of cross-party 
consensus about the desirability of immigration into Northern Ireland. However, it is 
notable that a small number of unionist representatives go against this general trend, 
articulating arguments that suggest migrants may impact negatively upon 
employment prospects for local people. The series of quotations below serve to 
highlight the extent of the general cross-party consensus on this issue. The first 
quotation we will consider comes from an interview with a representative of the UUP: 
 
When people do come out with that stuff about 'they've stolen our jobs', well 
that doesn't turn out to be actually quite right. Often people here didn't actually 
want the jobs, so that's the real problem (UUP2, 2013). 
 
There are obvious parallels in the next statement that was made by a member of the 
DUP during a discussion about immigration and its impact on employment prospects 
for the domestic population: 
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It is raised on occasions. It is a natural reaction that if someone loses their 
job, the blame game starts, and the easiest person to blame is the immigrants. 
I always remind them, that the immigrants are here to do the jobs that local 
people don't want to do (DUP4, 2013). 
 
These arguments also found expression in discussions with non-aligned members of 
the APNI. For instance, consider the statement made below: 
 
Particularly in certain industries for example, poultry workers and the meat 
packaging industry. They say that they advertise the jobs, but they can't staff 
them from the local people. Sometimes people would rather stay on benefits 
than to fill those jobs. It is dirty work, physical work and low-paid, often people 
are not interested (APNI1, 2013). 
 
Nationalists of both parties were also keen to argue that immigrants tended to fill 
gaps in the employment market that had emerged because local people did not wish 
to apply for such positions. This is in evidence when we consider the following 
statement made by a member of The SDLP:  
 
Let's face it very often these people from immigrant backgrounds are here to 
do jobs that the indigenous people do not want to take at the rates on offer. It 
is good that the young people here have high aspirations and want to do skilled 
jobs, but it does mean that industry has to look outside to recruit people in 
some cases (SDLP3, 2013). 
 
These statements serve to illustrate the tendency of most politicians to agree that in 
the majority of cases, immigration has served to plug gaps in the labour market that 
could not be filled by the domestic population due to a lack of interest in the low paid, 
low status jobs on offer. However, despite this element of cross-party consensus, a 
significant number of representatives from both of the unionist parties brought in 
different arguments, raising questions about the potential for immigration to impact 
negatively on employment prospects for local people. 
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5.4.5 Protectionist Narratives 
A sizeable minority of unionist representatives argued that competition from migrants 
was creating difficulties for the native population through harming their employment 
prospects. Again, this confirms the suggestion that while most party representatives 
are positive about immigration, certain sections of both unionist parties harbour fears 
about the potentially negative impact of immigration into Northern Ireland. This 
sentiment is well captured in the statements below that were made by 
representatives of both unionist parties. The first example comes from an Assembly 
contribution made by former UUP leader, Reg Empey: 
 
Many immigrants are skilled workers, such as welders or surveyors, but many 
others are receiving the minimum wage. If that was to be lowered, it would be 
likely that part of the indigenous population would be pushed back onto 
benefits. However, because migrant workers are not immediately eligible for 
benefits, they would take minimum wage-jobs because the wages would still 
be relatively high compared to those in their home countries. The net effect 
would be that in areas where low wages are paid the indigenous population 
would be driven back onto benefits, which could create tensions in the 
community (Hansard, 2007c). 
 
A similar approach is articulated in the statement below that came from the former 
Environment Minister and DUP representative, Sammy Wilson: 
 
In any country citizenship confers certain privileges on people. It has 
obligations to its own citizens before those of other countries, otherwise what 
is the value of citizenship?[…] Do you really want to put someone from here 
on the dole and have to pay for their upkeep, family and lifestyle when 
someone who has chosen themselves to be mobile could be the one in 
employment? (Belfast Telegraph, 2009). 
 
The significance of these restrictive arguments is that once more they serve to 
highlight the negative approach to immigration adopted by sections of political 
unionism. Unlike the majority of representatives consulted in these interviews who 
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tend to state that migrants fill gaps in the labour market through taking on roles not 
widely sought by the domestic population, these arguments state that immigration 
impacts negatively on the local community. This collection of statements, coupled 
with those made earlier in reference to immigration and welfare, can be taken 
together to highlight the existence of a pro-restriction bloc that exists in both of the 
unionist parties. This bloc stands in opposition to the majority of political 
representatives who are either supportive of mild immigration controls or those who 
would actively welcome greater expansion. The final section of this chapter will sum 
up these findings and consider their relevance in terms of ideological positioning 
processes. 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The evidence in this chapter points to the suggestion that in an ethnically defined 
party system, immigration issues become absorbed by pre-existing ideological 
structures. This contradicts suggestions that elite stances on migration are not 
subject to the usual considerations that drive inter-party positioning (Freeman, 1995; 
2002; 2011). Parties are most likely to adopt stances that they consider to be 
palatable to their supporters and that seem to be consistent with their longer standing 
ideological positioning. We know from our earlier survey of literature that parties will 
tend to explain events and phenomena in a manner that maximises their potential 
for popular support, but they are bound by the need to ensure that their arguments 
fit with their established ideological platform (Downs, 1957; Petrocik, 1996).  
 
With regard to immigration, there is some degree of evidence of a split in public 
opinion that may partially explain the strategies adopted by some of the parties. 
Using religious background to demarcate each party’s potential supporters has a 
degree of crudeness to it, though there are clear patterns of affiliation. For instance 
in the 2010 NILT survey, 68% of Catholic respondents stated that they voted for one 
of the two main nationalist parties, 63% of Protestant respondents voted for one of 
the two largest unionist parties (NILT, 2010a). Support for the APNI has less of an 
overt communal affiliation, with support split between Protestant, Catholic and 
others. The importance of this becomes clear when we observe NILT survey data on 
attitudes towards immigration. For some of the key indicators, Protestants were 
clearly more reticent about immigration than Catholics. For instance, in response to 
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the question: ‘do the needs of migrant workers’ children put a strain on schools?’ 
65% of Protestants surveyed stated that they either agreed or strongly agreed. This 
contrasts with 37% Catholic respondents that gave the same responses to this 
question (NILT, 2010b). These findings are not perfectly suited to enabling us to 
explain all aspects of party behaviour, as they do not account for the unanimity of 
the nationalist/non-aligned bloc on the desirability of immigration. However, they do 
provide an indication as to why unionists are more inclined to adopt restrictive 
positions on immigration than the other parties.   
 
While parties are keen to recruit popular support, they cannot say whatever they like 
at any given moment. They are tied to some extent by the specific linguistic 
formulations that their platform is constructed around. Consequently, the parties will 
seek to utilise their preferred ideological frameworks when engaging with emerging 
events. It is the contention of this chapter that these dynamics are evident when we 
consider the data that has been showcased in the text so far. On some occasions, 
immigration is invoked when it supports long-standing ideological positions adopted 
by the parties. At other times we tend to see ideological narratives bent and twisted 
in order to accommodate aspects of societal change that have arisen as a result of 
changing patterns of migration. This type of behaviour is in line with the broad 
theories of party competition referred to above. The positioning process is played out 
by the parties as they adapt their discursive frameworks to explain social phenomena 
in way that is harmonious with the party’s favoured ideological refrains. 
 
For instance, let us turn to consider the reasons behind the nationalist and non-
aligned consensus about the desirability and further encouragement of immigration 
into Northern Ireland. This is best understood through reference to wider linguistic 
refrains employed by these parties. For Sinn Féin, immigration provides an 
opportunity to draw upon one of their favoured ideological devices. Through twisting 
discussions of immigration to enable narratives about the harsh conditions that have 
historically forced many Irish people to work abroad, Sinn Féin representatives are 
able to align themselves with the immigrant communities in Northern Ireland. This 
ties in with the party’s keenness to present itself as open and progressive in contrast 
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to the perceived close-mindedness of political unionism and it provides comfortable 
linguistic territory for the party representatives.  
 
The APNI have historically constructed their appeal on speaking outside of the ‘two 
traditions’ narrative. The party has sought to highlight the fact that diversity in 
Northern Ireland should not be reduced to simple binary categorisation. Immigration 
issues tie in neatly with this ideological position, meaning that the party can quite 
easily accommodate expansive narratives into their broader platform and use migrant 
communities to bolster their arguments. The SDLP, as a party that is squeezed 
ideologically between the constitutional nationalist incarnation of Sinn Féin and the 
non-aligned APNI, reflects aspects of both of these narratives, at times discussing 
historic Irish emigration and also utilising refrains about the recognition of greater 
diversity in the territory. All of these shifts are very much in line with the theoretical 
work on ideological positioning which suggests that parties will seek to accommodate 
emergent issues within their favoured discursive frameworks (Finlayson, 2012). 
 
Unionists by contrast, are split over the desirability of immigration into Northern 
Ireland. This split divides the unionist electorate and the political parties. While the 
majority of unionist politicians are entirely comfortable with discussing the economic 
benefits associated with immigration and the excellent work ethic of migrants, many 
would like to see further restrictions placed upon freedom of movement. The best 
way to explain this is through reference to longer term ideological fractures within 
political unionism. Both unionist parties contain civic and ethnic elements in their 
political make up. These ideological positions are broad definitional fault-lines that 
help us to understand some of the central political instincts of unionism, but they are 
not mutually exclusive and there are significant degrees of overlap within and 
between the parties.  
 
Where unionists bring in discussions about the economic desirability of immigration 
in the context of a broader UK-wide pattern, we can see clear evidence of an attempt 
to utilise civic narratives to frame immigration politics in the territory. Where we see 
arguments suggesting migrants may abuse welfare and harm the employment 
prospects of the local population, there is evidence of a protectionist streak 
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associated with exclusive conceptions of territoriality and ethno-national community. 
Hence, it seems likely that the messy and uneven civic and ethnic fissures, within 
and across the unionist parties, influences the adoption of narratives on immigration. 
The next chapter will build upon these arguments by focussing upon narratives 
related to the potential for immigrants to change Northern Irish society. It will be 
shown that there is evidence of a schism between the larger tribune parties and the 
smaller parties when discussing the cultural impact of immigration. 
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Chapter 6: Language and Cultural Accommodation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the manner in which cultural politics have been played out 
in inter-party debate in Northern Ireland during the period under consideration in our 
case study. It will be argued that there is very little emphasis placed on the 
accommodation of migrant cultures due to the dominance of inter-party debates that 
relate to the ‘two traditions’ framework. Most particularly, this has become evident 
due to the preeminent position of debates related to parading, flags and other forms 
of performative ritual associated with the cultural division in Northern Ireland. The 
issue of minority languages has implications for parity of esteem between the 
majority groups but also impacts on integration processes for migrant communities 
in the territory. For this reason, we will be placing our primary focus on political 
debates related to the accommodation of minority languages in order to outline some 
of the more pertinent aspects of cultural politics in the period of the study.  
 
The chapter will begin by highlighting some of the aspirations for approaches to 
cultural accommodation that have been expressed in policy frameworks for the 
governance of Northern Ireland, before considering how the parties themselves have 
approached these issues. It will be suggested that the aspirations for multicultural 
and intercultural accommodation that are set out in such documents lack a sense of 
theoretical clarity and are seldom reflected in political discussions on these issues. 
As the chapter progresses it will be argued that debates over the accommodation of 
difference in Northern Ireland seem entirely distinct from wider theoretical positions 
due to their grounding in the historic particularities of the territory. Illustrative 
quotations will be used to highlight the contours of a split within the party system 
that does not follow constitutional fault-lines, but is best expressed in terms of a 
distinction between the larger and smaller political parties. In order to illustrate this, 
the first section of findings focusses upon the manner in which parties discuss the 
impact of increased diversity on Northern Irish society.  
 
It will be argued that there is evidence of a tendency on the part of the smaller parties 
to focus upon the potential for change offered by immigration. The SDLP, APNI and 
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UUP all argue that immigration has had a significant influence in diluting the cultural 
binary that has been traditionally associated with the history of division in Northern 
Ireland. These narratives tend to suggest that migrants have helped or may help to 
create a fundamental change in approaches to the accommodation of diversity in the 
territory. It is notable that these arguments are largely absent in statements drawn 
from the DUP and Sinn Féin. The two larger parties instead tend to focus upon the 
performative cultural displays of ethnic minorities making few references to the 
potential for societal change associated with immigration. 
 
The chapter then turns to provide a detailed investigation into language politics in 
Northern Ireland in order to highlight the extent to which the parties engage with the 
cultural accommodation of ethnic minorities. It will be argued that the evidence 
suggests that ethnically defined parties, particularly the tribune parties, focus nearly 
exclusively upon traditional fault-lines in cultural politics. For this purpose, an 
overview of contemporary language debates will be provided. This area of cultural 
politics serves to highlight the dominance of the parity of esteem framework in such 
discussions. It will be shown the needs of ethnic minorities are usually only discussed 
in these debates either by non-aligned members arguing in favour of moving the 
debate beyond binary calculations, or by unionists invoking minority languages as a 
blocking tactic against greater legislative support for Gaélic programmes. In this 
sense, ethnic minority languages become employed as a defensive stratagem to 
subvert the political demands of Northern Irish nationalists. The final section of the 
chapter will consider the relevance of these findings, utilising theories of ideological 
positioning and literature on party conflict in Northern Ireland to aid our 
interpretations. However, before we can proceed to analyse the statements made by 
the party representatives on these issues, it is useful for us to dissect some of the 
legislative provisions that have been made for cultural accommodation in the 
territory. This will serve to highlight the lack of theoretical clarity associated with 
such documents and the gap between policy aims and the positions of the political 
parties. 
6.2 Cultural Diversity Policies 
During the period of our case study, three different overarching policy frameworks 
have been in place for the management of cultural difference in Northern Ireland: 
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firstly, there was the Shared Future strategy (2005); secondly the Cohesion, Sharing 
and Integration framework (2010), (CSI); and thirdly, the Together: Building a 
United Community package (2013), (T:BUC). Additionally, there are some other 
pieces of relevant legislation in place such as the European Charter on Minority 
Languages (C.O.E, 1992). By providing a brief examination of these documents we 
are able to outline the legislative context in which cultural diversity is expected to be 
accommodated in the territory.  
 
Each of the legislative frameworks invoke either multiculturalism or interculturalism 
to some extent as discursive devices. It has been argued earlier in this thesis that 
despite the differences between these positions that they are mutually 
complementary and both exhibit sophisticated understandings of cultural diversity 
(Wood et al. 2006: Bouchard, 2011: Modood & Meer, 2012a; 2012b). The language 
used in policy documents during the period of the case study does reflect some 
recognition of the increasingly diverse nature of Northern Irish society. Though the 
form that this has taken has varied according to the wider political contexts in which 
these documents were shaped. The first of these frameworks, A Shared Future, was 
written during a period of direct rule from Westminster. The document highlights a 
keen engagement with the needs of immigrant communities in Northern Ireland and 
was accompanied by a wide-ranging racial equality strategy. The framework draws 
on linguistic components that are associated with some of the theoretical models 
discussed in our earlier literature review chapter. Most notably linguistic patterns 
associated with liberalism, multiculturalism and interculturalism are invoked in the 
document. For instance, there is a strong emphasis on tolerance and individual 
equality in the text, which are most commonly associated with liberalism. This is 
apparent when we consider the following quotation:  
 
This policy document sets out that we need to establish over time a shared 
society defined by a culture of tolerance: a normal, civic society, in which all 
individuals are considered as equals (OFMDFM, 2005, p. 3).  
 
Elsewhere the document utilises the term ‘multi-cultural’ in order to describe the 
changes that were taking place in Northern Ireland in this period, this is evident in 
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the statement “Cultural diversity training is vital in a divided society that is becoming 
more multi-cultural” (OFMDFM, 2005, p. 36). The document also draws on 
intercultural terminology in order to discuss educational measures taken to promote 
cultural accommodation in school settings.   
 
Overall, the document seems to reflect the ideas of liberal multiculturalism associated 
with scholars such as Kymlicka (1989; 1995), though there is limited usage of 
explicitly multicultural terminology. One plausible explanation for this is that during 
this period the ‘backlash’ against multicultural principles discussed in our earlier 
literature review was already taking place and policy-makers were beginning to avoid 
using this terminology in such documents (Vervotec & Wessendorf, 2010). Despite 
the ambiguous use of language in the framework there is a clear recognition of the 
complexity of diversity and identity that we find in both liberal conceptions of 
multiculturalism and intercultural texts. For instance, there is an explicit recognition 
of the nuanced and variable nature of identity when the framework states that:  
 
A ‘cultural variety’ in constant motion is very different from, and highly 
preferable to, a limited ‘variety of cultures’ set in aspic. Nor, however, are we 
talking about a process of homogenisation, or of assimilation to one official 
ethos, but a ring of diverse cultural expressions where interactions, can thrive. 
(OFMDFM, 2005, p. 8) 
 
Furthermore, the document makes explicit recognition of the wide range of different 
languages spoken in Northern Ireland other than internal linguistic forms when it 
states that:  
 
In addition to English, many other languages are used in Northern Ireland, 
including indigenous minority languages (Irish, Ulster-Scots, and British and 
Irish Sign Languages) and minority ethnic languages (such as Cantonese, 
Portuguese, Cant and Arabic). Research which mapped minority ethnic 
languages in Northern Ireland reveals over 50 languages, most of which are in 
daily use here and all of which are an important part of our both shared and 
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diverse cultural heritage. Our different languages are an intrinsic part of our 
cultural capital (OFMDFM, 2005, p. 35) 
 
In this sense, the document goes some way towards recognising the extent of cultural 
diversity present in Northern Irish society. However, it has little to offer in terms of 
specific support measures for minority languages other than Irish and Ulster-Scots 
which are afforded certain protections under the European Charter for Minority 
Languages (C.O.E. 1992). Despite the failings of the Shared Future framework in 
offering support for migrant languages it does engage to some extent with the 
changes brought about by an increasingly diverse society. Subsequent policy 
frameworks written at the devolved level within Northern Ireland have tended 
towards a difference in emphasis with less focus on migrant issues than Shared 
Future. This will become evident as we begin to dissect the CSI consultation 
document that was put forward as a replacement for the Shared Future.  
 
Following on from the St Andrews agreement which saw Sinn Féin and the DUP 
formulate agreements on mutual participation and power-sharing, a changed context 
emerged in which devolved, consociational governance became more stable for a 
significant period (Knox, 2011). During this timeframe, the OFMDFM put forward a 
new programme for the management of difference in the territory that reflected their 
own specific concerns rather than those of the government in Westminster. This 
prompted the consultation process for the CSI framework (OFMDFM, 2007). The 
adoption of the term ‘cohesion’ in this document seemed to suggest some correlation 
between the Northern Irish situation and the trends towards the idea of ‘community 
cohesion’ that was becoming a common feature of discussions about the 
management of diversity in other parts of the U.K., particularly with reference to the 
accommodation of difference in in Northern England (Cantle, 2005).  
 
Given that these terms were most closely associated with the work of Ted Cantle who 
was discussed earlier in this thesis as a proponent of interculturalism, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that CSI began to adopt similar linguistic features. There are a number 
of references to interculturalism in the CSI framework. This trend is evident in the 
statement below:  
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Our vision is for an “intercultural” society – a dynamic process where different 
cultures and communities interact, learn about and question their own and 
each other’s cultures. Over time this may lead to cultural change. It recognises 
the inequalities at work in society and the need to overcome these. It is a 
process which requires mutual respect and acknowledges human rights 
(OFMDFM, 2007, p. 44) 
 
The CSI consultation framework prompted a significant academic response much of 
which was negative in its appraisal. Some of the first contributors to this critique 
were Todd et al. (2010) who argued that CSI had side-lined some of the more 
ambitious proposals put forward in the Shared Future framework. Knox (2011) 
provides a pointed review of CSI that is well expressed in the quotation below: 
 
In short, it is a woolly benign document and one which offers little by way of 
specific and measurable objectives, policy priorities, or an implementation 
strategy. It is the product of a political consensus between the DUP and Sinn 
Fein replete with good intentions but lacking in specificity. (Knox, 2011, p. 
551) 
 
It is certainly fair to say that CSI is marked by a number of key flaws. Firstly, there 
is a tendency to discuss interculturalism whilst offering little of substance to explain 
what is meant by this, or how such principles could find expression in practice. 
Following the work of intercultural scholars such as Bouchard (2011) we might expect 
to see provisions set out to explain how intercultural dialogue could be promoted in 
order to facilitate cultural blending, yet in practice the document does not achieve 
this. The document showcases certain examples of grass-roots organisations that 
have engaged in cross-communal work, but this does not clearly mark-out how 
further intercultural initiatives would be formulated and supported by the devolved 
government. Furthermore, the document is notable for the fact that when it 
addresses actual approaches to cultural accommodation it seems to utilise linguistic 
refrains associated with excessively simplistic conceptions of multiculturalism. In a 
number of places there are signs of a ‘saris, samosas and steel-bands’ approach 
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which is rejected by the majority of multicultural theorists and interculturalist 
thinkers (Modood & May, 2001; Cantle, 2014). For just one example of this type of 
emphasis consider the quotation below: 
 
New arrivals provide new occasions and new celebrations which add to the 
range of cultural traditions which we can enjoy and embrace (OFMDFM, 2007, 
p. 29) 
 
There is a distinct focus on the importance of cultural festivals and displays in CSI 
that is not present in the Shared Future strategy. An example of this is evident in the 
following statement: 
 
Community festivals are about participation, involvement and the creation of 
a sense of identity and are important in contributing to the social well-being of 
a community (OFMDFM, 2007, p. 33) 
 
This change in focus could be explained in terms of reflecting the priorities of the 
dominant tribune parties. This is something that we will consider further later in the 
thesis when we outline our findings related to cultural accommodation and discuss 
the motivations driving the political parties to adopt particular narratives in response 
to the challenges of an increasingly diverse society. Ultimately, the CSI framework 
did not move beyond the consultation process and was replaced by the T:BUC 
document. However, this framework shares a number of similarities with CSI in terms 
of its discussions of a vague interculturalism coupled with a focus on cultural displays 
as a means of accommodating diversity.  
 
T:BUC is in many ways an ambitious policy document. It sets out some challenging 
goals aimed at fostering greater accommodation between the two primary cultural 
communities. However, it contains virtually no focus on measures to accommodate 
linguistic diversity. Furthermore, there is scant mention of minority communities 
outside of the two traditions. Once again, this suggests that the document reflects 
the priorities of the two dominant parties and their inability to overcome deadlock in 
certain areas. Despite this, the document frequently invokes the lexicon of 
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interculturalism. One such example can be found in the quotation below which states 
that: 
 
We must work together both in Government and with community and statutory 
partners to build trust and increase understanding of the range of cultural 
backgrounds that exist here. We believe that an approach based on 
intercultural dialogue can help facilitate greater integration and build a more 
united community (OFMDFM 2013, p. 79) 
 
However, similarly to CSI, the only measures to promote cultural accommodation 
discussed at any length in the document focus nearly exclusively on the promotion 
of simplistic varieties of cultural celebration. This is evident in the quotation below 
which highlights this tendency: 
 
As we move towards achieving our vision of a united community, we are 
committed to developing an open and tolerant society in which everyone is 
free to mark and celebrate their identity, or indeed identities, in a peaceful and 
respectful manner (OFMDFM, 2013, p. 86) 
 
In addition to its focus on celebration, the discussion of celebrating in a ‘peaceful’ 
manner seems to suggest the primary preoccupation of the document is in dealing 
with managing differences within the two traditions model rather than the full 
spectrum of diversity in the territory. Overall the policy documents designed at 
devolved level seem to offer less focus on immigrant generated diversity than the 
Shared Future strategy despite the fact that Northern Ireland was becoming 
increasingly diverse during the period in which they were written. Whilst some degree 
of focus upon cultural celebration is to be welcomed, such documents fail to outline 
actual measures to promote intercultural dialogue and do little to address the real 
needs of migrant communities.  
 
It is clear that all of the policy frameworks recognise the changing nature of diversity 
in Northern Ireland. By using terms such as ‘intercultural’ and ‘multicultural’ the 
documents suggest that the sub-state should play an active role in formulating 
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measures to ensure the accommodation of difference in an equitable fashion based 
on the protection of diversity and cross-cultural dialogue. Though there is little clarity 
as to what these terms should mean with respect to policy outcomes. Furthermore, 
the approach to language issues that is adopted in these documents seems to suggest 
the manner in which policy-makers have stepped back from engaging with the actual 
true of extent of linguistic diversity in the territory. Consequently, the main policy 
framework for the protection of minority languages in the province comes in the form 
of the European Commission Charter on Minority Languages (C.O.E, 1992). The 
difficulty with this is that the document focusses purely on local languages and says 
nothing about linguistic diversity brought about by inward migration. The charter 
seeks to work toward: 
 
Realising that the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages 
in the different countries and regions of Europe represent an important 
contribution to the building of a Europe based on the principles of democracy 
and cultural diversity within the framework of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity (C.O.E, 1992, p. 1). 
 
However, elsewhere the charter explicitly states that migrant languages or dialects 
of official languages are not covered by the provisions of the document (C.O.E. 1992) 
Consequently, in Northern Ireland we have seen a strange situation whereby as the 
society has become increasingly marked by cultural diversity, which is perhaps most 
obviously exemplified by the changing linguistic variety in the territory, the legislative 
frameworks aimed at accommodating difference seem to have become less engaged 
with migrant languages.  
 
This leaves linguistic accommodation set firmly within the ‘two traditions’ approach 
in which local minority languages dominate the agenda. The data gathered by this 
thesis seems to suggest that the ethnically defined parties have a very limited sense 
of engagement with the multicultural and intercultural terminology set out in such 
documents when discussing diversity outside of the ‘two traditions’.  Despite this, the 
ethnic parties are often keen to invoke protection narratives on behalf of ‘their’ 
community. This highlights the need for fresh thinking and further political leadership 
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in this area. However, as we proceed it will become apparent that with the exception 
of the APNI, there is very little thirst to discuss the accommodation of difference 
outside of the parity of esteem framework. The first section of evidence taken from 
party representatives revolves around the impact of the migrant communities on 
Northern Ireland. 
6.3 Cultural impact 
When discussing the cultural impact of immigrants in Northern Ireland we see 
evidence of a distinctive fissure that splits the larger parties from the smaller ones. 
Firstly, we see the smaller parties often focussing on their perception of migrants as 
a dilution to the cultural binary that is associated with Northern Ireland. Secondly, 
we tend to see the representatives of the larger parties discussing the cultural impact 
of migrants in terms of superficial ritualistic displays. The former view presents 
immigration as a means to potentially undermine the ‘two traditions’ narrative 
through changing the cultural balance in Northern Ireland. The second view outlines 
a reductive narrative on the cultural impact of migrants that is often expressed in 
academic literature as the ‘saris, samosas and steel-bands’ approach (Modood & May, 
2001). This narrative tends to characterise the minority communities according to 
certain limited stereotypes that are associated with their ethno-cultural displays. We 
will turn firstly to highlight some examples of the smaller parties articulating 
narratives about the potential for immigration to bring about further cultural dilution 
in Northern Ireland. 
6.3.1 Dilution narratives 
The smaller parties tend to focus on dilution narratives when considering the cultural 
impact of immigration. This is evident in the following statement made by a 
representative of the UUP. The quotation highlights a perception that immigration 
has served to widen the cultural playing field and to further diversify the society 
through breaking down or diminishing some of the traditional communal fissures:  
 
Remember we have been stuck here for years with basically Protestant or 
Catholic and Irish or British, Orangeism or GAA, Irish language or Ulster-Scots. 
So I think immigration does make a valuable contribution. It is good for 
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Northern Ireland because it shows us that there is a much bigger world out 
there (UUP2, 2013). 
 
This type of remark was echoed in the next statement made by a member of the 
APNI when discussing their particular endorsement of immigration: 
 
It certainly has changed cultural diversity in Northern Ireland. Particularly in 
South Belfast. You walk down the street, down the main street, Lisburn Road. 
You hear people speaking different languages for instance and I think it's great 
for Northern Ireland which for so long has been all about orange and green. I 
certainly hope that it will us help to create a new kind of society (APNI1, 2013). 
 
The following quotation, made by a member of the SDLP, again serves to highlight 
commonalities between the smaller parties and their assessment of the cultural 
impact made by immigration: 
 
All of those people bring some colour and enrich our society, both in terms of 
language, in terms of their sheer presence, their cultural presence if you want 
to call it that. I certainly think that this new diversity could help us to overcome 
some of our historical hang-ups about ‘us’ and ‘them’ if you know what I mean? 
(SDLP1, 2013). 
 
Each of the statements outlined above, serves to illustrate wide areas of overlap 
between the smaller parties when discussing the impact of immigration on the 
cultural politics of Northern Ireland. They coalesce around a common core in which 
the new diversity created by immigration is juxtaposed favourably against the 
traditional communal binary. This new diversity is described in terms of its ability to 
impact upon Northern Irish society: to challenge and to change existing divisions. 
The tribune parties that have made more overtly sectional communal appeals tend 
to focus upon superficial aspects of cultural celebration. We will move now to provide 
some examples of these types of narrative. 
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6.3.2 Saris, Samosas and Steel Bands 
The two largest parties tend to recognise the cultural presence of migrants, but paint 
a picture of the immigrant communities performing ritualistic displays that add colour 
to the society rather than making any serious differences to binary understandings 
of ethnic division. This becomes evident when we consider the statements below. The 
first of which was made a representative of Sinn Féin, the second by a member of 
the DUP: 
 
I think it is great that we do have diverse cultures and that we celebrate it. I 
think that diversity enriches everybody. It is good if people that come here 
from other communities can have their day or do whatever it is that they wish 
in order to celebrate their culture. It allows them to feel a part of things and 
helps bond them as a community.  (SF4, 2013). 
 
The suggestion that minority communities should receive recognition in the form of 
‘a day’ in which their culture is celebrated through the opportunity to put on a displays 
is not in itself a form of bigotry, it is intended to be welcoming. However, the 
statement serves to portray the cultural impact of immigrants in terms of 
performative activities that add colour or gloss to the society but create limited 
impact in terms of cultural change. This is far removed from the commitment to 
intercultural dialogue set out in the policy documents reviewed at the beginning of 
this chapter. We see similar tendencies in discussions that were held with DUP 
representatives. For instance, let us examine the statement below made in an 
interview with a member of the DUP:  
 
I enjoy going along to the Indian cultural festivals in Belfast, I like to see the 
dancing and the bright outfits, and I enjoy the food! Round here is a very 
different area. It is a traditional rural part of Northern Ireland. It would be nice 
to think that things like that might happen here, but I think that it is quite 
unlikely in the near future. (DUP3, 2013). 
 
Again this narrative places near exclusive focus upon the impact of migrants as a 
form of decoration in Northern Irish society. Once again, there is nothing about the 
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potential for intercultural dialogue that is aspired to in the later policy frameworks on 
cultural accommodation in Northern Ireland. The drivers behind this distinction 
between the large and the small parties are very likely to be driven by two 
considerations that relate to inter-party positioning. Firstly, the tribune parties have 
tended to benefit from sectional appeals to their ethnic constituencies. Consequently, 
there is little incentive for them to embrace wider diversity and the dilution of the 
‘two traditions’ approach to cultural accommodation in Northern Ireland. Secondly, 
in-keeping with the priorities of the cultural conflict described in a number of existing 
texts on Northern Irish party politics, the tribunes transfer their concern for the 
specific forms of ritual and identity that they have fought for on behalf of their 
constituent communities, to their discussions of immigration generated diversity 
(McAuley & Tonge, 2009; McDaid et al. 2013; Tonge et al. 2014)  
 
The influence of the tribune parties in setting the agenda for cultural politics becomes 
more obvious when we turn to consider party positioning on minority language 
issues. In this area we see the clear dominance of the bi-national politics of communal 
defence. Both of the tribunes and the smaller ethnically defined parties adopt stances 
in support of their traditional cultural community. Only the APNI continues to 
articulate narratives about progressing beyond communal binaries when the issue of 
minority languages is discussed by the political representatives.  
6.4 Language Politics: Parity Stalemate 
Language politics and the accommodation of linguistic pluralism is at the centre of 
debates on how best to govern a culturally diverse society in an equitable fashion 
(Kymlicka, 2001; Kymlicka & Patten, 2003) While cultural politics in Northern Ireland 
covers far more than just debates over language, it is here that we can see most 
clearly the manner in which ethnic minorities are marginalised in such debates, or 
utilised in order to support existing ideological positioning. The following section will 
highlight the discursive manifestations of the deadlock in language politics that is 
played out amongst politicians. The key stimulus in these debates is internal linguistic 
diversity, focussing primarily on Gaélic and Ulster-Scots. 
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6.4.1 Nationalism: Promoting the Irish Language 
Nationalists of both parties commonly argue in favour of greater state support for the 
Irish language, very rarely invoking the wider varieities of language diversity in the 
territory. The form that these arguments take varies to a reasonable extent between 
the parties, but there are commonalities between the two. While members of the 
SDLP tend to focus on the suggestion that Irish language is part of the heritage for 
the members of all communities on the island, Sinn Féin representatives are split 
between this type of argument and messages about the colonial mistreatment of the 
native language. In-line with broader trajectories of ideological convergence between 
the nationalist parties, there is evidence of Sinn Féin adopting elements of the SDLP’s 
approach on support for the Irish language. However, on some occasions, it is more 
appropriate to speak of continuity in Sinn Féin’s arguments on the Irish language, 
which revolve around the suggestion that support for Irish culture is a form of 
resistance against the colonial past of the territory (O’Reilly, 1999). The following 
quotations exhibit two examples of SDLP members seeking to articulate an inclusive 
narrative on Irish language, the first of which is taken from a Ministerial question 
time in the Assembly: 
 
I thank the Minister for, and support him fully in, what he is saying about the 
Irish language.  It is there for everyone.  It belongs to no one, or to no section 
of the community in particular. It is there for us to gain understanding of our 
history, background and environment (Hansard, 2014d).  
 
Similar arguments often occurred during interviews with SDLP representatives when 
discussing the politics of language: 
 
Oh I would be supportive of that and my party is supportive of that. We believe 
that the Irish language should be supported by government in a very pro-
active way.  I'm not an Irish speaker myself, but I see the value of the 
language as a cultural thing. It is something that enriches all our lives (SDLP1, 
2013). 
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Sinn Féin are commonly characterised in literature on language politics in Northern 
Ireland as being far more concerned with utilising a ‘decolonising discourse’ on 
language than the SDLP (O’Reilly, 1999). However, there is some evidence that Sinn 
Féin has begun to use similar linguistic refrains to those of the SDLP when discussing 
the language. This is suggestive of their annexation of ideological ground traditionally 
held by the moderate nationalists (Tonge, 2005). This tendency is captured in the 
following quotation that was taken from the Sinn Féin manifesto for the 2007 
Assembly election: 
 
The Irish language is a central part of our culture, which belongs to all of us 
irrespective of creed or political outlook. It enriches all our lives. Sinn Féin 
believes strongly in the need to protect and promote the Irish language and 
above all other political parties we have acted as its champion (Sinn Féin, 
2007). 
 
However, there are occasions when Sinn Féin representatives draw on traditional 
ideological refrains about the poor treatment of the Irish language under British 
Imperial rule. The quotation below provides an example of this tendency and 
suggests a potentially transitional phase in the manner in which Sinn Féin approach 
language debates. The next statement was taken from an interview with a Sinn Féin 
representative and highlights a degree of continuity in the ideological framing used 
by party members in discussions on language policy:  
 
For hundreds of years the British government tried to ban the Irish language 
and tried to keep it down so that people couldn't use it and stopped using it. 
That's where we're at, that's why the Irish language isn't as strong as it should 
be. But there is a big revival going on now around the Irish language. (SF3, 
2013). 
 
Another area in which Sinn Féin diverge from SDLP narratives on language policy is 
in their characterisation of unionists who seek to block Irish language legislation as 
bigoted, small-minded or racist. In the back and forth of Assembly debate, language 
is an issue that regularly comes to the fore. The following quotations were taken from 
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Sinn Féin contributions during Assembly debates on language policy. They serve to 
exhibit a key feature of the combative exchanges on Gaélic that have dominated 
political discussion on the protection of minority languages. The first quotation comes 
from a private member’s debate on the Irish language: 
 
The issue of language rights is not controversial in Wales, Scotland, the South 
of Ireland or throughout Europe. An expression of human rights has become a 
political football in the battle for supremacy between the unionist parties. The 
determination of unionist politicians to block any recognition of the Irish 
language is a misguided and macho demonstration of anti-Irish bigotry. It is 
almost as if unionism has decided to define itself by how ferociously anti-Irish 
it has become. That is nothing short of pathetic. (Hansard, 2007d). 
 
This type of narrative has been fuelled to some extent by the actions of some unionist 
politicians that have sought to ridicule the promotion of the Irish language. The most 
high-profile incident involved DUP representative, Gregory Campbell, during an 
exchange in the Assembly, in which he parodied an Irish phrase commonly used by 
Gaélic speakers in the chamber: 
 
Curry my yogurt can coca coal yer. The Minister has outlined what she is 
talking about with the Irish language strategy and an Ulster-Scots strategy. 
Would it not be more inclusive to have a minority languages strategy so that 
nobody would feel left out? (Hansard, 2014e). 
 
While this type of incident is far from commonplace in the chamber it has certainly 
served to fuel Sinn Féin’s representation of political unionism as bigoted in its 
approach to the Irish language. The quotation below was one of many responses 
from Sinn Féin representatives to Campbell’s attempt at humour in the Assembly. 
 
Unfortunately this is nothing new from the DUP who have blocked the 
development on an Irish language act, and whose representatives have a long 
history of insults to the Irish speaking community […]. While this might be 
funny in Gregory’s little closed world, it is hugely insulting to all of those who 
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promote the huge benefits of endorsing and enhancing bilingualism in our 
society (McCorley, cited in McGreevy 2014). 
 
Interestingly, while Sinn Féin are very keen to discuss minority languages internal to 
Ireland, they have much less to say about other minority languages. In many ways 
these types of narrative are reminiscent of the multicultural theories that relate to 
the accommodation of indigenous groups, but offer much less protection to external 
migrant minorities (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). The interviews in this study were 
able to put this point directly to the representatives of Sinn Féin. When asked about 
what level of state support should be provided for external minority languages, they 
often had very little to say, or would argue that such issues were primarily a matter 
for the private sphere. The statement below, which was taken from an interview with 
a Sinn Féin representative, illustrates this type of approach to external minority 
languages: 
 
I don't actually know, certainly they should receive help to learn the language 
here and obviously the working language here is English. So people coming to 
live and settle here do need some help to integrate. Learning the language is 
very important and they should be facilitated to do that. Obviously people 
come with their own culture and they bring their own language, so I don't know 
what you need to support other languages, because they are coming with their 
language (SF4, 2013). 
 
Nationalists generally, and Sinn Féin in particular, have made promotion of the Irish 
language part of their platform for the promotion of their ethnic group interests. 
However, as a consequence of this, migrant languages are relegated in these 
narratives, they are expected to be preserved in the private sphere. Given the effects 
of cultural swamping, it would seem likely that this approach would effectively 
amount to a form of neglect that would ultimately lead to assimilatory pressures of 
the type discussed earlier in the thesis (Glazer, 1997; Modood, 2007). This 
preoccupation with internal languages has overshadowed the need to engage with 
linguistic diversity in its totality. In response to nationalist demands for greater 
support for the Irish language, unionists have constructed defensive narratives in an 
173 
  
 
attempt to repel these perceived cultural assaults. In order to highlight this, the 
chapter will now turn to examine some of the unionist arguments that have been 
employed to block legislative support for the Irish language.  
6.4.2 Unionism: Counter Strategies 
As nationalist politicians have attempted to promote further funding for Irish 
language programmes in Northern Ireland, unionists have adopted a series of 
blocking measures aimed at countering such claims. The most common of these 
arguments is evident in the narratives of both unionist parties and is constructed 
around the suggestion that support for the Irish language is simply a political project 
of Sinn Féin. The first example of this type of narrative is taken from a UUP 
representative’s contribution to a private members’ debate in the Assembly: 
 
Since 1998, unionists have been subjected to having the Irish language forced 
down their throats in an uncompromising and adversarial way. How 
disappointing it is, therefore, in our country […] to find conflict manufactured 
by an Irish-speaking minority, as represented in the House by Sinn Féin, which 
is forcing an obscene aggression of deliberate defiance right smack into our 
unionist faces (Hansard, 2007d). 
 
Similar arguments are also made by representatives of the DUP which suggests an 
ideological overlap between the unionist parties on this issue, and some evidence of 
outflanking strategies being played out within the pro-union bloc over the issue of 
minority languages: 
 
It is true that minority languages are part of the cultural heritage and cultural 
wealth of every country. The problem in regard to the Irish language is that, 
back in the early 1980s, at the time of the hunger strikes and soon after, when 
Sinn Féin started really stepping up its cultural war, we had a Sinn Féin 
publication that stated clearly that every word spoken in Irish was another 
bullet in the freedom struggle.  That was talking about cultural war.  It was 
not speaking about cultural wealth. (Hansard, 2013a). 
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The competitive dynamics that have emerged between the unionist parties over the 
issue of the Irish language are discernible on some occasions in debates within the 
Assembly. Having been outflanked by the DUP, the UUP sees an opportunity to 
recover lost ground through exploiting agreements on language that the DUP entered 
into as part of the St Andrews negotiations of 2007. This is evident in the statement 
below made by UUP representative Danny Kennedy: 
 
The decision at St Andrews by the political parties — including the DUP — to 
introduce an Irish language Act is profoundly unsettling and potentially has 
very damaging implications for community relations and for respect for cultural 
diversity. Any person who claims that an Irish language Act would have only a 
positive impact on community relations demonstrates a wilful ignorance of the 
views that a wide range of political and community stakeholders in Northern 
Ireland hold. (Hansard, 2007d) 
 
The second line of defence in the unionist struggle to block further support for the 
Irish language comes in their suggestion that it is too costly a project and should not 
be considered a spending priority. This type of approach is evident in the quotation 
below that comes from a press statement made by Michelle McIlveen of the DUP:  
 
Any Irish Language Bill would need Executive and Assembly approval. It won't 
get it, therefore it won't be happening. Budgets are stretched as it is without 
the further expense of an Irish Language Act (Belfast Telegraph, 2011). 
 
More common still is a tactic of utilising the presence of ethnic minorities as a shield 
against the claims of Irish nationalists. This is a common device employed by 
unionists in order to block demands for greater support for the Irish language. The 
following quotes, which are taken from interviews with members of both unionist 
parties, serve to highlight this type of argument. The first statement comes from an 
interview with a representative of the UUP: 
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Should we spend money? Well there are more people, speak Mandarin than 
Irish as their first language. So it is a language, but it is not a language of 
communication in the same way that French is in France (UUP3, 2013). 
 
This is a common defensive stratagem that is employed by both unionist parties. The 
quotation below was taken from an interview with a member of the DUP:  
 
So if there is funding to go to the Irish language, well then it would be only 
correct and right that we should be allocating funding for the study of other 
languages. To be honest with you I would much rather see a large amount of 
money going in to Cantonese. If we are spending hundreds of millions of 
pounds on encouraging outside investment from China, India, Russia let's start 
supporting languages that will help that process, rather than supporting 
languages purely for the sake of identity (DUP1, 2013). 
 
The quotation above suggests an argument in favour of supporting wider language 
diversity, but this is coupled with a rejection of measures to aid internal language 
diversity. In this sense, immigrant languages are used to prop up arguments against 
further support for internal linguistic pluralism. This section has highlighted the 
central issue that divides the parties in discussions on minority language policy. 
Divisions over the Irish language dominate inter-party debate on language policy. In 
this case, nationalists demand legislative action: Sinn Féin in particular utilise 
language as a resource to highlight their strong credentials as representatives of their 
ethno-national community.  
 
Unionists by contrast, raise defences against this onslaught, arguing that Sinn Féin 
has weaponised the issue. More importantly, we see that unionist parties often use 
the new minority communities as a shield to buttress their arguments. Not only are 
the migrant languages ignored by nationalists, they are politicised by unionists. This 
cultural deadlock is further mirrored in the second part of the parity of esteem based 
stand-off over languages which revolves around Ulster-Scots. Here again, we see 
evidence of an impasse between the two primary ethnic-blocs which serves to 
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marginalise the language needs of ethnic minorities due to an excessive 
preoccupation with internal forms of linguistic diversity.  
6.5 Ulster-Scots 
A second arc of inter-party debate associated with local minority languages has 
opened up around the issue of state support for Ulster-Scots. This is more often 
associated with the DUP than the UUP, though members of both unionist parties have 
utilised the issue in language debates on occasion. Support for Ulster-Scots further 
highlights division between civic and ethnic instincts within unionism. We often see 
Ulster-Scots invoked by unionists as a marker of a distinctive ethnic identity that 
requires state protection. Yet support for this approach is not universal across political 
unionism. Particularly in anonymous interviews, a significant number of unionist 
representatives argue that Ulster-Scots is actually a device to pursue parity in funding 
for the two communities, despite a lack of balance in terms of public interest when 
compared with the Irish language revival. Nationalists of both parties tend to be open 
to the idea of funding for the Ulster-Scots language. They see Ulster-Scots as non-
threatening and generally tend to agree to some degree of state support. However, 
the issue of parity is often questioned by political representatives of nationalism, who 
argue that equality is not possible for a number of reasons. We will turn first to 
consider unionist narratives on supportive measures for Ulster-Scots.   
6.5.1 Lack of Parity 
A common device utilised by representatives of the DUP is to equate Ulster-Scots 
with the Irish language and argue that the funding disparities between these two 
languages highlight the fact that unionist culture has lost out since the Agreement. 
This type of argument illustrates an example of protectionist themes associated with 
ethnic incarnations of unionism. The civic and ethnic splits within unionism are 
demarcated by the fact that a significant minority of unionist respondents did not see 
Ulster-Scots as a particularly important issue, arguing that it was a buttressing move 
made in order to block the ethnic demands of Irish nationalism. We will turn first to 
highlight the manner in which Ulster-Scots is utilised as a discursive resource for the 
support of ethnic conceptions of unionism. The first statement here is taken from a 
DUP representative’s contribution to an Assembly debate on arts funding:   
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Under the previous devolved Government, there was a substantial disparity in 
funding, support and commitment regarding the two languages, in that vast 
resources were pushed into the Irish language through Foras na Gaeilge, 
whereas very limited resources, coupled with many imposed difficulties, went 
to the Boord o Ulstèr-Scotch. Therefore, the concept of equality was not there 
(Hansard, 2007d). 
 
The following quotation is taken from the DUP manifesto for the 2007 Assembly 
election, highlighting the extent to which the party has made parity for Ulster-Scots 
a central feature in its ethnic positioning strategy: 
 
The DUP is committed to the promotion and development of unionist culture 
and cultural identity. Much good work has already been started in this area 
and this will continue. Over the last number of years we have witnessed the 
recognition and growth of the distinct and culturally rich tradition of Ulster-
Scots. This area continues to require enhanced funding and support. Irish and 
Gaelic culture should not be allowed to dominate funding (DUP, 2007). 
 
These types of arguments suggest an ethnic conception of unionism being pitted 
against the demands for linguistic support made by Irish nationalists as discussed in 
the work of McAuley & Tonge (2009). A significant minority of representatives that 
participated in this study claimed that Ulster-Scots was not on equal par with the 
Irish language and that this made it difficult to be accorded equal weight. Others 
suggested that the campaign to support Ulster-Scots was actually a further blocking 
strategy to prevent funding for the Irish language. Interestingly, these types of 
statements rarely arose during interviews with nationalist politicians, but did occur 
in a handful of interviews with unionists or non-aligned politicians. For instance, the 
first quotation here comes from an interview that was carried out with a 
representative of the UUP: 
 
I don't have an issue with funding it, but I don't particularly like the idea that 
you fund one thing like Gaelic, so you have to then fund something else like 
Ulster-Scots or something like that. I think we could just end up dividing out 
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along those lines.  I see it not in language terms, it is not equal to Gaelic. It is 
more like a dialect (UUP2, 2013). 
 
On some occasions, representatives of the DUP would similarly claim that Ulster-
Scots was not in fact a language but a dialect, and that funding for Ulster-Scots was 
an attempt at formulating a balancing act between support for the ‘two traditions’: 
 
Well, it's a dialect rather than a language as such, I believe to some extent 
that the funding that has gone in to it, is to kind of salve the conscience of 
people who allocate funding to Irish language, so they do the same for Ulster-
Scots. (DUP3, 2013). 
 
Certain members of the APNI argued that Ulster-Scots had been adopted by some 
within the unionist community to create a blocking tactic in the communal deadlock 
over the Irish language. This was not a widely held perspective, but occasionally 
came up during interviews with APNI representatives. One such example is captured 
in the quotation below. 
 
I fear that a lot of what is passing off for Ulster-Scots campaigning is almost 
directed on the basis that 'they have got Irish, so we must have something 
too. It is often used as a means to stall discussions about the Irish language 
(APNI3, 2013). 
 
In interviews with nationalists it became apparent that they were generally 
supportive of some degree of funding for Ulster-Scots, but this was usually paired 
with the suggestion that actual parity was not possible. 
6.5.2 Parity is Unachievable 
Many nationalists argued in favour of state support for the Ulster-Scots language, 
though these arguments were generally made alongside the suggestion that Irish 
should receive greater funding, and that parity was not possible due to the lack of 
public interest. This is outlined in the quotation below that came from an interview 
with a representative of the SDLP:  
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I have no problem with that. I think it is something that is worthy of support. 
I don't see the language as being that well supported in real terms. In terms 
of people actually speaking it and so forth, but the culture is there, and in a 
wider sense the Ulster-Scots culture is something which is of value and it 
should be cherished, encouraged and supported (SDLP2, 2013). 
 
Similar types of argument were made during interviews with representatives of Sinn 
Féin, as we see in the quotation below: 
 
I have no problem with funding things to do with culture and Ulster-Scots is 
part of that. The problem that happens is that some unionists have called for 
equal funding between Irish language and Ulster-Scots. Now, when you think 
that there are Irish language schools, how can you give the same funding for 
Ulster-Scots when there are no Ulster-Scots schools?  (SF2, 2013). 
 
The quotation above highlights a key strand in nationalist arguments on Ulster-Scots 
in which it is stated that parity cannot be achieved because of an imbalance in 
educational provision between the internal minority languages. This is further 
illustrated in the exchange below in which the Sinn Féin Education Minister is taking 
questions from an MLA representing the DUP:  
Mr Humphrey: The Minister will be aware of his Department's funding and 
resource responsibilities for the Ulster-Scots Agency.  Given what he has just 
said, what extra resources will he put into the education system and sectors 
across Northern Ireland to promote Ulster-Scots education?  Indeed, given the 
ongoing disparity in funding between Irish and Ulster Scots, what more can he 
make available to help to address that? 
Mr O’Dowd: My Department funds on the basis of need.  The Member will be 
aware, and I have said this in answer to previous questions, that we have a 
thriving Irish-medium sector.  We have over 4,000 children being taught 
through the medium of Irish, and that number continues to grow.  We have 
over 20 specific Irish-medium units or schools.  Unfortunately, we do not have 
any for Ulster Scots.  (Hansard, 2014d) 
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The quotation above serves to highlight the reactive dynamics that take place within 
the ideological posturing of the political parties in relation to language issues. While 
the DUP member goes on the attack using Ulster-Scots, the Sinn Féin representative 
defends greater funding for Irish through focussing on the disparity between 
demands for educational facilities associated with local minority language groups. 
Arguments made by both unionists and nationalists in these debates are marked by 
a narrow vision of linguistic diversity in the province. There is little sense of 
engagement with the realities of an increasingly plural society. It is only the non-
aligned APNI that regularly invokes the full spectrum of minority languages in 
Northern Ireland. We will now move on to discuss the discursive themes that mark 
APNI narratives on the accommodation of linguistic diversity. 
6.5.3 External Minority Languages 
The chapter so far has primarily focussed on a stand-off that exists between 
nationalists and unionists over internal minority languages. There has been little 
mention of ethnic minority languages. This is due to the fact that external minority 
language issues are largely absent from the majority of political debates on cultural 
accommodation in Northern Ireland. The preoccupation with internal language 
diversity on the part of the ethnically defined parties is further highlighted when we 
turn now to consider the arguments of the APNI. The APNI tends to argue in favour 
of wider ranging support for all minority languages spoken in the territory. This 
argument suggests an approach to the accommodation of linguistic diversity that 
seldom features in the narratives of the other parties. The first of our illustrative 
quotations is drawn from the APNI manifesto for the 2007 Assembly election in which 
the party outlines its perspective on minority languages: 
 
Alliance recognises the linguistic diversity within our community, and believes 
that all ethnic minority languages practiced in Northern Ireland deserve as 
much protection as local languages. Alliance believes that this is best carried 
out through public bodies producing language schemes rather than a rights-
based approach. (APNI, 2007, p. 38) 
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These arguments clearly reflect the respect for diversity outlined in approaches to 
multicultural approaches to the accommodation of pluralism (Parekh, 2006; Modood, 
2007). Similar arguments were repeatedly made in the Assembly by APNI 
representatives. Most commonly, this came in the form of contributions from Anna 
Lo, who was the first (and only) member of an ethnic minority group elected to the 
Assembly: 
 
Much of the European human rights protections regarding languages apply 
only to minority languages that are indigenous to the area. That is a somewhat 
narrow view that neglects the much wider diversity and language need in our 
midst. Since the EU expansion in 2004, we have seen a huge increase in the 
number of migrants coming to Northern Ireland whose first language is not 
English. It is estimated that there are up to 80,000 migrants from across the 
world in Northern Ireland. It is likely that there are more people speaking 
Polish or Chinese than speaking Irish on a daily basis in our towns and cities. 
(Hansard, 2010) 
 
This type of argument correlates at surface level with similar statements made by 
unionists regarding the importance of recognising external minority languages 
alongside Gaélic. However, there are different incentives driving the adoption of these 
narratives. We shall turn in the final section of the chapter to consider the 
motivational drivers behind the discursive themes that have been reviewed in this 
chapter.  
6.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Through studying the politics of culture in Northern Ireland we can arrive at certain 
findings that are instructive in our study of how immigration affects ideological 
positioning in an ethnic party system. We see a number of examples of cultural 
diversity being used by parties as a resource in ideological positioning, or, deprived 
of attention when it is not considered helpful to their wider strategies. We have seen 
that with the exception of the APNI, there is evidence of a distinct gap between the 
aspirations to intercultural accommodation set out in a number of important policy 
documents and the exclusive ethnic defence strategies that characterise party conflict 
on this issue. The main patterns that we have ascertained in inter-party positioning 
182 
  
 
around culture and language are as follows. Firstly, there is evidence of a fissure 
between the larger tribune parties and the smaller parties around the cultural impact 
of immigration. Secondly, when discussing politics of language, the ethnically defined 
parties conduct their debates around perennial issues in Northern Irish cultural 
politics. Thirdly, the non-aligned APNI is the only party that provides a significant 
narrative focus upon the minority language groups in Northern Ireland outside of the 
‘two traditions’ framework.  
 
How are we to make sense of these trajectories of party positioning? Following our 
assumptions about the incentives that underpin party behaviour, we understand that 
the parties are likely to adopt strategies that maximise their potential for popular 
endorsement and electoral support. Further to this, we assume parties to be bound 
to some degree by their historical record of ideological positioning. This limits the 
freedom of movement available to party representatives when seeking to engage 
with new emerging social realities such as increasing cultural diversity. Consequently, 
it is reasonable to assume that parties will adopt narratives on cultural 
accommodation that will garner electoral support, and fit with the broader ideological 
structures associated with the party. 
 
Firstly, let us consider the incentives driving the distinction between the ethnic 
tribunes and the smaller parties. We know that the smaller parties are keen to argue 
that increasing diversity will change Northern Ireland by diluting traditional 
communal divisions. These parties, who have largely found themselves marginalised 
in post-agreement party politics have a vested interest in seeing communal defence 
narratives decrease in political salience and consequently tend to relate immigration 
generated diversity to the diminution of binary conceptions of culture. However, for 
the tribune parties who have profited electorally from being recognised as staunch 
defenders of their particular ethnic group, there is less incentive to argue that greater 
diversity had diluted cultural politics in the territory. Furthermore, when the larger 
parties do enter into discussion on how best to welcome and integrate new 
communities of citizens they assume that their own ideological priorities based upon 
recognition for particular forms of cultural ritual will translate into the correct 
approach for the management of immigrant generated diversity. This is despite the 
183 
  
 
fact that immigrant communities are likely to face different issues to those of the 
traditional communal groups in Northern Ireland.  
 
Additionally, if we consider trends in public opinion it becomes even more apparent 
why Sinn Féin and the DUP should wish to maintain their strong stance on communal 
defence. In the NILT survey (2010c), when asked whether they agreed with the 
following statement ‘It is the job of our politicians to fight the corner for the 
community that they come from’, 46% of Catholics either agreed or strongly agreed, 
and 53% of Protestants either agreed or strongly agreed. This contrasts with only 
28% of Catholics who disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 23% of Protestants who 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed (NILT, 2010c). Given the ascendancy of the 
tribune parties in electoral terms, this type of attitude has clearly found expression 
at the ballot box. The parties that have benefitted most from this situation have least 
incentive to see it change. While the smaller ethnically defined parties may wish to 
court these opinions in the same fashion that the tribune parties have, they are 
hamstrung by their historical ideological positioning.  
 
Neither the SDLP, nor the UUP can suddenly switch to a strong message about their 
credentials as ethnic defenders without appearing to repudiate longer-standing 
aspects of their ideological platform as the moderates within their electoral bloc. 
Consequently, these parties overlap with the APNI on their suggestion that increasing 
diversity will help to undermine binary calculations in the cultural politics of Northern 
Ireland. For the APNI, increasing cultural diversity fits easily with the party’s non-
ethnic counterbidding strategies. In particular, demographic changes support the 
party’s narrative about moving beyond the ‘two traditions’ in order to recognise the 
wider diversity in Northern Irish society. Consequently, the party has not had to 
change to any great extent in reaction to the increasingly diverse character of cultural 
pluralism in Northern Ireland. 
 
The ethnically defined parties — both hard-line and moderate — fall back onto more 
traditional ideological refrains when faced with the issue of minority languages. We 
see the nationalist parties seeking to strongly advocate greater support for the Irish 
language, and both unionist parties building barricades against such measures. The 
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dynamics behind this can be explained through reference to the cultural stand-off 
that has emerged in Northern Irish politics since the Agreement. While support for 
Irish language programmes have actually been rather lukewarm in the Catholic 
community, data suggests that a significant number of Protestants consider the 
promotion of Gaélic to be a significant political issue. If we refer once more to public 
opinion, the staunch defensive posturing of political unionism is more 
understandable.  
 
In the 2007 NILT survey when asked whether receiving a letter from the hospital that 
was in both English and Irish would annoy them, 55% of Protestants stated that they 
would feel annoyed or very annoyed, 24% of these respondents selected the ‘very 
annoyed’ option (NILT, 2007). Clearly, for a significant number of Protestants, further 
support for the Irish language represents something that should be resisted. 
Furthermore, when we consider that findings from the 2008 NILT survey suggested 
that 50% of Protestants felt that Catholics had benefitted disproportionately in the 
post agreement period, the extent of unionist intransigence over cultural issues 
begins to make more sense. The manner in which Irish language funding is resisted, 
varies in a fragmented manner across unionism, reflecting the underlying civic and 
ethnic splits within the movement. The civic tendency within unionism utilises themes 
based upon the costs of language programmes. Ethnic elements invoke Ulster-Scots 
and parity of esteem as a defensive strategy. 
 
Neither unionist party can be seen to cede to the cultural claims of nationalism, but 
nationalists can accommodate Ulster-Scots to some extent within their platform on 
support for minority languages. While Sinn Féin have undoubtedly politicised the 
issue of the Irish language for political gain, unionists have also contributed to this 
through their resistance measures. The consequence of this stand-off is that minority 
languages, other than Gaélic and Ulster-Scots, seldom feature in political debates 
over language, unless they are raised as part of defensive strategem by unionists; 
or in the attempts of the APNI to highlight the restrictive nature the of ‘two traditions’ 
framework.    
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Chapter 7: Racism 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth view into party political debates on racism in 
Northern Ireland. It has been established earlier in the thesis that politicians in 
Northern Ireland have historically been slow to respond to the realities of racism, due 
to excessive preoccupation with constitutional issues in the province and a perception 
that there were no significant ethnic groups outside the primary communities 
(Hainsworth, 1998). However, in the period under consideration in this thesis, racism 
has given rise to a number of high profile incidents and has increasingly become a 
driver of hate crime in the territory (Knox, 2011).  
 
The question that we have asked is how the parties have approached this issue and 
what impact racism has had in the operations of inter-party debate? Drawing on 
interview data, and other qualitative sources, the chapter highlights the discursive 
contours that have emerged as the parties have been faced with evidence of the 
increasing prominence of racism in Northern Ireland. In the first section, it will be 
shown that there is a cross-party condemnation of racist attacks in the province, and 
a general agreement that there is a connection between racism and sectarianism in 
Northern Ireland. This relationship between racism and sectarianism is the subject of 
some controversy amongst academics that have studied the Northern Irish context, 
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and these findings will be considered in the light of such debates throughout 
(Geoghegan, 2010; McVeigh, 2014; Gilligan, 2017). 
 
The chapter highlights the fact that narratives on racism have become enmeshed 
with the politics of bi-nationalism in the territory. There is evidence of issues related 
to immigration and increasing diversity becoming employed as a swords and shields 
in the melee of inter-party conflict. This is to say that there are signs of traditional 
ideological structures absorbing the politics of racism in Northern Ireland. It will be 
shown that Irish nationalists, particularly Sinn Féin, feel some degree of issue 
ownership when discussing racism; though this is contested by the APNI who have 
utilised racism in a different fashion in order to critique the lack of progress made by 
the tribune parties in tackling discrimination (Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996). Both 
nationalist parties and APNI representatives are keen to emphasise the widespread 
nature of racism and to highlight it as a significant social problem. In this sense, we 
see evidence of a crossover in nationalist and non-aligned narratives on racism. 
However, Sinn Féin differs from the APNI and the SDLP in that the party often utilises 
racial discrimination and hate crime as a means to prosecute attacks on political 
unionism.  
 
Firstly, this arises in narratives that explicitly relate the racist incidents perpetrated 
on immigrants with the suggestion that the Northern Irish sub-state is an innately 
racist entity. Secondly, Sinn Féin representatives will often draw connections between 
loyalists and racially motivated incidents. Thirdly, we see the party explicitly argue 
that unionist politicians are failing to provide leadership in tackling racism within their 
community. Finally, Sinn Féin politicians will often tend to argue that their party is 
leading in the fight against racism, thereby juxtaposing their own efforts with the 
characterisation of passivity amongst the other parties. It will be argued that by 
adopting this aggressive strategy, republicans have weaponised racism as a tool for 
the prosecution of ideological warfare. The effect of this is to push unionists into a 
defensive posture, thereby hampering the possibility of a balanced and reasonable 
discussion on how best to tackle the racism that has afflicted Northern Irish society.  
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The second section of the chapter argues that when faced with this ideological 
onslaught from republicans, unionists adopt a number of linguistic shields to limit 
debates on racism. On occasion, this takes the form of the type of straight-out denials 
of the existence of racism that were originally discussed in the work of Hainsworth 
(1998) and McVeigh (1998). More often, unionists use the traditional argument that 
racism is not prevalent in Northern Ireland because of the deeply ingrained 
sectarianism that has afflicted the society. When forced to engage with racism, 
unionists are strongly condemnatory. However, there is evidence to suggest that due 
to the dominance of nationalism in engaging with racism, unionists would rather 
avoid the issue if possible. This type of strategy highlights the other side of the ‘issue 
ownership’ dynamic whereby if one party is perceived to own an issue, other groups 
will tend to avoid it. Within the unionist/nationalist axes of party competition, Sinn 
Féin exhibit a significant degree of ownership over racism issues and unionist parties 
seek to limit its discussion (Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996).  
 
The data gathered in this research serves to paint a picture of political unionism as 
uncomfortable with addressing the issues of racism and racial discrimination. It will 
be argued that the robust verbal assaults mounted by Sinn Féin representatives, 
combined with the counter measures taken by unionists, have created a form of 
discursive deadlock between the two primary ideological groupings. Given the 
consociational institutional framework within which these parties operate, this has 
unsurprisingly led to areas of stalemate and slow progress in formulating a joined-
up approach to tackling racism during the period of our study. Frustration with this 
deadlock is evident when we examine the narratives of the non-aligned APNI, and to 
some extent, those of the smaller ethnic parties. 
 
The final section of this chapter will be used to outline the sense of frustration that is 
stressed by members of the non-aligned APNI when discussing racism in Northern 
Ireland. While Sinn Féin can be characterised as owning racism within 
unionist/nationalist dimensions of inter-party positioning, the APNI has sought to 
liberate the issue for a counterbidding critique of the ethnic tribunes within the 
small/large axes of party competition. What will be highlighted here is the fact that 
there are distinct differences in the approach of the APNI to racism that are not 
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evident when discussing racism with members of the other political parties. Firstly, 
there is evidence of a tendency to focus not just upon the high profile racist incidents 
that have made headlines in Northern Ireland through recent years, but to discuss 
the widespread, low-level racism that they perceive to be common place in Northern 
Irish society. Secondly, in the period studied, there was a palpable sense of 
frustration with the inability of the OFMDFM parties to find commonality on tackling 
racism.  
 
It must be noted that these frustration-based narratives were not exclusive to the 
APNI, but were also manifested in certain contributions made by members of the 
SDLP and the UUP.  It will be argued that this provides further evidence of the manner 
in which the smaller parties are increasingly overlapping in some areas of inter-party 
debate due to shared strategic calculations. Furthermore, it serves to highlight the 
incredibly tight ideological space that is occupied by the smaller ethnic parties who 
are squeezed between the tribunes and the cross-communal APNI. These arguments 
will be developed further as the chapter progresses, but in the first instance we will 
turn to examine an element of cross party unity that is centred upon a shared 
condemnation of racism.  
7.2 Cross-party Condemnation of Racism 
One of the first things that should be highlighted when discussing the manner in 
which political representatives have engaged with racism in Northern Ireland, is the 
cross-party unity on condemning racially motivated hate crimes. Representatives of 
all parties were strong and unified in affirming their contempt for racist behaviour. 
This arose on a number of occasions in Assembly debates on issues related to racism. 
The following quotations serve to highlight the extent of this cross-party consensus. 
The first statement comes from a representative of the DUP during a contribution to 
an Assembly debate on racist attacks: 
 
Racism should have no place in our society.  I am unequivocal in my 
condemnation of attacks that have happened in recent days, as are all of my 
colleagues.  It is deeply concerning when we look at recent figures released by 
the PSNI and see that there has been a 30·9% increase in racist incidents in 
the last 12 months. (Hansard, 2014c) 
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Similar statements were made by representatives of the UUP during debates within 
the Assembly on racially motivated attacks in 2009, following the eviction of members 
of the Roma community from South Belfast by elements operating within loyalist 
paramilitary organisations: 
 
No right-thinking person could fail to be appalled by the racist attacks in Belfast 
in recent weeks, and like all other parties, the Ulster Unionist Party roundly 
condemns them. On behalf of my party, I express to the Roma people our 
profound sympathy and horror at what took place. (Hansard, 2009a) 
 
The quotation below serves to highlight further consensus in an Assembly 
contribution made by an APNI representative: 
 
The Alliance Party will, of course, support the motion.  I welcome the 
opportunity that it gives to all MLAs to take a clear, united and unequivocal 
stand against racism and to consider how we work together to eradicate 
prejudice from our community.  It is right that we condemn racism, stand 
united against it and show leadership, but it is also vital that we see real 
action. (Hansard, 2014c)  
 
Moderate nationalists shared in this cross-party condemnation of racism, as we see 
in the quotation below taken from a statement made by a member of the SDLP: 
 
I welcome the junior Minister's news.  Does he agree that minority ethnic 
communities unfortunately remain the target of vile racism from certain 
sections?  Will he join me in condemning the distribution of a racist leaflet in 
south Belfast over the weekend by the National Front? (Hansard, 2012b) 
 
Finally, Sinn Féin were also strong in their censure of racist behaviour. This is evident 
in the quotation below taken from an Assembly discussion on an incident that 
witnessed members of the Roma community in Northern Ireland being evicted from 
their homes by racists in South Belfast:  
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In the past number of weeks, there is no doubt that our society has once again 
been disgraced and scandalised, and it is unfortunate that that is with good 
reason. There is no question or doubt in our minds that the images of families 
having to gather their belongings, be bussed into church halls, spread 
mattresses and makeshift mattresses in community halls in order to get a roof 
over their heads and some type of protection are nothing short of an absolute 
disgrace (Hansard, 2009a) 
 
Given this wide-ranging consensus over the rejection of racist behaviour in Northern 
Ireland, we might tend to assume that measures to deal with racism may be 
politically uncontroversial. However, in reality, this does not tend to be the case. This 
is largely because of an unhelpful tendency amongst the ethnically defined parties to 
connect the issues of racism and sectarianism which serves to provide a contested 
dimension to such discussions. This evidence has clear impact on debate between 
scholars as to whether sectarianism should be considered as a variety of racism 
(Brewer, 1992; McVeigh, 2014). It illustrates a tendency for sectarianism to dominate 
discussion of prejudice and violence aimed at immigrant communities. This discursive 
relationship between racism and sectarianism is evident in the quotations below in 
which representatives of the ethnically defined parties tend to equate the two issues 
as a pair.   
7.3 Racism Linked with Sectarianism 
A recurring theme in the narratives of the parties studied, is a trend of presenting 
racism and sectarianism as being closely linked. This was occasionally present in the 
narratives of APNI members, but featured more often in discussions with 
representatives of the ethnically defined parties. In order to highlight this common 
practice, the section below provides examples taken from statements made by 
members of the tribune parties and the smaller ethnic parties. The first example was 
taken from a Sinn Féin representative’s contribution to an Assembly debate on racism 
and sectarianism in 2009:   
 
As Members said, we are debating the twin evils of sectarianism and racism. 
The recent sectarian murder of Kevin McDaid, the attempted murder of Damian 
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Fleming and the sight of the Roma families being forced from their homes 
indicate that we need to do more to tackle sectarianism and racist bigots 
(Hansard, 2009a). 
 
The pattern of equating racism closely with sectarianism is also mirrored in the 
following statement, which is taken from an Assembly contribution made by a 
representative of the SDLP: 
 
Sectarianism and racism are simply two sides of the one coin and the one evil, 
which is intolerance and bigotry. It is incumbent on all of us, particularly those 
in high office, to show leadership. If we do not show leadership, then we are 
letting down the whole community and letting down those from an ethnic 
background who come to live here as our guests and our citizens. (Hansard, 
2014c). 
 
In the example below, we see a representative of the UUP utilise a similar connection 
between racism and sectarianism during a debate about tackling anti-social 
behaviour at sporting events: 
 
The Ulster Unionists welcome the opportunity to debate sectarianism, racism 
and violence in sport […]. Such incidents have no place in sport or society, and 
must be stopped. Although I support the introduction of legislation to stop the 
ugliness of sectarianism and racist abuse, I suspect that enforcing such laws 
will not be an easy task (Hansard, 2007c). 
 
Here, we see the coupling of the two issues in a statement made by the former First 
Minister and Leader of the DUP, Peter Robinson, when discussing racism: 
 
Specifically, tackling the twin blights of sectarianism and racism, in addition to 
other forms of intolerance, is essential in shaping a shared and cohesive 
community equipped to face the challenges of an ever-changing world. 
(Hansard, 2013b). 
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While the coupling of the two issues of racism and sectarianism may seem to make 
sense, given their shared characteristics, this approach has been condemned by anti-
racist campaigners in Northern Ireland. For instance, in the following statement 
Patrick Yu the former executive director of NICEM, stated that this type of approach 
would create problems for ethnic minority communities: 
 
Separate provision exists in law, and police practices, to cover issues of 
sectarianism, and that is welcome, but using race relations legislation would 
in our view distract from the very real needs and concerns of the minority 
ethnic community in NI (Yu, cited in Devenport, 2011).  
 
It has been argued earlier in the thesis that the close equation of racism and 
sectarianism should be avoided. Despite the fact that racism and sectarianism exhibit 
similar traits, the exceptional position of sectarianism in Northern Ireland, means 
that to classify it as a form of racism has the potential to obscure policy measures 
aimed at the protection of ethnic minority communities. It is likely to embroil such 
matters in long-standing, historical controversies. Furthermore, as we will see in the 
following sections, racism has the potential to become a resource in the prosecution 
of traditional ideological competition if it is not explicitly demarcated as a distinctive 
issue. In order to highlight the potential for racism to become intertwined with 
existing patterns of ideological conflict in an ethnically defined party system, it is 
useful for us to begin by examining the narratives of the nationalist parties on racism, 
and analysing the manner in which the issue is weaponised by republicans in attacks 
on political unionism. 
7.4 Nationalism  
7.4.1 Racism is a Big Issue 
Irish nationalists of both parties were keen to suggest that racism was a significant 
issue facing Northern Ireland. In some instances, they focussed on specific high 
profile incidents in order to make their case. Generally speaking, the representatives 
of both nationalist parties were keen to discuss racism: confident in their assertion 
that it was a widespread problem in the territory. The research clearly suggests that 
nationalists, particularly Sinn Féin, own the issue of racism in a manner described in 
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the work of Petrocik (1996). The first statement that highlights this theme was made 
in an interview carried out with a representative of the SDLP:  
 
Racism is a significant issue yes, it has manifested itself by people being pulled 
out of their homes. There have been cases of that in a number of different 
places. There was an incident that I remember about three or four years ago 
when the Roma community were targeted by racists and removed from their 
homes.  (SDLP2, 2013). 
 
If we turn to review evidence taken from interviews taken with Sinn Féin 
representatives, it is apparent that they tend to agree with the suggestion that racism 
has become an important political issue facing contemporary Northern Ireland. For 
instance, consider the quotation below taken from an interview with a representative 
of Sinn Féin:  
 
Oh it's a massive problem. We have seen that some people have a serious 
problem with immigrants and this has raised its head in terms of violence in 
some cases. I think that there is a need for greater leadership, both from the 
police and from the political institutions to try and help to tackle racism (SF3, 
2013) 
 
Representatives of both nationalist parties clearly felt comfortable discussing racism 
in a manner that was not shared by the majority of unionist politicians interviewed 
in this study. Members of the nationalist parties tended to agree that racism was a 
big problem in Northern Ireland, and they often chose to invoke evidence of high 
profile racist attacks in order to support their arguments. However, in many 
instances, responses to racism seemed to suggest that the topic had been fashioned 
by Sinn Féin as a linguistic weapon to attack unionists. One of the first areas in which 
they moved away from the narratives shared by members of the SDLP was the 
equation of recent racist attacks with anti-Irish racism in the province. 
7.4.2 Anti-Irish Racism 
When discussing racism with representatives of Sinn Féin, a common linguistic device 
was evident in their attempts to connect recent evidence of racist attacks with their 
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broader narrative about the discriminatory nature of the Northern Irish sub-state. 
Through equating racist attacks carried out upon ethnic minorities with traditional 
forms of anti-Irish discrimination in Northern Ireland, they laid the groundwork for a 
more concerted attack on political unionism. The quotation below comes from a Sinn 
Féin representative’s contribution to an Assembly discussion on race relations, it 
makes the argument that the Northern Irish sub-state is itself a racist entity: 
 
Racism has its own history in the North. The Six-County statelet has been 
subordinated to British rule. Britain has notable race problems, which the 
British state was obliged to recognise after the death of Stephen Lawrence, 
and the Macpherson inquiry identified institutional racism. We in Ireland have 
been part of Britain’s colonial history, and partition established an institutional 
sectarian and racist state. (Hansard, 2009c) 
 
By using these types of arguments, Sinn Féin representatives are shifting discussions 
of racist attacks aimed at the new ethnic minorities onto their preferred ideological 
terrain. A tendency that commonly arose in the interviews was for Sinn Féin 
representatives to intertwine the racist attacks carried out on immigrants with anti-
Irish racism: 
 
I think there is racism against ethnic minorities, and there is racism against 
people who consider themselves Irish. It is dangerous. There have been a lot 
of racist attacks, and I know some people who are very scared by it. I do 
believe that Sinn Féin is leading from the front on this in relation to anti-racism. 
There is too much tolerance of it (SF1, 2013). 
 
This association of the racism experienced by migrant minorities, and that of the local 
Irish/Catholic/nationalist community, was a recurring pattern in discussions with Sinn 
Féin and is used to form the foundations of an attack focussed upon loyalism and 
political unionism. We can begin to see this groundwork being laid when we consider 
the quotation below: 
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We feel as republicans that the loyalist reaction to our Irishness is a form of 
racism. This fear of people being different, naturally then extends to other 
minorities who choose to settle here (SF4, 2013). 
 
With this argument outlined, Sinn Féin representatives then move on to articulate 
their suggestion that loyalism is the home of racist attitudes in Northern Ireland. It 
is at this point that we begin to see the issue of racism become weaponised in order 
to prosecute overt attacks on ideological rivals. 
7.4.3 Racism and Loyalism 
One of the recurring refrains employed by Sinn Féin representatives when discussing 
racism is to argue that racial prejudice is particularly acute amongst members of the 
loyalist community. They are aided in this endeavour by the fact that the majority of 
racist incidents have occurred in areas traditionally understood to be loyalist 
territories (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007). Their strategy is to paint a picture of loyalists 
as narrow-minded bigots, and of their political representatives engaging in a passive 
acceptance of racist attitudes. When discussing racism, there is a definite inclination 
on the part of republicans to use the issue to support political offensives. This type 
of pattern becomes obvious when we consider the statements below: 
 
Unfortunately some people in the loyalist community don't like anybody who 
isn't the same as them. They don't like different cultures, whether that is the 
Irish culture, or that of the immigrant communities (SF3, 2013). 
 
In the Assembly, former Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuiness, brought this 
argument to the fore in his suggestion that loyalist groups were directly responsible 
for racist attacks occurring in Belfast during the sharp spike in such incidents that 
occurred in 2013-2014:  
 
It is about time that leading spokespersons from the unionist benches who say 
that they condemn attacks on isolated eastern Europeans or attacks on 
Alliance Party offices, be those attacks because of racism or sectarianism, 
stood up and told the public whom they believe are responsible […]. I have 
made it crystal clear in the course of recent times that a lot of the violence 
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that has occurred on the streets of Belfast has been orchestrated by elements 
in the UVF, with some assistance from elements in the Orange Order (Hansard, 
2014f). 
 
This representation of the loyalist community ties in with the Sinn Féin’s broader 
party narratives upon the discriminatory nature of unionism and the persecution 
experienced by the Irish community in the Northern sub-state. The suggestion that 
loyalist communities have a propensity towards the adoption of racist attitudes also 
extends into an attack on political unionism for a suggested failure to engage with 
discriminatory attitudes and actions emanating from their support base. This is 
evident in the quotation below that was taken from an interview with a representative 
of Sinn Féin:  
I’m not sure how much unionists are willing to challenge some of their own 
policy base, or some of their more conservative elements of their electorate 
on the issue of racism. I think that the representatives of political unionism do 
reject racism, but that doesn’t always translate in to an outright rejection of 
racist attitudes (SF4, 2013).  
 
These types of political attacks were made nearly exclusively by representatives of 
Sinn Féin and should be understood as a distinctive party narrative that was not 
shared by members of The SDLP. Representatives of The SDLP were strong in their 
condemnation of racism and their recognition of its widespread nature, but did not 
engage in the same type of anti-loyalist rhetoric that characterised the arguments of 
Sinn Féin representatives. A further feature of Sinn Féin narratives was to 
characterise their own party as a staunch proponent of anti-racism in Northern 
Ireland. 
7.4.4 Tackling Racism 
Sinn Féin, as a party, clearly relish the opportunity to discuss racism, it offers them 
the opportunity to employ powerful linguistic attacks on unionism and to present 
themselves as the ardent champions of anti-racism. The following statement provides 
an example of the manner in which Sinn Féin have sought to position the party as 
the self-proclaimed agent of anti-racism in Northern Ireland: 
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The past few weeks and, indeed, months have been difficult for many in our 
communities, those who have come to live in the North to make a better life 
for themselves and their families.  Those people deserve a future in our country 
in the same way as Irish people who have travelled and worked abroad in 
every continent also deserved a future. Sinn Féin brings this motion to the 
Assembly because we understand the importance of sending out a clear, 
unambiguous, strong message that there is zero tolerance of racism in all its 
forms in our society.  Where it surfaces, it needs to be challenged and action 
taken, whether it is on social media, on our streets, in the workplace or in our 
communities (Hansard, 2014c). 
 
These types of statement were echoed in a number of interviews with Sinn Féin 
representatives. One such example is captured in the quotation below: 
 
I hear varying forms of racism, which I challenge. In the same way I challenge 
sexism or homophobia. Our party is very strong, on tackling discrimination. 
We are leading the way on same-sex marriage, we are progressive. In terms 
of racism for instance, we recently had a situation in Belfast where some 
Filipino nurses experienced racist jibes in their local street. We immediately 
approached the racists, we isolated them and said 'this is not on'. We 
challenged it, and I think that's what is different with Sinn Féin. Is there 
racism? Yes. How do we tackle it? Head on. (SF2, 2013) 
 
Sinn Féin clearly feel that when discussing the issue of racism, they have political 
unionism on the ropes. Their argument is supported by the fact that evidence does 
tend to suggest that the majority of racist incidents take place in loyalist areas 
(Rolston, 2004; Macdonald, 2006). The effect of this type of linguistic attack is to 
push unionists onto the back foot when discussing racism, preventing the possibility 
for a reasoned, balanced discussion. While republicans tend to land blows on 
unionism through employing these narratives, unionists adopt blocking strategies 
that serve to stifle or redirect conversations about racism. This is something that we 
will turn to explore in the next section of the chapter. 
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7.5 Unionism 
7.5.1 Avoidance Strategies 
When surveying the data drawn from representatives of political unionism, a pattern 
emerges that suggests their collective discomfort in discussing racism. While 
unionists are often strong in their condemnation of high-profile racist incidents it is 
not one of their favoured areas of discussion. Again, this seems to follow the pattern 
of issue ownership as described by Petrocik (1996). In this instance, because 
nationalists are dominant in this area, with Sinn Féin in particular using the issue as 
a means to make political capital, unionists prefer to avoid this area of discussion 
where possible.  
 
Particularly during interviews, it was apparent that avoidance strategies were 
employed to try and shut the conversation down, or to twist the discussion in other 
directions away from racism. This tended to take the form of a complete closing-
down approach in which the participant would say virtually nothing, or the adoption 
of conversational shifting measures that would move the discussion in other 
directions. Furthermore, there were a number of instances in which racism was 
compared to sectarianism and allocated a lesser order of priority for political action. 
7.5.2 Racism Diminution 
Members of both unionist parties generally coalesced around arguments that 
suggested racism is not particularly widespread, and is the preserve of a tiny minority 
of people. The evidence here suggests a significant degree of continuity with the 
politics of racism described in the work of Hainsworth (1998) and McVeigh (1998). 
This tendency is highlighted through an examination of the following statements, the 
first of which was made during an interview with a member of the UUP: 
 
Well clearly we have had problems in parts of Belfast, also in the Portadown 
area, and more recently in Coleraine, where someone from a Chinese 
background was attacked. There have been a few isolated incidents, there are 
certain pockets, where it would occur, but it certainly isn’t something I’m 
aware of from my own constituency. I don't know if we are less racist here or 
if there are just so few people from other countries that there is less 
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opportunity for that sort of behaviour. Or, are we so busy fighting each other 
in political battles that there is no time to worry about someone from another 
place?  (UUP4, 2013). 
 
We see similar emphases brought in to play in this statement that was made by a 
member of the DUP. Again the focus here is placed on a particular case and 
accompanied with a broader suggestion that racism is not particularly common or 
widespread in the territory: 
 
Well, because we are such a homogenous society it doesn't really raise its 
head. We have had some problems with attacks on Roma, in South Belfast a 
few years ago. It may happen, but I suppose to some extent if you are in a 
situation where the native, Northern Irish population is so dominant, racism 
hasn’t really affected us so far. It would be wrong to say that there is no 
racism, all I will say is that where I'm from in Northern Ireland it is very down 
at the bottom of concerns.  (DUP3, 2013). 
 
An unusual line of argument that was utilised by some members of both of the 
unionist parties was the suggestion that violence and abuse towards ethnic minorities 
may not be fuelled by racism but a general dislike of difference. The logic of this is 
confusing, it would seem to suggest that these political representatives are saying 
that the perpetrators of such crimes are not inspired by racism, but a rejection of 
anyone different, which is hardly more justifiable than racism. This is akin to saying, 
that the individuals who carry out racist actions are somehow exonerated because 
they have a similar level of disdain for everyone, thereby achieving a kind of equality 
in their rejection of difference. These types of argument were articulated by a small 
minority of representatives from both of the unionist parties. This is evident when we 
turn to consider the quotations below, the first of which came from an interview with 
a member of the DUP: 
 
I think at times some people may choose to dislike anyone from outside their 
own community. I don't think that is necessarily the same thing as racism. 
Also, you do sometimes hear about things like people in Chinese restaurants 
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being insulted by customers, though it may be with drink, they would probably 
slag off anyone who was serving them at that moment (DUP3, 2013). 
 
Similar sentiments were also expressed in a number of interviews with UUP 
representatives. One such example is located in the statement below in which the 
respondent also invokes a narrative based on territorial ownership of specific areas 
as discussed in the work of Shirlow and Murtagh (2006):   
 
With the arrival of immigrants from abroad, some are accepted, and some 
aren't. Generally this has nothing to do with the colour of their skin, but 
because if local people wish to remain in an area near their family and their 
community, they can't always understand why a Polish person's need may be 
greater than theirs. It is not because the person is Polish, it is the fact they 
are not from this neighbourhood (UUP3, 2013). 
 
This pool of evidence seems to suggest two things. Firstly, that despite evidence of 
obvious, high-profile racist incidents in Northern Ireland throughout the last decade, 
and a general upward trend in the reporting of hate crimes based on racial 
distinctions, a significant number of unionist representatives are still keen to 
downplay the extent of racism. This may come through suggestions that racism is 
not widespread, or arguments that such incidents should not be classified as racism, 
but that they should be understood as a broader rejection of difference and hostility 
to outsiders. Secondly, we see evidence of territorial conceptions of particular areas 
invoked in order to explain racist actions in loyalist areas. When pressed to engage 
with racism in public debate, unionists will often discuss the troubles as an example 
of anti-Protestant/British racism in Northern Ireland, further highlighting the 
connection between debates over racism and the sense of territorial decline in loyalist 
communities. 
7.5.3 Anti-Protestant Racism 
A further line of defence adopted by some unionists when in direct debate with 
nationalists, is the suggestion that Protestants have been the victim of racist attacks 
and discriminatory treatment by republicans. This particular argument did not feature 
during the interviews carried out with unionist politicians, but has surfaced on a 
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number of occasions during Assembly debates on racism. The first example of this 
type of strategy was utilised in a debate on racist attacks in 2014. In this instance, a 
DUP representative articulates this argument as a blocking measure when confronted 
by a Sinn Féin member over the extent of unionist political leadership in the fight 
against racism: 
 
I will take no comments at all from Sinn Féin Members in here about anything 
to do with racism, after 30 years of a terrorist campaign that thrived on a racist 
attack on anybody who was British and not Irish (Hansard, 2014g). 
 
Another argument that was invoked by unionists during debates on racism was the 
suggestion that the Protestant community had endured ethnic cleansing by 
nationalists in certain parts of Northern Ireland. The quotations below illustrate this 
type of argument being made by representatives of both unionist parties. The first 
quotation comes a UUP member during an Assembly debate on race relations: 
 
The Protestant community is only too aware that people throughout the 
Province, particularly those who live in border areas, have suffered ethnic 
cleansing. For many years, members of the Province’s Protestant community 
have been targeted, murdered, bombed and put out of their homes (Hansard, 
2009c). 
 
Similar arguments were used by DUP representatives over the contentious issue of 
flags in Northern Ireland. The contribution below came from one such debate in the 
Assembly that followed on from the civil unrest after the decision to restrict the flying 
of the Union Flag on Belfast City Hall to designated days: 
 
Given that we are talking about the flying of flags, the identity that people 
have and how they show affinity to their national identity, it is a bit rich if 
people lecture people about how magnanimous they are, whether it is in 
Londonderry or anywhere else, when an entire population has been 
systematically ethnically cleansed from one side of that city. (Hansard, 2014h). 
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Collectively, this evidence from debates between nationalists and unionists over the 
issue of racism, highlights the manner in which such discussions become entangled 
with long-standing communal divisions. We have seen that Sinn Féin will frequently 
utilise high-profile racist incidents in order to support their condemnation of the 
partition of Ireland, elements in the loyalist community, and political unionism. We 
have also seen evidence of unionist counter strategies whereby the significance of 
racism is diminished or debates are shifted onto a discussion of republican violence 
in the territory. These arguments clearly reflect some sense of the perceptions of 
territorial decline and anxiety amongst certain sections of the unionist community 
(Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). However, when we turn to review the arguments of the 
APNI, we see a different emphasis placed on tackling racism. In some cases these 
non-aligned arguments are supported by sections of the SDLP and the UUP. This 
evidence seems to be suggestive of a degree of cross-party overlap in this area. The 
last section of findings will discuss the narratives on racism articulated by APNI 
representatives and highlight a degree of correlation across the smaller parties.   
7.6 APNI 
7.6.1 Low-Level Racism 
An interesting line of discussion often emerged in conversations with APNI 
representatives that did not come up in interviews with other party representatives. 
This was a focus on the prevalence of background racism. There is a degree of 
crossover with nationalist narratives in terms of a shared consensus on the 
widespread nature of racism in Northern Ireland; yet there are distinct differences 
evident when we delve further into the specific arguments made by APNI 
representatives. When discussing racism with the majority of respondents from the 
ethnic parties, their narratives would either focus on some of the large scale, high 
profile racist incidents that have taken place in Northern Ireland, or they would seek 
to portray Northern Ireland as relatively racism-free. Members of the APNI would 
contrast from these positions, often placing a distinct emphasis on their perception 
of widespread, low level, background forms of racism. This type of distinctive 
narrative is evident when we turn to consider the quotations below, which provide 
examples of common conversational refrains located in interviews with members of 
the APNI: 
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Certainly it is still out there, people's experiences in schools and in the 
workplace are often quite negative. People experience the thoughtless casual 
racist language too often. Most racism is low-key, but there are those groups 
who would attack people on the street. Such attacks are rare, but the fear of 
them, that people live with would be significant (APNI4, 2013). 
 
The emphasis on background racism is also present in the quotation below, which 
again was taken from an interview with a representative of the APNI: 
 
There is a kind of low-level harassment, not always the out and out, breaking 
down the doors, breaking windows and spraying graffiti all round incidents that 
you hear about in the news. It's mostly young lads about eleven or twelve 
years old, daring each other. They see it as a game, like there are no 
consequences from calling people names or throwing stones or whatever 
(APNI1, 2013). 
 
This type of narrative was a commonplace feature of interviews carried out with 
members of the APNI: similar themes were seldom repeated in interviews carried out 
with the representatives of the ethnically defined political parties. This highlights a 
divergence in the approach of APNI members from the other parties. The APNI has 
made progress on tackling racism, in all of its forms, a central part of their 
condemnation of the political deadlock that has characterised Northern Irish politics 
since the peace agreement. As such, it can be identified as an example of the manner 
in which narratives on racism have become a feature of the positioning strategy 
adopted by the APNI. This type of argument finds a more full-bodied expression when 
we turn to examine another element of APNI narratives on the politics of racism. This 
time the focus is upon the party’s sense of frustration with the tribune parties that 
have occupied the OFMDFM since 2007. 
7.6.2 Frustration Narratives 
Another key feature of APNI arguments in the period under study, was a sense of 
frustration at the lack of legislative action aimed at tackling racism. The data collected 
for this thesis were mostly drawn from the period in between the scrapping of The 
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Shared Future framework and the accompanying Racial Equality Strategy for 
Northern Ireland: 2005-2010 (OFMDFM, 2005a: OFMDFM 2005b), and the 
introduction of The Racial Equality Strategy 2015-2025 in the province (OFMDFM, 
2015). A recurring feature of the party’s discussions of racism was to argue that the 
focus on racial equality had become lost in the continuing executive stand-off 
between Sinn Féin and the DUP. This is evident when we turn to examine the 
statements below, the first of which was taken from a press release made by an APNI 
representative: 
 
Following the recent rise in hate crimes across Northern Ireland, with two or 
three incidents being reported to the police on a daily basis, there is an urgent 
need for the First and deputy First Ministers to publish the long awaited Racial 
Equality Strategy. The lack of a well-resourced Government policy to tackle 
racism has created a vacuum where there is neither political leadership nor 
departmental actions to address prejudice, promote community relations and 
protect ethnic minorities (APNI Website, 2014a). 
 
To a large extent, Chris Lyttle and Anna Lo formed something of a duo on pushing 
issues of racism and racial equality in the period under consideration. The following 
quotation was taken from a press statement made by Anna Lo of the APNI in the 
aftermath of high profile racist incidents in Belfast, again highlighting dissatisfaction 
with the activities of the OFMDFM: 
 
The Assembly just recently passed an Alliance amendment calling for the 
urgent publication of the Racial Equality Strategy which we have been waiting 
on for seven years. The First and deputy First Ministers cannot delay this 
important strategy any longer. Thousands of people attended two rallies in 
Belfast and gave a clear message that they wanted this strategy published now 
(APNI Website, 2014b). 
 
It must be noted that while these types of argument were articulated most commonly 
by APNI representatives, there is some evidence of the smaller, ethnically defined 
parties adopting similar strategies in order to attack the dominant tribunes for their 
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lack of leadership on tackling racism. For instance, consider the following statements 
made by an SDLP member and a UUP representative during an Assembly debate. 
There are clear areas of overlap between the smaller parties in relation to these 
issues. The first statement comes from a contribution made a member of the SDLP: 
 
I would accept the emotion that the junior Minister demonstrated on the radio 
this morning if mountains of work had been progressed by the DUP on racial 
discrimination and attacks.  We do not need emotion on our airwaves; we need 
leadership, vision and ambition for all living and visiting here.  However, the 
stagnation around the racial equality strategy not only highlights one of the 
fundamental problems of the two-party stranglehold but how a lack of 
appropriate Executive urgency around fundamental matters can act to the 
detriment of people here and those who visit (Hansard, 2014c). 
 
There are similar elements of discursive correlation in the quotation below that was 
taken from a contribution made a UUP representative: 
 
I have not been proud of the fact that we cannot achieve half the things we 
want to achieve because we are not getting it back down from OFMDFM.  We 
need that racial equality strategy today and everything coming back down to 
us so that we can actually get on with making Northern Ireland a better place 
(Hansard, 2014c). 
 
What these quotations collectively highlight is the tendency of the smaller parties to 
overlap in their condemnation of the OFMDFM parties’ inability to make progress on 
tackling racism. Once again, this serves to suggest the foundations of a shared 
position on issues related to immigration, cultural difference and racism. The final 
part of this chapter will now turn to provide concluding remarks and discuss the 
motivations that have helped to shape the contours of inter-party debate on racism 
as they have emerged in Northern Ireland. 
7.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter has provided an overview of key trends in the politics of racism in 
Northern Ireland and used illustrative examples in order to highlight the central 
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narratives of the political parties on these issues. In the first instance, we have noted 
that all of the parties are strong in their condemnation of racism when it arises in the 
form of high-profile incidents in the territory. At first sight, we may assume that this 
cross-party consensus on the rejection of racism might provide a basis from which 
all of the major parties could work towards anti-racism policies in an uncontroversial 
fashion. However, during the period of our study, racism became enmeshed and 
intertwined into the conflicting narratives that marked inter-party debate. This 
situation led to a long stand-off in which the racial equality strategy for the territory 
was replaced by a policy vacuum for a period that lasted eight years.  
 
We have seen that nationalists feel comfortable discussing racism and highlighting it 
as a significant social issue in Northern Ireland. However, Sinn Féin take this problem 
and utilise it to support longer-standing party narratives about the discriminatory 
nature of the Northern sub-state, the loyalist community, and unionist politicians. 
Unionists react to this by seeking to stifle debates over racism through discursive 
blocking strategies, or to redirect discussions of racism into a portrayal of the 
Protestant community as victims of territorial displacement during the troubles. 
Again, this strategy twists the issue of racism to fit within well-established processes 
of ideological positioning in the melee of inter-party conflict in Northern Ireland.  
 
The APNI stand apart from the ethnically defined parties through widening the 
discussion to take low-level racism into account. They also express a narrative of 
frustration with the OFMDFM stalemate on racial equality that is partially supported 
by elements within the smaller ethnic parties.  How might we interpret these trends 
in light of party competition theories? We understand that parties seek to recruit 
popular support in order to gain access to the levers of office, yet they are bound to 
some degree by their previous trends in ideological positioning. Hence, we should 
expect parties to court public opinion using linguistic refrains that fit within their 
existing ideological frameworks.    
 
Existing research into the extent of racial prejudice in Northern Ireland provides a 
degree of insight into why the parties may have chosen to adopt the strategies 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Data taken from the NILT survey into prejudicial 
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attitudes suggests that Protestants are far more likely than Catholics to self-report 
as being prejudiced. Details derived from the 2005 NILT, suggested that 33% of 
Protestants self-reported as being either ‘very prejudiced’ or a ‘little prejudiced’ 
against people from ethnic minority communities (Gilligan & Lloyd, 2006, p. 1). This 
research also highlighted a tendency amongst voters for unionist parties to be 
prejudiced against ethnic minorities. For instance, 46% of DUP supporters and 31% 
of UUP surveyed admitted to being prejudiced to some extent, this contrasts with 
21% of SDLP voters and 19% of Sinn Féin and APNI voters (Gilligan & Lloyd, 2006, 
p. 2). Statistics such as these would undoubtedly impact on the ideological 
positioning strategies of parties that wish to compete for the support of the unionist 
electorate. While this does not translate into openly hostile narratives towards ethnic 
minority communities, it limits the potential for unionist politicians to pursue anti-
racism as a central plank in their ideological platform. Consequently, unionist 
politicians would rather limit discussions of racism than to lead the debate.   
 
Nationalists and centrists, by contrast, have less concerns about racial prejudice 
amongst their core electorate. Furthermore, given that nationalists have traditionally 
drawn on the depiction of the Northern sub-state as a discriminatory entity, in which 
the Catholic minority has been persecuted by the Protestant majority, it is not a huge 
leap for Sinn Féin to connect historic injustice with contemporary hate-crimes. When 
pushed, unionists respond to these allegations invoking their own narratives of 
communal victimisation that occurred during the troubles. Ultimately, this clash has 
created a discursive stand-off that has proven unhelpful in supporting the needs of 
ethnic minority communities. For the APNI, racism serves to support their long-
standing narratives about a lack of tolerance for difference in certain sections of the 
community in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the lack of progress on the racial 
equality strategy provides an evidential basis for their claims that post-agreement 
politics has led to deadlock in Northern Ireland. Finally, the party has enjoyed a 
degree of comparative advantage in this area due to the election of minority 
community spokesperson, Anna Lo, as an APNI MLA. This has proven a benefit to the 
APNI when discussing such issues and at least partially explains why the party is 
keen to push this area of debate. 
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Finally, there is evidence to suggest a degree of correlation between the smaller 
parties around the frustration narratives that are most commonly expressed by the 
APNI. Interestingly, this suggests another example of strategic overlap between the 
parties that have performed less successfully in the electoral politics of post-
agreement Northern Ireland. The stand-off over racial equality legislation has clearly 
served to provide an impetus for these parties to share in a joined condemnation of 
the two party dominance of the executive. This type of crossover, on an issue that 
stands outside of the traditional ethnically defined politics of the territory, represents 
the manner in which the smaller parties are seeking to gain competitive advantage 
through an attack on the tribunes for lack of progress. This is similar to the type of 
crossover that was evident when we discussed attitudes to immigration earlier in the 
thesis. As such, it is possible to tentatively point out at least partial ideological de-
contestation between the smaller parties when discussing immigration and the 
related issue of racism in the territory. We will turn now to the concluding chapter in 
order to tie together the various evidential strands that have been discussed in the 
findings sections, and relate them explicitly to the core questions that have inspired 
this piece of research. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has utilised the case study of Northern Ireland between 2004 and 2014 
to consider the effects of immigration on ideological positioning in both a sub-state 
level of governance and an ethnically divided party system. Through this process we 
have captured fresh, original data that contributes knowledge to the study of the 
party politics of immigration in Northern Ireland. The particular methodological 
approach utilised in this endeavour has highlighted the competitive dynamics of party 
competition related to immigration as they have emerged in the specific linguistic 
formulations of politicians operating in the Northern Irish context. This serves to offer 
a new case study that is useful both to scholars studying the relationship between 
diversity and politics in Northern Ireland and those who study immigration in sub-
state settings more generally. 
 
The key data has highlighted the manner in which issues related to immigration have 
been utilised as swords and shields in the prosecution of inter-party conflict in this 
context. We have seen existing ideological structures, stemming from established 
axes of party competition, absorb immigration issues as parties position themselves 
relative to democratic rivals. This is apparent across two axes of party competition: 
nationalist/unionist divisions; and, along the fissures that separate the smaller 
parties from the larger ones. This suggests that the competitive dynamics between 
the sub-state, ethnically defined parties are the key driver behind political responses 
to immigration in such settings. 
 
The project has made contributions to existing research by highlighting the process 
of linguistic absorption of immigration issues within wider party narratives. By 
capturing this phenomenon as it emerged in Northern Ireland during the period of 
the study this has built upon existing findings in the work of Gilligan et al. (2011). 
Through providing a richly detailed thematic analysis the thesis corroborates their 
quantitative outline of divisions between broadly restrictive positions adopted by 
unionists and more expansive approaches to immigration adopted by nationalists and 
non-aligned politicians. The thesis expands upon their original study through 
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providing layers of valuable linguistic content that highlight the details of how this 
process occurs as a feature of inter-party positioning strategies. Secondly, we have 
seen the manner in which language debates have absorbed immigration generated 
diversity as a means to prosecute inter-party conflict. Again, this builds upon broad 
existing arguments outlined in the work of McMonagle (2010) who suggests that 
unionists in particular have hijacked the issue of immigrant languages to prevent the 
adoption of greater support measures for the Irish language. The thesis supports this 
conclusion whilst capturing the linguistic dynamics of this process as it emerges in 
the discursive themes utilised by Northern Irish politicians. By conducting an audit of 
party approaches to racism and utilising wider theories on party competition we have 
built upon the work of McVeigh and Rolston (2007) through highlighting the complex 
manner in which nationalists and non-aligned political parties have fought for 
ownership over this issue and unionists have sought to avoid this area of debate or 
to obfuscate it through reference to wider sectarian issues in Northern Irish society.  
 
Furthermore, through carrying out this detailed investigation into the relationship 
between ethnically defined political parties and immigration, the thesis offers a useful 
case study that could form a basis for comparison with similar dynamics as they 
emerge in other sub-state settings marked by multiple strains of diversity. Given the 
limited nature of this area of research, additional case studies are necessary in order 
to work towards a position where we can extract generalizable theories on the 
dynamics of diversity politics in such locations. Consequently, the case study could 
be utilised as a pillar in the emerging bodies of research driven by the work of 
Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014). Future studies into the politics of immigration 
in sub-state settings could benefit from utilising a similarly detailed methodological 
approach in order to capture the linguistic nuances of such processes as we have 
seen evidenced in this thesis. 
 
The latter section of the thesis has now showcased the findings of this project across 
three chapters. We have looked at the discursive themes that mark three key areas 
of inter-party positioning: immigration; language and cultural accommodation; and 
racism during the period of our study. The findings chapters have reviewed the 
central areas of consensus and conflict between the major parties and considered the 
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motivational factors that have driven the selection and omission of certain discursive 
themes within these debates. The final chapter will now bring the thesis to a 
conclusion by returning to the original questions that arose from our review of 
literature on diversity, immigration and political parties. The concluding chapter will 
be broken down into three sections each of which engages with one of our core 
questions. These sections will be utilised to make calls for political action with regards 
to some of the issues under consideration, as well as making some important 
observations for related areas of academic debate. The final section will then point 
to the need for on-going research into these dynamics in Northern Ireland, and for 
further comparison with other cases.  
8.2 What can Northern Ireland tell us about the manner in which 
immigration debates impact on ideological positioning in an ethnically 
defined party system? 
The data derived from this process of research tells us that expansive and restrictive 
approaches to immigration have clearly made an impression on party narratives as 
they appear in the Northern Irish context. Furthermore, we see economic factors, 
and issues related to welfare, invoked as discursive themes in party narratives on 
immigration. This development is, as we might expect, following the patterns of 
academic argument established in our earlier literature review section (Freeman, 
2002; Miller, 2005; Banting, 2005). While there is no policy control for the local elites 
in terms of setting limits on migrant numbers, or indeed opening borders to allow 
more expansive measures, there are clear trajectories in patterns of inter-party 
positioning around immigration debates. The discursive themes adopted by the 
political groupings clearly relate to existing axes of party conflict. The manifestations 
of this process correlate with theories of party competition in which political elites 
adopt vote-maximising strategies within the confines of pre-established processes of 
ideological positioning (Downs, 1957; Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996, Finlayson, 2012). 
 
One the key things that we see here are broad areas of crossover between nationalist 
and non-aligned narratives on immigration. Both are in favour of expansive 
approaches to encourage further immigration. This contrasts with unionists who tend 
to endorse inward migration with modest restrictions, or, to outline the need for 
212 
  
 
significant tightening of territorial borders. The motivation behind the adoption of 
these strategies is firstly defined by differences in perceptions of public opinion within 
their target electorate; and secondly, by the confines of the wider ideological 
platforms associated with these parties. While there is some evidence of anti-
immigration sentiment among sections of the Catholic population, it is clearly more 
pronounced amongst Protestant voters. This makes it easier for nationalists to 
present themselves as inclusive and welcoming to migrant communities, unionists, 
by contrast, are forced to approach this issue more carefully, offering limited 
endorsements of immigration based on economic merits, and coupling this with 
suggestions that restriction is necessary to prevent negative impacts upon the local 
population.  
 
In addition to the motivational incentives related to courting public opinion, there are 
signs of long established ideological trends becoming intertwined with immigration 
issues. The APNI as a non-ethnic party finds that immigration and widening diversity 
fit neatly with its long-standing narratives on the limitations of the ‘two traditions’ 
paradigm. Consequently, immigration offers the party a useful prop to well-
established discursive themes. Similarly, we see that Sinn Féin utilise immigration to 
bolster their narrative on the historical injustices perpetrated upon the Irish people 
at the hands of British imperialism.  
 
Discursive schisms within unionism on this issue, illustrate splits that traverse both 
unionist parties on the issue of immigration. This is highlighted by civic arguments 
being invoked in order to support immigration and ethnic defence narratives being 
employed to argue in favour of greater restrictions. Civic arguments are usually 
constructed around the economic benefits associated with migration. Ethnic 
narratives argue in favour of greater restriction in order to protect the local population 
from unfavourable economic competition associated with immigration. On balance, 
this evidence suggests that in the Northern Irish context, during the period of our 
study, stances on immigration have been driven by long-standing strategic 
calculations underpinning inter-party conflict. Rather than immigration disrupting 
established patterns of party positioning, it has been used as a resource by parties 
to support existing political fault-lines.  
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This type of ideological positioning on immigration clearly reflects the manner in 
which the parties seek to tailor narratives in order to accrue and to maintain popular 
support. This evidence seems to counter Freeman’s argument that elites are not 
guided by the usual vote-maximising strategies when discussing immigration 
(Freeman, 1995; 2002). However, this could also be argued to highlight one of the 
key differences associated with immigration politics at sub-state-level (Hepburn & 
Zapata-Barrero, 2014). We know that in the case of Northern Ireland, immigration 
policy is not formed by local institutions but at Westminster, and has traditionally 
been heavily influenced through participation in the E.U. Hence, if the ‘organised 
public’ described by Freeman were seeking to influence policy-makers, it would make 
no sense to lobby at the devolved level. Furthermore, explicitly anti-immigration 
parties have made no real impact upon party politics in Northern Ireland. While both 
the DUP and the UUP have argued in favour of tightening restrictions on immigration, 
there has been very little electoral impact made by parties such as UKIP or the BNP 
in promoting an overtly anti-immigration platform in the territory. This means that 
in the Northern Irish context there are less obvious incentives to adopt either pro-or-
anti immigration postures than we might see at state-level politics in the U.K. (Bale, 
2003; 2008) Consequently, the local parties are more likely to court their core 
electorate through formulating narratives that fit with the overarching trends of 
public opinion in their support base. 
8.3 What impact has immigration had upon cultural politics in the 
ethnically defined party system in Northern Ireland?  
In a sub-state party system that is defined principally by an ethnic cleavage, cultural 
issues contribute the bread and butter of inter-party debate. Immigration changes 
the cultural landscape through contributing further strands of diversity into the 
society. We understand from our review of literature on multiculturalism that there 
are likely to be tensions between approaches to the accommodation of multi-
nationalism and that of immigrant-generated diversity in such settings (Kymlicka, 
1995; Parekh, 2006). What does our study into the Northern Irish experience of this 
type of cultural crossover tell us about the party political ramifications of changes in 
societal diversity? 
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One of the first things that became apparent in the Northern Irish context was the 
importance of the large/small axis of party competition. It was evident that the larger 
tribune parties which had benefitted most from exploiting the politics of bi-
nationalism had very little to say about the cultural impact of immigration. However, 
the smaller parties, who had fared less successfully in the cultural stand-off that 
characterised Northern Irish party politics, were keen to stress the importance of 
immigration in breaking down barriers and diluting ethnic division in the territory. 
Once again, this is best understood by reference to strategic considerations driving 
party competition in the territory. In this instance, the relevant axis of party 
competition is not the nationalist/unionist spectrum but the large/small division 
between the parties. A schism between those who have benefitted from the 
exploitation of cultural fissures, and those who have been marginalised by this type 
of politics, defines the direction of ideological positioning in this area of debate.  This 
split between the larger and smaller parties is further reinforced by the logic of the 
tribune strategy employed by Sinn Féin and the DUP.  These parties have prospered 
through the use of ethic defence strategies which focus upon the protection of their 
respective communities’ varieties of cultural celebration.  As a result of this, the larger 
parties extend the same logic when discussing measures to accommodate migrant 
groups.  
 
When we utilise the specific example of language politics, the large/small axis of 
party competition becomes less relevant. What we see here is evidence of the 
nationalist/unionist tribalism dominating the agenda. Despite the fact that Northern 
Ireland witnessed significant changes in its linguistic diversity during the period of 
the study, the discussion is nearly entirely dominated by claims related to the 
accommodation of the ‘two traditions’ and parity of esteem. When Sinn Féin discuss 
minority languages they clearly relegate migrant issues to a lower strata of 
importance than internal linguistic pluralism. In this sense, they adopt a variety of 
multiculturalism that favours internal minorities and subjects immigrants to 
assimilatory pressures (Parekh, 2006; Modood, 2007).  
 
Conversely, when unionists discuss migrant languages it is part of a blocking tactic 
to prevent progress on further support for Gaélic programmes. In this sense, the 
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ethnically defined parties are falling back onto comfortable ideological terrain; with 
wider diversity mainly invoked by unionists as part of a counter stratagem to the 
cultural politics of nationalism. It is only within the non-aligned pillar that broader 
language diversity is seriously discussed as part of the counterbidding strategy 
employed by the APNI.  
 
The drivers behind these strategies are the desire to gain popular support and the 
need to accommodate immigration issues within long-standing ideological positioning 
processes. Unionist and nationalist competition in the arena of language politics are 
marked by outbidding strategies. Trends in public opinion captured by the NILT 
survey data suggest that, particularly for unionists, compromise is unlikely to be 
rewarded by their electorate (NILT, 2007). Furthermore, the tendency of voters to 
seek strong advocates for their particular community highlights the utility of strong 
communal defence strategies for the ethnically defined parties (NILT, 2010). Hence, 
the overall picture suggests that immigration has had a relatively small impact on 
cultural politics in Northern Ireland. This further highlights the extent to which ethnic 
parties will adopt issues related to immigration within their wider platform if they are 
perceived to be of strategic value, but will ignore them if they do not fit within the 
parameters of established party competition (Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996). 
 
The manner in which the ‘two traditions’ stand-off in Northern Ireland has absorbed 
wider cultural issues suggests the effect of ‘swamping’ as described in the literature 
on multiculturalism (Modood, 2007). In this case, the needs of minorities are not only 
swept up by a singular societal culture, but they are caught in a conflict between two 
distinctive traditions. In an ideal world, it would be helpful if debates related to the 
Irish language and Ulster-Scots could become features in an overarching 
multicultural framework for the accommodation of linguistic diversity. However, in 
practice, the stakes in the cultural stand-off between Sinn Féin and the DUP are so 
high that this type of compromise is very unlikely.  
 
Finding a way through this deadlock is likely to take concerted political will over a 
significant period. In the meantime, there is very little support for migrant minority 
languages in the territory. While the children of immigrants are helped to integrate 
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in an assimilatory sense through learning English in schools, there is less help 
available for maintaining and widening language diversity in Northern Ireland. This 
highlights the need to provide clear separation between forms of cultural 
accommodation related to parity of esteem, and measures taken to promote the type 
of multicultural/intercultural integration that is alluded to in policy frameworks in 
Northern Ireland.  
8.4 Has immigration-generated diversity had a significant impact on 
inter-party debates related to racism and sectarianism in Northern 
Ireland?  
Existing literature suggests that discussions of racism in Northern Ireland have 
traditionally been relegated to a second tier status due to sectarianism dominating 
the political agenda (Hainsworth, 1998; McVeigh, 1998). However, with increasing 
immigration in the territory, there has been significant evidence of high-profile racist 
attacks taking place in areas marked by the presence of migrant communities. How 
then have politicians reacted to the undeniable evidence of racism in Northern Irish 
society? 
 
The findings from our case study suggest that some parties are keen to discuss 
racism and to highlight its presence as a major social issue facing the society. Other 
parties are less keen to discuss racism suggesting that it is a small problem and that 
it is a secondary issue to that of sectarianism. Within the unionist/nationalist 
spectrum of party competition, Sinn Féin have gained some degree of dominance 
over discussions of racism. The party has successfully taken the issue and fashioned 
it into a useful weapon with which to prosecute attacks on unionism.  
 
The fact that the majority of racist incidents have taken place in areas traditionally 
understood to be loyalist territories within the urban centres of Northern Ireland have 
clearly helped republicans to make this case (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007). Sinn Féin’s 
discursive themes tie in with established party narratives on the discriminatory 
nature of the Northern sub-state, the small-mindedness of loyalists, and the failure 
of political unionism to tackle prejudice in their community. Through adopting this 
approach, Sinn Féin have politicised the issue in an unhelpful fashion, negating the 
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possibility of consensual action on tackling racism during the period of our study. 
Unionist politicians take defensive measures against these attacks that serve to close 
down the debate, or to move discussions onto the theme of republican violence and 
the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Protestants in certain parts of Northern Ireland. This type of 
strategy ties racism in with some of the communal defence strategies that are a 
common feature of unionist political narratives (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). 
 
The drivers for this type of positioning are located in the party perceptions of public 
opinion. Whilst prejudice against immigrants is not the sole preserve of the Protestant 
community, survey data suggests that unionist voters are far more likely to be 
prejudiced than the nationalist electorate (Gilligan & Lloyd, 2006). The outcome of 
this means that whilst all parties share in condemnation of racist incidents, 
nationalists have far more freedom to engage with these issues than unionists. 
Consequently, we see Sinn Féin adapting racism to support political offensives, and 
unionists creating discursive barricades to repel such narratives. The effect of this 
has hampered the possibility for cross-party consensus on the rejection of racism, to 
transform into a united front in tackling it. 
 
However, whilst Sinn Féin enjoy a degree of issue ownership in the 
nationalist/unionist axis of ideological competition, this has been challenged by the 
APNI within the large/small party spectrum. The APNI crossover with nationalists on 
the suggestion that racism is a significant social problem in Northern Ireland, though 
they utilise this discursive theme in a different way. Firstly, APNI representatives tend 
to focus on the totality of racism including its low-level manifestations as well as 
high-profile, violent incidents. Secondly, APNI representatives utilise the issue to 
support attacks on the ethnic tribune parties for failing to overcome their differences 
in order to make progress in tackling racism. In this sense, blame is shifted from the 
unionist community as discussed in the narratives of Sinn Féin and placed equally 
upon both of the largest parties for their inability to negotiate successfully. 
Representatives of the SDLP and the UUP also utilised similar discursive themes to 
launch assaults on the Sinn Féin/DUP diarchy over the issue of racism. This 
development suggests some degree of strategic commonality between the smaller 
parties on the issue of racism.  
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A further feature that marked all of the parties’ discussions of racism to some extent, 
was a tendency to equate racism and sectarianism as ‘twin’ problems that should be 
addressed together. There is a significant body of literature that argues in favour of 
classifying sectarianism in Northern Ireland as a variety of racism (McVeigh, 2014; 
Gilligan, 2017). There is good reasoning behind this move, classifying sectarianism 
as an exceptional feature of Northern Irish society suggests some degree of 
acceptance about its inevitability. Furthermore, there are powerful arguments that 
separating sectarianism from racism removes the former from the standards of 
international human rights legislation. There are many good reasons why racism and 
sectarianism should be addressed as a singular issue. However, the evidence from 
this thesis highlights one of the key impracticalities associated with this approach.  
 
Sectarian issues come with a weight of history that add to the communicative 
deadlock in the arena of political debate. Racism serves to unite the parties in joined 
condemnation. In theory, it would seem that this consensus should make progress 
in tackling racism easier to achieve. However, because racism is utilised as an 
offensive resource by Sinn Féin, and twisted to form a defensive structure for 
unionists, racism has become swamped by longer standing sectarian rivalries in the 
realm of inter-party conflict. Consequently, while it may insult the desire for 
theoretical clarity expressed in the work of McVeigh (2014) and of Gilligan (2017) to 
split sectarianism from racism, it is a practical necessity if political elites are to offer 
joined-up leadership in tackling the problems faced by members of ethnic minority 
communities. In the political arena, decoupling racism and sectarianism is likely to 
diminish the extent to which racism becomes a resource in political antagonism. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in more than one area of scholarly debate. 
Through utilising a form of in-depth, thematic analysis to study the politics of 
immigration as they emerge in the context of an ethnically divided, sub-state, party 
system; the project captures the dynamic relationship between migration issues and 
ideological positioning in this context. Through combining this analytic method with 
an interpretive framework based broadly on Downsian theories of party competition, 
the thesis has employed a distinctive approach to the study of immigration politics in 
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Northern Ireland. This framework could be used as a basis for comparison with future 
projects carried out in similar settings. The thesis has highlighted the importance of 
inter-party positioning in determining the extent to which issues related to 
immigration-generated diversity will be addressed by political parties operating in 
ethnically defined party systems. We have illustrated the manner in which 
immigration issues become swords and shields in the arena of inter-party conflict. 
This has been highlighted through a dissection of two axes of party competition: 
unionist/nationalist; and, divisions between the smaller and larger parties.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to contributing a new case study to the emerging canon of 
comparative scholarship on immigration politics in sub-state settings, the thesis has 
carried out a detailed process of investigation that builds on existing literature on 
political parties in the specifically Northern Irish context. While the politics of 
immigration, cultural diversity and racism in Northern Ireland have been explored to 
some extent in established scholarship, there is no single body of work that studies 
all of these issues, in such depth, across the entire party system. In this sense, the 
thesis adds a distinctive perspective on the party politics of Northern Ireland during 
this period of widening diversity. This information will be of use to academics, policy-
makers, civil society organisations and students interested in developments in the 
recent history of Northern Irish party politics.      
 
In summary, the evidence collated in this thesis suggests that the impact of 
immigration on diversity politics in a sub-state, ethnically defined party system is 
likely to be somewhat limited. In the Northern Irish context between 2004 and 2014, 
there was evidence of changing cultural demography in the territory brought about 
by an increased tendency towards immigration. However, this was not mirrored by 
significant changes in inter-party positioning processes. While immigration has 
changed the cultural composition of the territory, political debates are largely 
dominated by long-standing divisions related to bi-national concerns in the territory. 
Furthermore, racist incidents have proven to be a recurring problem in Northern 
Ireland as immigration has become more commonplace. However, racism has also 
become enmeshed within traditional debates between the ethnically defined parties.  
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The primary impact of immigration has been to provide new weapons and novel 
defensive measures that the ethnically defined parties, in particular, have seized 
upon in order to gain competitive advantage in existing areas of inter-party conflict. 
Ultimately, there needs to be greater separation between issues that pertain 
specifically to the needs of immigrant minorities and historic inter-communal 
disputes. It is understood that this approach is problematic. To separate racism from 
sectarianism could well be argued to provide tacit acceptance of the latter. This is to 
suggest that because sectarianism is so ingrained, it should be left to one side and 
efforts focussed upon tackling racism against immigrant groups. Furthermore, to 
separate immigrant minority languages from the current quandary that marks 
political debates on Gaélic and Ulster-Scots could be argued to further preserve the 
glacial stand-off between political elites representing the two primary communities.  
 
These arguments are relevant and cannot be dismissed, but in the current climate, 
immigrant minorities are subjected to racism and to certain degrees of cultural 
swamping that cannot be addressed at the political level due to a prevailing discursive 
stalemate in the devolved institutions. If political leadership is to be forthcoming in 
these areas, it is necessary, at least in the short to medium term, to consciously seek 
separation between the politics of the ‘two traditions’ and matters related to wider 
cultural diversity.   
 
However, despite these useful contributions, it must be acknowledged that this study 
is limited in the sense that it has only provided a snapshot of a particular time-period. 
There is still potential for Northern Ireland to transform in ways that may change the 
manner in which political elites approach immigration-generated diversity, or perhaps 
to further entrench the bi-national nature of cultural politics in the territory. The 
following section will review a number of changes that have occurred since the period 
of this study and make calls for further research into the impact of these 
developments. The thesis is further bound by its focus on a singular territory. In order 
to establish whether the findings have relevance for other locations, they must be 
utilised as a component in comparative studies into the dynamics of immigration 
politics as they emerge in other sub-state, ethnically defined party systems. We will 
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turn first to examine certain developments in the Northern Irish context that merit 
further research. 
8.6 Developments and Opportunities for further research   
At time of writing the institutions and practice of devolution in Northern Ireland are 
suspended, with language one of the key stumbling blocks in talks aimed at forming 
a new executive. However, regardless of how negotiations progress, some of the 
issues discussed in this thesis should continue to form the basis for future pieces of 
research. This section highlights a handful of key factors that are likely to shape the 
future context of diversity and immigration politics in the territory: 
 
 Brexit: 
The outcome of the U.K. wide Brexit referendum has the potential to change 
the nature of border controls in the territory. Currently, there is no clear plan 
for how this is to be managed emerging in the negotiation process between 
the British government and the E.U. (Roberts et al. 2017). The fact that a 
majority in Northern Ireland voted to maintain membership of the E.U., and 
that there was a clear partisan split with nationalists favouring remain and 
unionists tending towards leave means that the issue is ripe for exploitation 
by ethnic entrepreneurs as a device in inter-party positioning processes 
(Garry, 2016). It remains to be seen what the outcome of this will be for the 
future of immigration into the territory. However, the issue of the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic will form a key factor in 
negotiations related to the British exit from the E.U.  
 
Obviously, the most pressing issue facing Northern Ireland with respect to 
Brexit is the issue of a potential hard-border and its impact on the provisions 
set out in the Agreement (McHugh, 2017). However, there are also 
implications for the future of diversity in Northern Ireland. Throughout the 
U.K., immigration has shown signs of slowing since the Brexit referendum 
(Hope & McCann, 2017). Similar dynamics are likely to impact on Northern 
Ireland reducing its desirability as a place for migrants to work and live. On 
the other hand, should a solution be found that keeps Northern Ireland within 
regulatory alignment with the E.U. it may become an increasingly attractive 
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place for immigrants seeking to enter the U.K. Studies focussing on the 
ramifications of Brexit in Northern Ireland should take into account the social, 
political and economic factors related to immigration in the territory.   
 
 Racism: 
While a racial equality strategy was eventually brought into effect in Northern 
Ireland, legislative progress has not been matched by developments in the 
wider society (OFMDFM, 2015). Racially motivated crimes have reduced 
slightly in the interim period but there are disproportionate numbers of 
incidents considering the relatively small numbers of ethnic minorities resident 
in Northern Ireland (PSNI, 2016). Debate on racism in Northern Ireland still 
seems to be dominated by the tendency to equate it as a twin problem with 
that of sectarianism. Further work in this area should seek to investigate the 
views of the members of ethnic minority communities in order to establish 
what measures they would like to see taken in order to tackle racism. This 
would help to separate racism from sectarianism and to tease out the 
challenges that are specifically faced by members of minority communities.      
 
 Language Diversity: 
The executive stand-off over minority languages in the territory has evolved 
to the point where it has undermined the possibility for power-sharing between 
Sinn Féin and the DUP (Emerson, 2017). At the time of writing, the deadlock 
between the two largest parties is preventing devolved governance in the 
territory. This situation has the potential to destabilise the limited truce that 
has been established in the territory. Furthermore, it offers no protection for 
linguistic diversity associated with migrant groups. Further research into the 
accommodation of linguistic diversity in the territory, should specifically 
consider what actions members of minority communities would like to see, in 
order to support language diversity in its widest sense. This information would 
provide a useful component in strategies to widen the debate over cultural 
accommodation in Northern Ireland. 
 
 Oppositional Politics: 
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One of the recurring factors that emerged in the findings was evidence of 
crossover between the smaller parties in their assessment of the cultural 
impact of immigration, and in their approaches to tackling racism. In several 
places, these party narratives unite in condemnation of their shared perception 
of an ethnic deadlock at the heart of government. Widening diversity clearly 
provides some form of discursive leverage for these parties to mount 
opposition to the ascendant position of the ethnic tribunes. In the current 
climate it seems unlikely that these elements of partial consensus, on the part 
of the smaller parties, will amount to an effective challenge on the dominance 
of Sinn Féin and the DUP. However, where such patterns are emerging they 
are built upon a shared recognition of wider diversity in Northern Irish society. 
The relationship between these areas of limited agreement and wider cultural 
diversity, may prove instrumental in affecting political change in Northern Irish 
society. Such areas are likely to continue to merit further research in the 
future.   
 
 Widening Comparison: 
So far the suggestions for further research have pertained specifically to the 
Northern Irish context. However, to support the overall body of scholarship on 
the effects of immigration on sub-state, ethnically defined party systems, we 
need to carry out similar in-depth studies of specific cases and to promote 
comparison between different contexts. It would be useful to carry out this 
type of qualitative research in similar party systems and to compare the results 
with the Northern Irish experience. This would enable us to examine the 
similarities and differences that emerge in these case studies. The 
particularities of the Northern Irish case make straight-forward comparative 
studies difficult to achieve. However, where there are ethnically divided party 
systems, constructed around bi-national fault-lines, accompanied by some 
degree of immigration, useful comparisons can be made. Similar studies have 
already been carried out in places such as Belgium and Canada, but so far 
there has been a relatively limited number of direct comparisons between 
these texts (Banting & Soroka, 2012; Dandoy, 2014). This is a gap that needs 
224 
  
 
to be filled in order to improve our understanding of immigration politics as it 
emerges in sub-state, ethnically defined party systems. 
 
8.7 Final Thoughts 
This thesis has painted a somewhat bleak picture of the potential for political change 
in Northern Ireland. We have detailed the power of ideological structures based on 
binary ethnic strategies to withstand demographic change, and indeed, to incorporate 
new issues into the linguistic arsenal available to the political parties as they mobilise 
exclusive communal appeals. This has implications for immigration into other 
territories marked by cultural fissures in the arena of party politics. Ethnically defined 
political parties tend to be well versed in arguments related to the accommodation of 
diversity and tackling discrimination; though their appeals are usually made on behalf 
of their particular community. Immigrant-generated diversity in this context is not 
so much a ‘drop in the ocean’ as a ‘drop between opposing waves’. 
 
The particular contours that demarcate the majority communities in Northern Ireland 
have been formed through a long historical process of interaction and conflict. 
Understandably, the idea of well-established cultural fault-lines being eroded by new 
forms of diversity is appealing, yet it is unrealistic in the near future. While the 
presence of immigrants is unlikely to seriously impact upon the binary nature of 
political conflict in the territory, migrant communities continue to form a distinctive 
part of the cultural tapestry of Northern Irish society. Furthermore, a significant 
minority of recent migrants have chosen to settle in the territory, meaning that wider 
diversity is likely to be a continuous feature of Northern Irish society in the future. 
Rather than using migrant groups as pawns in inter-party strategies, it would be 
welcome to see more political leadership devoted to formulating innovative, novel 
approaches to cultural accommodation that reflect the full scope of societal diversity. 
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Appendix 1: Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: 
   
It is important that you read, understand and sign the consent form.  Your contribution to this 
research is entirely voluntary and you are not obliged in any way to participate, if you require any 
further details please contact your researcher. 
I have been fully informed of the nature and aims of this research               □ 
  
I consent to taking part in it                           □ 
             
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the research at any time   □ 
without giving any reason                   
  
I give permission for my words to be quoted                                               □ 
  
I understand that the information collected will be kept in secure conditions    □ 
for a period of no more than five years at the University of Huddersfield      
      
I understand that no person other than the researcher and facilitator/s will    □ 
have access to the information provided.              
            
I understand that if I choose anonymity for the purposes of this study, my identity will be   
protected by the use of pseudonym in the report and that no written information that could lead to 
my being identified will be included in any report.                                                                 □ 
                                                                                                                                                  
I wish to remain anonymous                                                                          Yes:□          No: □    
 
(You will be given further opportunities to opt for anonymity later in the study)    
  
If you are satisfied that you understand the information and are happy to take part in this project 
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please put a tick in the box aligned to each sentence and print and sign below. 
 
Signature of Participant: 
 
 
 
Print: 
 
 
Date: 
 
 
Signature of Researcher: 
 
 
 
Print: 
 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
(one copy to be retained by Participant / one copy to be retained by Researcher) 
254 
  
 
Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
The Politics of Diversity in Northern Ireland 
 
INFORMATION SHEET  
 
You are being invited to take part in this study. Before you decide to take part it is important that 
you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read 
the following information carefully and discuss it with me if you wish.  Please do not hesitate to 
ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to consider whether immigration into Northern Ireland has had an 
impact on the way political representatives discuss issues associated with new forms of diversity. 
The study will compare the differing styles and views across the party spectrum in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
Why have I been approached? 
You have been asked to participate because you are a democratically elected representative and 
a member of a political party. This means that your views on the subjects discussed provide a 
valuable insight into this area of contemporary political debate in Northern Ireland.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not you take part.  If you decide to take part you will be asked to 
sign a consent form. You will be free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
What will I need to do? 
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If you agree to take part in the research you will be asked to participate in a short interview either 
face to face or over the telephone. The interview will ask you to discuss your background and 
your journey into politics before bringing in questions on language policy, cultural celebration, 
immigration and racism in Northern Ireland. Interviews will typically take around 30 minutes and 
will be arranged to minimise any inconvenience to yourself. Interviews will be recorded with your 
consent.  
 
Will my identity be disclosed? 
All personal information disclosed within the interview will be kept confidential. Anonymity can be 
assured, except where legal obligations would necessitate disclosure by the researcher to 
appropriate personnel. In practice this would only be in the case that this research uncovers 
evidence of illegal activity, or plans to engage in criminal actions in the future. This would require 
me to report any such findings to the police. 
 
What will happen to the information? 
It is anticipated that aspects of the research will, at some point, be published in an academic 
journal.  However, should this happen, your anonymity can be ensured, although it may be 
necessary to use your words in the presentation of the findings and your permission for this is 
included in the consent form. 
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
If you require any further information about the research, please contact me and I will be happy 
to discuss any concerns you may have. Please find my contact details enclosed below 
 
Gavin Hart 
 
Post-Graduate Reseacher 
University of Huddersfield 
Human and Health Sciences Research Building 
HD1 3DH 
 
E-mail: u0052672@hud.ac.uk 
Mobile: 07412 992 305 
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Appendix 3: Interview Template 
General 
How long have you been involved with the party? 
How did you become involved with politics/your party? 
Culture 
How would you describe your cultural heritage/background? 
Is your culture recognised and respected in the current political settlement? 
Language 
Should the state support minority languages? 
Should state funding be allocated to promote the Gaelic language? 
Should state funding be allocated to promote Ulster-Scots? 
What about Mandarin/Cantonese? Or Polish?/other languages 
Immigration 
In what ways has immigration changed Northern Ireland? 
Negative/positive factors?  
Has your constituency been affected? 
Do your constituents consider immigration an important issue? 
What are the effects on the local economy? 
Welfare 
Should economic migrants have access to welfare rights? 
What responsibilities do economic migrants have to the rest of the community? 
Racism 
Is racism a major issue in Northern Ireland? 
Is racism becoming more or less common? 
Do you see a connection between racism and sectarianism? 
What are your views on the racial equality strategy? 
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Appendix 4: Data Matrix Example 
Due to the sheer size of the spreadsheets employed in order to analyse the data it is 
impossible to adequately capture the full scope of detail. The tables below are 
designed to provide an impression of some of the analytical procedures that took 
places in order to arrive at the themes that were discussed throughout the thesis. 
The following images provide snippets of the manner in which Sinn Féin and the DUP 
discussed the work ethic of immigrants in Northern Ireland. The tables highlight the 
manner in which the parties agreed about the strong work ethic of immigrants, 
though Sinn Féin representatives coupled this up with discussions of the Irish 
diaspora. Similar forms of tabular comparison were used throughout the analytic 
process in order to establish themes from the coded fragments. 
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